



AIR
UNIVERSITY

review

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1983



reflections on a rude and barbarous kingdom

Whether the Soviet air defense apparatus believed it was tracking an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft or knew it was after a civilian airliner, the fate of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 weaves well into the warp and woof of Russian history. The remark by the Soviet officer who praised the Sukhoi pilot for his heroic act in defense of the “sacred borders” of Russia emerges more from the history of Russia than from ideology gone mad or technology gone astray.

Past, present, and future are related in the tragic complexity of history and ideology that have become the Soviet Union. What sixteenth-century English travelers to Muscovy described as a “rude and barbarous kingdom” is, for all its advances in science and experimentation with the social order, very much the same as it was under Ivan the Terrible. To comprehend the Soviet Union, one must first understand Russia. Coming to grips with the rude and barbarous kingdom may well be the most important task facing the American military.

Warfare is more than a contest between armies, air forces, and navies. Preparing for war goes beyond learning orders of battle, capabilities of weapon systems, and speculating on the course of enemy research and development. Warfare is, after all, a struggle between societies with political, economic, ideological, as well as military aspects. To understand the Soviet Union in terms of its instruments of war is to master only a part of the equation. The key to why Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down can be found in the study of Russian history as much as it can be deciphered in the workings of the Soviet Air Force air defense system.

The concept of the sacred borders of Mother Russia reflects a xenophobic paranoia experienced by travelers from the sixteenth century to the present. Russia’s tragic yet heroic past is a fundamental part of the Soviet Union. History, geography, religion, and a parade of brutal, sometimes great, rulers shaped Russia long before the German Karl Marx wrote *Das Kapital* in the British Museum.

Stalin fused Marxist-Leninist dogma to the potential of Russia to set the world on a new course. The challenge to the military professional in the democratic West is to look beyond the weapon inventory lists that too often comprise the way we perceive the “Soviet threat” to ask the important questions concerning the why and the how of the forces at work in Mother Russia. Formulating the right questions is the difficult part. Learning all that one can about Russia is the way to begin.

E.H.T.

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
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COEXISTENCE AND SUCCESSION: THREE LOOKS BACKWARD AND ONE STEP FORWARD

DR. GARY L. GUERTNER

THE death of Leonid Brezhnev completed an ongoing process of internal maneuvering and patronage that has evidently produced a successor with a strong political base. The elevation of Yuri Andropov to General-Secretary only two days after Brezhnev's death suggests early and skillful maneuvering in what appears to be as close to an "orderly" succession as any in Soviet history. In the West, the new leadership has sent Soviet specialists scurrying to read Andropov's speeches for clues about the future of Soviet-American relations.

Assessing Soviet behavior can be tedious, and,

at best, only tentative conclusions can be reached. There are the predictable problems of holding a closed society up to the light of academic scrutiny. Facts are withheld or incomplete, misleading, and even false information is published in Soviet source materials. Compounding these difficulties are the complex biases and preconceived ideas about Soviet intentions held by many Americans toward our long-term rival. Analysis often begins from these two levels of darkness.

Kremlinologist Marshall Shulman recently made an important distinction on this problem. Kremlinology, he argued, is the effort to gain




informed intuitions about the Kremlin's inner politics. It is useful but amounts to little more than guesswork. Soviet studies, on the other hand, seek to understand what has happened in the past and why. This, according to Professor Shulman, is the more reliable approach since it reveals a great deal about "patterns of conduct." In other words, leadership transitions are important but only to the extent that they tell us something about policy transitions, which is the subject of this essay.

Before looking into the future of Soviet-

American relations, it is important to take a backward glance and reflect on patterns of conduct during and after the previous three succession periods. Specifically, this will include the evolving Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence and its probable evolution in the post-Brezhnev era.

The Soviet perception of peaceful coexistence with the West changed dramatically from the periods of Lenin to Stalin, from Stalin to Khrushchev, and from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Without these changes, Soviet-American relations



would be even more tense than they are today. If the past is a faithful indicator, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Brezhnev's successors will move rapidly to improve relations with the West. Western leaders should be cautious, perhaps even skeptical, toward future Soviet initiatives. They should not, however, reject Soviet initiatives out of hand or miss opportunities that might have a positive effect on turning Soviet priorities and resources inward toward their considerable social and economic problems. Looking at the past may offer insights and suggest strategies for future Soviet-American relations.

Lenin: Flexibility and Pessimism toward the West

Lenin and his published legacy play an important role in legitimizing contemporary policy-making. Soviet leaders must find him to be an uncertain compass, since he was both dogmatic and flexible. This apparent contradiction can be partially resolved if one distinguishes between propaganda and doctrine and between the rhetoric of a leader out of power and that of a leader in power. His collective literature, which forms a great deal of Communist doctrine and ideology in foreign affairs, consists of published articles, speeches, and testimony made in defense of or opposition to specific policies of a particular period. It is not surprising that political assumptions changed from one period to another and from one generation of leaders to another after Lenin in response to new challenges. Soviet ideology did not fall from on high into the hands of its architects; rather, as a recent text observes, "it evolved out of the crucible of the political struggles in which its proponents were engaged."¹

For this reason, Soviet propaganda has historically fluctuated widely over short periods of time. Basic doctrines and concepts such as economic laws of capitalism, capitalist hostility, or peaceful coexistence, however, change less frequently and usually over longer periods. When changes in Soviet doctrine do occur, they are significant. The doctrinal modifications in Soviet

concepts of peaceful coexistence have played a central role in their approach to East-West relations. This role from Lenin through Brezhnev may provide insights to the problems and direction of the new leadership.

Lenin was the first but not the last Soviet leader to modify the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Lenin's doctrine was the inevitable outgrowth of his adaptations of Marxism to Russia and the world as he saw it.

Marxist theories explained the internal affairs of capitalist states. These theories predicted that capitalism would fall through its own internal contradictions and that communism would ultimately pervade the world as its successor. Capitalism's fall was not only desirable but demonstrably inevitable, according to Marx's "scientific laws." Through his angry genius, Lenin and other Marxists saw a powerful economic base capable of high-mass production but with its entire superstructure resting on the backs of an impoverished working class. High-mass production combined with poverty and low consumption contributed to social chaos, depression, and monopoly capitalism. Inevitably capitalism would breed its successor as the masses would rise up and through proletarian revolution combine industrial production with equitable distribution through a socialist society.² Lenin's most significant contribution to Marxism was the extension of his theories to explain international relations. In effect, Lenin turned Marxism into a major theory of foreign policy. In his essay, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Lenin explained that not only was capitalism exploitive to its own working class, but it also required international expansion. It is important to remember that Lenin expressed these views in 1916, before any Communist states were in existence.

Imperialism, he argued, produced an international system in which capitalist states shared a common socioeconomic structure that fed on competition and conflict for overseas markets, colonies, and raw materials. Wars were inevitable as long as capitalist states existed. Lenin saw

World War I in precisely these terms. Only socialist revolutions throughout the capitalist-state system could rid the world of its major source of conflict. That struggle could begin in the exploited nations on which capitalist societies depended for their stability. Break the system's weakest chain through revolution and wars of liberation and the entire structure of capitalism would fall. One spark would precipitate continuous revolution. For Lenin, the first spark was Russia.

Lenin's success in leading the first socialist revolution produced substantial modifications in his theories. At the time, Lenin and his followers gave revolution in Russia great importance because they saw it as the beginning of revolution everywhere. Victory through the revolutionary efforts of respective Communist parties would occur country by country.

The role of the first socialist state was not made explicit in Lenin's prescription. His doctrine held that revolution as such was not exportable. It must be generated initially from within when "objective conditions" were present. At minimum, these conditions included a system of socio-economic exploitation and widespread class consciousness and opposition. The first socialist state could aid and abet revolutions elsewhere but nothing in Marxist-Leninist theory required that it initiate war. As both world wars have demonstrated, successful Communist revolution has grown out of "other peoples" wars.

It is true that during the Russian Revolution and civil war Lenin saw armed conflict between communism and capitalism as inevitable. He saw a role for Soviet arms in that struggle, but it is necessary to place those declarations in their historical context. Lenin made his most bellicose statements during the revolution, at a time when forces from Western nations, including U.S. forces, were occupying parts of Russia, and when Lenin naïvely believed that the fall of capitalism generally was right around the corner.

By 1921, Lenin saw that the stability of capitalism was a long-run phenomenon. The precarious situation inside the new Soviet state

required and gave rise to the notion of peaceful coexistence with capitalism. Peaceful coexistence was never explicitly developed in detail by either Lenin or Stalin. In fact, both Soviet leaders used the term only rarely. Rather, the policy was implicit in Soviet priorities and in their skillful application of realpolitik. Coexistence was essential not only for building the political and economic power of the state but also to keep the flame of revolution alive lest capitalist hostility be provoked to crush the revolution during its most formative and vulnerable stage. Coexistence with the West was a short-term tactic required by internal weakness. In the long term the Soviet view of the world continued to be based on the concept of capitalist hostility and the inevitability of war so long as capitalism existed. This concept was to remain a pivotal part of Soviet foreign policy.³

Lenin had begun the turn toward consolidating internal power. That, in turn, required placing Soviet national interests above proletarian internationalism. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence could never have survived its many internal critics if national priorities did not continue to be preminent in Soviet thinking. Stalin was even more insistent on these priorities. He looked inward with such vengeance that all efforts to build communism with a "human face" were swept aside. It is the Stalin legacy that dominates American perceptions of communism and remains the predominant backdrop to contemporary Soviet-American relations.

Stalin: Pessimism and Brutality

Lenin's death in January 1924 accelerated a succession struggle that had begun in earnest more than a year earlier following Lenin's first stroke, which had effectively removed him from public life. Lenin's policies after the bloody three-year civil war in the Soviet Union were models of compromise and moderation compared with what was to follow. It was this contrast in policies that prompted Winston Churchill to observe that two great tragedies had befallen

Russia: "The first was Lenin's birth; the second, his death."

Lenin, aged 52 when he suffered his first stroke, was referred to as the "old man" by the 26-member Central Committee whose average age was only 38. The "old Bolsheviks" were youthful revolutionaries in comparison with the mean age of 69 years for members of the "contemporary" Politburo.

Few in the West would have predicted Stalin's rise to power. He maintained a low profile while Lenin was alive. The tyrant that emerged with such force lay dormant in the master bureaucrat and organizer who built a party apparatus with loyalties to himself. Opposition was overwhelmed and eventually destroyed.⁴

Issues as well as organizational skill played a critical role in the struggle for party leadership. None was more important than the concept of peaceful coexistence implicit in the debate between Stalin and Leon Trotsky over the proper relationship of the new Soviet state and the non-Communist world. Trotsky argued that Russia could not on its own build a complete socialist state. That would have to await the spread of revolution to industrialized states in Europe. Moreover, the proper role of the Soviet state was to aid and abet such revolutions.

Stalin countered Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" with his idea of "socialism in one country." Stalin insisted that not only was it possible to build socialism in the Soviet Union, but it was also a necessity if the proletariat were to survive in a world of hostile and temporarily stabilized capitalist states.⁵

Stalin's argument for domestic priorities was far more attractive than the dimly held light at the end of Trotsky's very long path to socialism. Trotsky argued for more and more revolutions before socialism could be secure. Stalin offered respite to an exhausted people after a long war and revolution. Trotsky's enemies openly worried that Lenin's former Commissar of War with his forceful personality and ties to the generals would become a Bolshevik Napoleon.⁶ Stalin's formula implicitly rejected the idea

that revolutionary war would be initiated by Russia's proletariat to assist Europeans in overthrowing capitalism. His ruthless policies to develop "socialism in one country" were legitimized by a world view based on a series of mutually reinforcing propositions that all led to the same gloomy conclusion: the Soviet Union was surrounded by capitalist enemies with whom no real cooperation was possible since they were dedicated to the destruction of the world's first socialist state.⁷

Stalin divided the world into two camps, socialist and capitalist. The logic of "socialism in one country" was to buy time and build the strength of the Soviet camp. "Capitalist encirclement" and "capitalist hostility" made war inevitable although not necessarily imminent. In the meantime, peaceful coexistence and cautious diplomacy were required to avoid provoking conflict with capitalist powers.

The final victory of socialism in the Soviet Union was defined by Stalin as the achievement of sufficient security to prevent the restoration of capitalism. To accomplish this, Stalin argued, "it is necessary for the present capitalist encirclement to be replaced by a socialist encirclement."

It is important to recognize the thrust of Stalinist strategic thought. Its preoccupation with conflict, danger, and external aggression aimed at the Soviet state made the development of a general and active strategy of peaceful coexistence impossible. Peaceful coexistence was simply the prerequisite for economic reconstruction and the development of Soviet power. Stalin's world view legitimized repression at home and diplomatic flexibility abroad.

Stalin's pragmatic diplomacy rested on his thesis of capitalist encirclement and hostility toward the Soviet state. But it was also true, according to orthodox Leninism, that conflict still existed among capitalist states. These schisms could be skillfully exploited to prevent a united capitalist front against the Soviet state. Realpolitik more than coexistence with or revolution within individual capitalist states became

the most salient feature of Stalin's diplomacy. Stalin's peaceful coexistence was based on short term, tactical alliances, not on optimistic hope that peace would prevail in the long run.

The pattern was very clear. Stalin continued the diplomatic pattern established in 1922 with the signing of a diplomatic and commercial treaty with the Germans at Rapallo.⁸ The two pariahs of Europe emerged from isolation with a diplomatic partner to play off against the French and Great Britain. The Treaty of Rapallo resulted in more than a decade of Soviet-German cooperation that included secret military collaboration. Ironically, the German army, with the aid of the Soviet army, bypassed the provisions of Versailles and experimented with new weapons on Soviet territory. Strengthening the German army was hardly a wise strategy for any Soviet leader who placed a high priority on the future prospects of the German Communists' seizing power.

Stalin's use of foreign Communist parties is worth noting. Many Westerners feared them for their revolutionary potential. Stalin was often believed to be pursuing a dual-track foreign policy: Proper official diplomacy through the foreign office and subversion through his control of Communist "fifth columns." In fact, both structures tended to support the same track. Stalin turned the Comintern (Communist International) into little more than an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. The role of foreign Communists in a particular country was largely conditioned by the degree of friendliness or hostility of that country toward the Soviet state. This was hardly the role of "general staff for revolution" originally conceived by Lenin and Trotsky.

Stalin's political agility was especially dramatic following Western appeasement of Hitler at Munich. From Moscow, appeasement appeared to come at the expense of Soviet security since it brought the German army closer to the Soviet border. Stalin countered the following year with the infamous Nazi-Soviet Pact which, in effect, turned back the Nazis onto the West at

a time when Stalin's diplomatic initiatives toward Great Britain and France were stalled.⁹

Soviet historians argue that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a skillful move on Stalin's part that bought time to prepare for the anticipated Nazi onslaught. The timing of the Nazi attack in June 1941 was apparently a tactical surprise. The offensive itself was not a strategic surprise. The elaborate military buildup and the defensive barriers constructed in the western military districts prior to the attack lend credence to the Soviet version of events.¹⁰ For those who doubt the strategic potency of diplomacy, it is also worth noting that during the final months of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin also signed a non-aggression pact with Japan. The significance of a one-front war for the Soviets should not be lost on U.S. policymakers observing the current pattern of initiatives toward normalizing relations with China.

The Grand Alliance with Western democracies forged military victory, but this coalition formed of military necessity failed to become a permanent structure for building or consolidating peaceful coexistence. The Cold War years of Stalin's reign saw him revive the old "two camps" thesis with its message about the danger of a capitalist attack against the Soviet Union.

A year before his death, Stalin presented a somber reiteration of war's inevitability so long as capitalism and imperialism existed. In a more optimistic vein, however, he modified the traditional "two camps" model of international conflict and set the stage for his successors to play a more assertive role in foreign affairs.¹¹ At the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party, Stalin announced an end to the long period of building socialism in one country. The "ebb tide of revolution" had been replaced by a "flow tide." As a result, he urged an abandonment of the essentially defensive policy that had been followed since 1921 and the beginning of a more assertive foreign policy.

The more aggressive posture was made possible, according to Stalin (in his speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress), by the economic

and military recovery of the Soviet Union, the consolidation of communism in Eastern Europe and China, and, perhaps most important of all, by the growth of revolutionary movements in the Third World. The Soviets could exploit this by "picking up the banner of nationalism where it had been dropped by the bourgeoisie." This would promote Soviet security by breaking up or preventing the consolidation of anti-Soviet alliances and hasten the collapse of capitalism in general. But even these improved geopolitical developments did not alter Stalin's perceived threat and permanent enmity of the remaining members of the capitalist world.

Stalin conceived this new offensive in nonmilitary terms. The party line he laid down was carried out almost immediately by his successors. One of them, however, was to carry out major revisions to the theoretical assumptions laid down by both Lenin and Stalin.

Khrushchev: Optimism and Revisionism

Georgi Malenkov seemed the likely successor to Stalin, since he assumed the posts of both Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the government and Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. Within two weeks, however, Malenkov was "released" from his duties on the Central Committee, leaving Nikita Khrushchev as de facto First Secretary of the Party.¹² In retrospect, the removal of Malenkov was the key event in the post-Stalin succession, for Khrushchev was able to strengthen his power base and outmaneuver his rivals. Before the year's end, Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's head of the feared secret police, was arrested and shot. By 1955, Malenkov resigned from his remaining post. Khrushchev had chosen his issues carefully to build a winning coalition within the party. He had asserted strong support for heavy industry and (like Andropov) support for the military. On other issues he played the role of "centrist" or innovator.¹³

As we watch the current succession to Brezhnev unfold, it is important to remember that no

one in the West, based on Khrushchev's rise to power, could have predicted the doctrinal revisions he would develop. These were first elaborated in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956.

Khrushchev's first revision was based on the growing nuclear arms race and the danger of nuclear war with the United States. He needed to establish an ideological basis for the existence of a long-term relationship between communism and capitalism that would not lead to war. Khrushchev, like the deposed Malenkov, believed that nuclear weapons had fundamentally altered the nature of international conflict. Nuclear war would result in the "mutual destruction" of both Communist and capitalist societies.

Once the new Soviet leader had taken the position that nuclear war would destroy Communist society, it became imperative to revise the Leninist theory of the inevitability of war lest he end up with a theory of inevitable doom. This Khrushchev skillfully did by asserting:

As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive towards military gambles and aggression, and may try to unleash war. *But war is not fatalistically inevitable.*¹⁴

Khrushchev had reversed both Lenin and Stalin by declaring that capitalism no longer meant the inevitability of war. Peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems could become a permanent feature of international politics rather than a short-term tactic.

The basic aggressive nature of capitalism had not changed. What had changed was the fundamental nature of war that allowed the Soviet Union to deter or perhaps even defeat aggression. In Khrushchev's words, "Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war." Khrushchev later added that "capitalist encirclement" no longer existed and, furthermore, the "final" victory of socialism had been achieved. "The danger of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union is ruled out. This means that

the triumph of socialism is not only complete, but final."¹⁵

Khrushchev's theory of peaceful coexistence was the beginning of an active, optimistic, and purposeful strategy. It was no longer the tactical necessity of Stalin's "socialism in one country." Peaceful coexistence rested on the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet state. It did not, however, mean reconciliation of the two hostile systems. The class struggle would continue but at a more regulated and less dangerous level of confrontation.

Support for the class struggle through wars of national liberation but rejection of wars between states was a clear theoretical distinction made in Khrushchev's theory. The former would continue, as would the obligation of the Soviet Union to support them. It was never made clear precisely how the Soviets would support wars of national liberation.

A corollary to the theory of peaceful coexistence was Khrushchev's optimistic assertion that Communist revolution could be brought about by peaceful means. "Our enemies," he argued, "like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence always and everywhere. . . . It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society." He went on to describe how the working classes might transform "bourgeois democracy" into the instrument of the "people's will."

The right-wing bourgeois parties and their governments are suffering bankruptcy with increasing frequency. In these circumstances the working class, by rallying around itself the working peasantry, the intelligentsia, all patriotic forces, and resolutely repulsing the opportunist elements who are incapable of giving up the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the interests of the people, to capture a stable majority in parliament, and transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will.¹⁶

In another theme directed more perhaps at his home audience, Khrushchev appealed to Soviet workers to increase productivity until the Soviet

system demonstrated its superiority by outstripping the West economically. This "competitive coexistence" would, in turn, demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet system to others, especially in the Third World where it might be emulated.¹⁷

Winning power through parliamentary majorities or model emulation were clear departures from Lenin's view that war or violent revolution were the midwives of social change. What Khrushchev was struggling to define through doctrinal revisions were the means for advancing communism in the nuclear age and in the face of Western military superiority. He provided a formula for peace that did not require a stalemate in the class struggle.

It is ironic that the reception of Khrushchev's revisions in both China and the United States ranged from skepticism to hostility. Chinese leaders feared that Soviet timidity would slow the world revolutionary movement. Publicly, they saw nuclear weapons as a means for advancing world communism. Privately, they may have been more concerned that the Soviet leader had, in effect, removed their protective, nuclear umbrella at a time of intense hostilities in Sino-American relations. There was good cause to question the value of an alliance with the Soviets in the event of war with the United States. Khrushchev's revisionism sounded very much as if the Soviets were prepared to leave their Chinese brethren "twisting in the west wind."

In the United States, Khrushchev's reversal of the inevitability of war went largely unnoticed. Instead, Americans saw his support for wars of national liberation as a threatening new means for escalating the global struggle. For Americans, the linkage of Soviet activities in the Third World was a pivotal part of Soviet-American relations. Protracted conflict, even at a low level of intensity, was not a sphere of activity governed by a different set of laws. For President Kennedy, Khrushchev's challenge was one of the major threats faced by the new administration. Our early involvement in Vietnam can be traced to Kennedy's belief that Southeast Asia represented

a test case for the future success or failure of wars of national liberation.¹⁸

There were compelling reasons for American skepticism of peaceful coexistence. In practice, the Soviets were discriminating in supporting only those struggles that seemed to enjoy Lenin's criteria for "objective conditions." This meant that "progressive forces" had to be either already in power or very likely to achieve it in the short term. But Soviet support ranged far beyond political endorsements and model emulation. Soviet strategy included massive arms support, advisers, and, more recently, surrogate military forces. It is also true that successive U.S. administrations have credited the Soviets with more power and influence than they have actually enjoyed in directing change in a politically intractable and nationalistic Third World.

Nikita Khrushchev presided over a remarkable period of ideological and conceptual innovation. He might have succeeded in forging a new and less tense era. The fact that he managed some of the most severe crises of the Cold War demonstrates the problem that continues to plague Soviet-American relations. How can the Soviets embrace a "science" of history that prescribes sharp political, economic, and ideological struggles between capitalism and communism while precluding military conflict between states that embrace the contending systems?

Brezhnev: Realpolitik and Military Power

No bill of particulars was ever articulated in the Soviet Union to explain Khrushchev's removal. But his colleagues evidently feared he was moving too far, too fast, on too many fronts. There may well have been widespread agreement after the Cuban missile crisis that the unfavorable strategic military balance threatened the source of Soviet power on which Khrushchev had built his theoretical revisions. Cuba may well have reminded them of Stalin's cynical observation: "You'll see, when I am gone the imperialist powers will wring your necks like chickens."¹⁹

In October 1964, a vacationing Khrushchev was informed that his colleagues were to install a more "stable" team of leaders. He received the news while conversing with two orbiting cosmonauts.²⁰ With a final message to outer space, Nikita Khrushchev "retired" to the sudden obscurity that only the Soviet system could provide.

Brezhnev had been a protégé of Khrushchev. Western newsmen had once asked who would replace him as first secretary if he died. "Brezhnev," was his insightful answer.²¹ Khrushchev's forced departure was followed by what appeared from the outside to be a collective leadership. Four dominant leaders emerged from the seven members of the Politburo who survived politically into the post-Khrushchev period. Brezhnev at age 58 became Party Secretary, Aleksei Kosygin headed the State bureaucracy as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Podgorny headed the State as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Mikhail Suslov carried on as guardian of party ideology through his functions as Secretary of the Central Committee.

These four presented a common front and a return to normalcy. How contested the internal struggle for dominance was is not known, but it is clear that like all previous leaders, Brezhnev as First Secretary of the party was best positioned to consolidate his personal power. This he did, but only after a period of more than ten years. His dominant position became clear by the Twenty-fifth Party Congress (1976) where he was given top military rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union, and his position as Chairman of the powerful Defense Council was publicly acknowledged for the first time. The following year, Podgorny was removed as President, and Brezhnev became both head-of-state and party leader.

The policy transition that accompanied Brezhnev's rise to power shows considerable modification from the Khrushchev period. Peaceful coexistence remained as Khrushchev had defined it but with substantial de-emphasis in policy priorities. When the goals of Soviet foreign policy were listed in Brezhnev's speeches, peaceful coexistence was often ranked last, behind proletarian

internationalism, building communism in the Soviet Union, and building the strength of world socialism.

Building the strength of socialism seemed especially important to the new Soviet leadership. It is essential to remember that Khrushchev built his theories on the foundation of growing Soviet military power, especially nuclear weapons. He seems also to have made greater claims for that power than were justified at the time. The shortcomings of Soviet power were revealed during the Cuban missile crisis. Determined never to be so vulnerable again, Khrushchev's successors expanded Soviet military programs. These programs produced steady and dramatic increases in Soviet strategic forces during the late 1960s while the United States was preoccupied in Vietnam (testing theories of national liberation).

By 1971 the Soviet Union had equaled and then surpassed the United States in the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The United States retained its strategic advantages in other areas, but it was clear to everyone that the Soviets had overcome the military and political disadvantages that they may have associated with our strategic nuclear preeminence. "Strategic equivalence," much like the original Soviet deployment of strategic nuclear weapons under Khrushchev, accompanied a new Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence, this time under the rubric of *détente*.

The strategic nuclear buildup was accompanied by a severe downgrading of the importance attached to economic competition. Under Khrushchev, economic competition or "competitive coexistence" played a major part in East-West relations. He argued in the strongest possible terms that the Soviet Union would fulfill its obligation to proletarian internationalism by defeating the West in the battle of economic indices. The Brezhnev leadership had no such faith in economic competition.

Ironically, military priorities contributed substantially to the inability to compete or improve the living standards of the Soviet people. Greatly increased military capabilities under Brezhnev

became the principle substitute for a growing inability to compete with the West in any other arena. Military might is the one symbol that continues to confer superpower status.

Strategic parity brought with it other challenges to Soviet foreign policy that were best served by *détente* in the early 1970s. It remained imperative to the Soviets to avoid a nuclear confrontation with the United States. Trade and technology were required by an unsound and declining economy. *Détente* also served to limit collusion between the United States and China. Even so, *détente*, like coexistence, did not end the class struggle. According to one widely circulated text in the '70s:

Peaceful coexistence is a principle of relations between states which does not extend to relations between the exploited and the exploiters, the oppressed peoples and the colonialists. . . . Marxist-Leninists see in peaceful coexistence a special form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the world, a principle whose implementation ensures the most favorable conditions for the world revolutionary process.²²

The widely circulated endorsements of peaceful coexistence through *détente* exemplified the Soviet ideal of East-West relations. *Détente* served the security interests of the Soviet state while increasing the opportunities for peaceful socialist construction elsewhere.

The dual track diplomacy of *détente* and endorsement of the world revolutionary process may have been the Soviet ideal. In the United States, this era of negotiation that accompanied the winding down of American participation in the Vietnam War was to be played by a different set of rules. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy offered concessions in trade, credits, technology, arms control, and European security provided the Soviets made concessions in areas of vital interest to the United States. These concessions were inevitably linked to Soviet behavior both at home (human rights) and abroad (Third World intervention).²³

Even though *détente* resulted in five Soviet-American summits and more than two dozen

formal agreements, no consensus on permanent rules of the game were established. The cracks in détente were exposed where Soviet activities in the Third World collided with American theories of linkage politics. Soviet doctrine made it clear that peaceful coexistence combined cooperation with competition. Its competitive aspects were aimed at limiting Western influence and, if possible, increasing Soviet influence throughout the globe. The waning of détente began over issues of human rights and the failure to ratify SALT II, but the critical blow was wielded by Soviet policies in Africa and the invasion of Afghanistan.

Brezhnev presided over both the high and low periods of détente. His final party Congress in February 1981 reaffirmed the policies of détente and pledged to cooperate with the United States in reestablishing superpower dialogue at the highest level.²⁴ The direction and substance of that dialogue will be subjected to the intrigues and power struggles of the Brezhnev succession.

Andropov: Reform or Repression?

At this writing Yuri Andropov appears firmly established in all three of Brezhnev's former positions: Party Secretary, Chairman of the Defense Council, and State President, a largely ceremonial post but one with added prestige and authority in foreign affairs.

Much has been made of his former role as Head of Soviet Internal Security in paving his way to power, but it is probably inaccurate to base predictions on his future policies on any negative associations with the KGB. While these contacts make him a well-informed leader, they apparently have not resulted in dogmatism or ideological orthodoxy. In fact, the death of Mikhail Suslov, the last of the rigid Stalin-era ideologues in February 1982, removed what may have been the most formidable opposition to Andropov's successful drive within the Politburo structure.

Andropov's early speeches predictably pledged to base policies on "the invincible might" of the

Soviet military. These capabilities are to be retained in support of what Andropov later developed as a major endorsement of peaceful coexistence. On 22 November, in his first speech as top party leader before the party's Central Committee he stated:

We are deeply convinced that the 70s, characterized by détente, were not—as is asserted today by certain imperialist leaders—a chance episode in the difficult history of mankind. No, the policy of détente is by no means a past stage. *The future belongs to this policy.*²⁵

Andropov's strong endorsement of peaceful coexistence and his assertion that there are no acceptable alternatives are a positive sign at this early stage of succession. His pledge to retain Soviet military power is not inconsistent with his early effort to show a conciliatory face to both the West and China. Once political power is consolidated, the Soviet military should not be regarded as an irresistible force given the magnitude of domestic problems the new leadership has inherited. Andropov referred explicitly to many of these problems. The obligatory clichés of communism's triumph over capitalism were dropped in favor of a critical examination of Soviet economic deficiencies. He spoke of "initiatives and enterprise," of greater decentralization, and studying "the experience of fraternal countries." He spoke of the need for incentives for workers and for placing policy personnel correctly so the best workers and scientists were in a position to aid economic growth. This last statement is intriguing for its potential challenge to a Soviet tradition of granting defense industries first call on the Soviet "best and brightest."²⁶

With a declining economy, unrestrained military growth cannot be sustained without at least intermediate efforts to reform and stimulate economic growth. For an economy approximately 60 percent as large as that of the United States, to make progress on issues ranging from such basics as food, consumer goods, health, and housing to more complex issues that include restive nationalities in the U.S.S.R., unstable allies in Eastern Europe, and dependent clients in the

Third World will require all of Secretary Andropov's administrative skills. Further repressing of Soviet citizens will not solve these problems. Dissent does not express itself on Moscow streets. Political activism is sublimated often in the form of apathy, indolence, and alcoholism throughout Russian society. These are not the symbols of a strong economy or powerful state. The former head of the KGB confessed that he "did not have ready recipes" for solving Soviet economic problems. From the tone of his early speeches and in spite of police crackdowns against truant workers, Soviet labor may have less to fear than corrupt and inept bureaucrats from Andropov's initial wielding of "carrots and sticks." At age 69 and in poor health, Andropov does not have the ten years it took to consolidate the Brezhnev era. He appears to be prepared to move quickly at home and abroad to liquidate weak positions. Early overtures to China, India, Pakistan, and the West indicate efforts to realign diplomatic and military strength for future cooperation or conflict with the United States. That future rests primarily on progress in strategic and theater arms reductions and in developing general ground rules for mutual conduct in the Third World.

In retrospect, Soviet leaders have embraced the strategy of peaceful coexistence first as a shield that protected the development of "socialism in one country." With the deployment of nuclear weapons during the Khrushchev era and the achievement of strategic parity under Brezhnev, military power reinforced that shield and extended its protection over the global class struggle. This will undoubtedly continue but with priority given to Soviet national interests rather

than proletarian internationalism.

The East-West conflict in this arena might be alleviated in one of two ways. First, Soviet domestic demands will require less activism in the Third World and could result in less willingness on the part of Soviet leaders to create dependencies. Second, the United States should undertake a much-needed reevaluation of its own strategy. National liberation movements are formed in most instances by broad but extremely nationalistic political coalitions. The United States would be well served by political strategies that distinguish between Soviet support and Soviet domination.²⁷ For the former, U.S. economic power in the form of trade, technology, and investment offers more effective instruments of policy than the military containment of revolution that has plagued Soviet-American relations since the end of World War II. Like Stalin after World War II, the United States should "pick up the banner of nationalism" where it has been dropped by aging bureaucrats who seem unable to solve their own internal problems, much less extend socialism beyond their borders.

IN LOOKING at past successions, the one optimistic trend that can be identified is the lack of dogmatism in Soviet ideology. New leaders have not been wedded to a single course of action. Soviet pragmatism and flexibility in the past indicate that U.S. initiatives and policies can play a significant part in determining whether the Andropov era produces a less dangerous period in Soviet-American relations.

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Notes

1. Joseph L. Noguee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II* (New York, 1981), p. 11.

2. For a readable account of these views see Robert Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers* (New York, 1967), chapter VI.

3. A detailed analysis appears in Frederic S. Burin's "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *The American Political Science Review*, June 1963, p. 337.

4. Stalin's consolidation of power is described in Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979), chapters 4 and 5.

5. For a discussion of the debate see Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York, 1960), pp. 129-63.

6. See Hough and Fainsod, p. 112.

7. Stalin's world view is described in Burin, pp. 334-54.

8. Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet*

Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York, 1974), p. 150.

9. For somewhat different interpretation of these events see Ulam, pp. 257-60 and D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins* (Garden City, New York, 1961), pp. 84-97.

10. Fleming, pp. 106-34. See also Otto P. Chaney, "Was It Surprise?" *Military Review*, April 1969, pp. 56-67.

11. For Stalin's views, see the account of the Nineteenth Party Congress in Leo Gruliu, editor, *Current Soviet Policies* (New York, 1953)

12. Hough and Fainsod, pp. 204-06.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

14. For Khrushchev's statement on the new theory, see Leo Gruliu, editor, *Current Soviet Policies II* (New York, 1957), pp. 29-63. Emphasis added.

15. Quoted in Paul Marantz, "Changing Soviet Conceptions of East-West Relations," *International Journal* 27, Spring 1982, p. 226.

16. Quoted in Nogee and Donaldson, p. 30.

17. Marantz, pp. 230-35.

18. Virtually all of Kennedy's biographers are in agreement on this point.

19. Strobe Talbott, editor, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, 1970), p. 392.

20. Ulam, p. 573.

21. Hough and Fainsod, p. 242.

22. Quoted in Nogee and Donaldson, p. 245.

23. For Kissinger's views on linkage politics, see *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), pp. 129-30.

24. The Congressional Research Service Report No. 81-203F, *The 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1 September 1981), pp. 1-2.

25. *New York Times*, November 23, 1982, p. A13. Emphasis added.

26. *Ibid.*

27. See Dan Papp, "Wars of National Liberation and Détente," *International Journal* 23, 1 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 82-99.

coming . . .

in our January-
February issue

- General Gabriel: Where We Are Going
- Big Brother in America and Russia
- America Enters the Atomic Age

AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND THE SOVIET SUCCESSION STRUGGLE



DR. JONATHAN R. ADELMAN

PERHAPS the crowning achievement of the now-concluded Brezhnev era was the attainment by the Soviet Union of perceived strategic nuclear parity with the United States. When Leonid Brezhnev wrested power from Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, the United States held a decisive lead over the Soviet Union in this critical area. Brezhnev gave the armed forces a top priority, resulting in a long and sustained military buildup. During the 1970s, the Soviet nuclear arsenal surged forward dramatically in both a quantitative and qualitative dimension. By 1980 the Soviet Union's 2500 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and bomber launchers represented more than a 60 percent increase from the 1500 launchers in 1970, not to speak of major improvements in quality. Soviet advances by the late 1970s had significantly degraded the value of America's land-based ICBMs, opening a possible "window of vulnerability" in the 1980s. Significant funds had also been spent on such defensive measures as ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and civil defense. By contrast the United States, far from engaging in its own buildup, had been content in the 1970s to exercise what Secretary of Defense Harold Brown aptly characterized as "strategic self-restraint." While the Uni-

ted States did MIRV its Minuteman and Poseidon missiles and double the number of nuclear warheads with increased accuracy in the 1970s, the total number of launchers in its triad was essentially the same in 1980 as in 1970. Between 1970 and 1978, cumulative Soviet spending on nuclear forces was three times that of the United States. Spending on defensive programs remained low, though, for the only American antiballistic missile site was dismantled, and civil defense stayed dormant.¹

As a result of the Soviet momentum and American stagnation, the Soviet Union attained its long-sought goal of strategic nuclear parity with the United States in the 1970s. From this achievement flowed a number of benefits for the Soviet Union. Ideologically, it seemed to validate the leadership's Marxist views of the inevitable rise of socialism and decline of capitalism, of history being decisively on the side of the Soviet Union. Militarily, the Soviet buildup forced the United States to cede claims of strategic supremacy and, for the first time, formally acknowledge the Soviet Union as an equal. This was reflected in the SALT I and II treaties, which gave the Soviet Union some leverage over American military development. Politically, the Soviet Union felt emboldened to stake out a position in the international political arena commensurate with its

newfound military position. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union launched military transport efforts for its allies in Egypt and Syria, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, and intervened directly in Afghanistan, the first Soviet move outside the Warsaw Pact since World War II. Perhaps Benjamin Lambeth has best captured this new Soviet attitude:

This mood of sublime self-assurance inspired by the growth of Soviet strategic power has perhaps been most confidently expressed in the widely-cited proclamation of Foreign Minister Gromyko that "the present marked preponderance of the forces of peace and progress gives them the opportunity to lay down the direction of international politics."²

The benefits flowing from the successful Soviet buildup did not come cheaply. During the early years of Brezhnev's rule, continued economic growth allowed both guns and butter, easing the cost of the arms race. But in the 1970s the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth sharply increased the opportunity costs of significant real conventional and nuclear appropriations increases. The fact that Soviet military spending continued to increase at the same rate even in the late 1970s came only at the expense of major decreases in the rate of growth of capital investment and lesser decreases in consumption growth rate. This clearly demonstrated, in Myron Rush's view, that "the prolonged Soviet military buildup is relatively insensitive not only to changes in international climate and in U.S. military policies but also to changes in Soviet economic circumstances."³

American Strategic Nuclear Modernization

By the late 1970s the relentless Soviet buildup, which seemed to threaten to go even beyond parity with the United States, began to alarm American defense policymakers. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 brought these concerns to the forefront of American policy as did concerns about a "window of vulnerability" for American land-based ICBMs in the

early 1980s. The Carter administration, especially in its last year, formulated plans for a major expansion in American military spending, including the nuclear arena. The Reagan administration, with its massive \$1.6 trillion five-year plan for military spending, made a top priority of reversing the adverse trends of the 1970s. Especially significant in Reagan's view was a major program for strategic nuclear modernization that would give the United States a decided advantage in this key area by the end of the decade.

In October 1981, President Reagan set forth a major program of strategic nuclear modernization of all three legs of the triad. He called for the deployment of 100 powerful counterforce MX missiles by the late 1980s to replace the Minuteman land-based ICBM. At sea Reagan stressed the rapid deployment of the Trident II/D-5 SLBMs, which possessed real counterforce capability to destroy hardened targets. In the air he called for the replacement of aging B-52 bombers with 100 B-1B intercontinental bombers in the late 1980s and the development of the Stealth bomber (ATB) by the end of the decade. Some B-52s would also be modernized and used as launching platforms for 3000 cruise missiles on B-52s and B-1s. All this would be accompanied by increased spending on C³I and strategic defense programs. The net result would be by 1990 to give the United States a strong counterforce first-strike potential against hardened Soviet targets.⁴

The long-term impact of such a program, if carried out in its broad outlines, would be very considerable. Not since the Eisenhower administration has there been such a comprehensive review and program for strategic forces. Given the longevity of such forces (many B-52s are older than their pilots), the potential impact could be felt into the next century.

While the Reagan program clearly lacked an overall coherent policy on the role and future of strategic nuclear forces, and elements of it will probably be changed (as MX), the overall thrust of the program was relatively clear. As Secretary

of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger reported to Congress in February 1982:

This Administration . . . does place the highest priority on the long overdue modernization of our strategic forces. While this modernization program is not designed to achieve nuclear "superiority" for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority to insure the margin of safety necessary for our security.⁵


Other Reagan spokesmen have gone even further to imply that the administration is aiming for nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.⁶

Soviet Perceptions of American Strategic Modernization

The rhetoric and programs of the Reagan administration have genuinely alarmed Moscow. As early as June 1981, V. V. Potashov declared, "With the aid of the MX program, the Pentagon leaders are openly planning to secure strategic superiority to Soviet strategic forces."⁷ In October 1981, Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canadian Studies in Moscow, averred that "a big step has been taken toward a Cold War" as "weapons systems are being developed which will further destabilize the balance or in any case create the illusions . . .

that will increase the shakiness and the instability of the world."⁸ In June 1982, *Krasnaya zvezda* and *Pravda* articles stressed that MX and Trident represented a clear attempt by the United States to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union.⁹ In December 1982, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov bluntly warned, "The point is that Washington has now set itself the goal of upsetting parity and achieving military superiority. A rough deadline for this—1990—is even being mentioned."¹⁰

In the Soviet view the United States possesses the economic resources, technological capability, and political will to carry out what they feel are dangerous programs. Although Soviet observers tend to emphasize the negative aspects of defense spending, they have little doubt that America's \$3 trillion economy could support the level of spending necessary for such forces. In 1982, strategic forces consumed only 13.3 percent of the defense budget (\$16.2 billion), a figure scheduled to rise to 16.3 percent of that budget by 1985 (\$33.2 billion).¹¹ Technologically, Vernon Aspaturian has seen Soviet fears of an American reversal of the existing nuclear strategic parity between the two superpowers as grounded in a "deep and even awesome respect for the enormous economic, scientific and technological resources of the United States and realizable mil-



itary potential inherent in them."¹² Politically, they perceive that the hardline tone of the Reagan administration and presumed power of the military-industrial complex make the completion of the strategic program a distinct possibility. Raymond Garthoff has placed the Soviet view in perspective:

In the Soviet perception, the USA has continued, notwithstanding SALT and détente, to seek military superiority. Although some highly placed U.S. leaders and others are considered to have "soberly" evaluated the strategic situation and given up the pursuit of superiority, powerful forces are believed to continue to seek advantage and superiority in order to compel Soviet acquiescence in U.S. policy preferences. Moreover, actual U.S. military policy and programs are seen as seeking to upset or to circumvent the nuclear mutual deterrence balance.¹³

Clearly the comprehensive modernization program poses a serious military threat in the late 1980s to the Soviet Union, especially as it puts directly at risk the 70 percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBMs. Also, the asymmetry of force postures, with the United States deploying only 20 percent of its force posture in such a mode, works to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. So, too, do the difficulties in altering such an orientation in a country with a strong military tradition of land power, weak access to open waters, and little history of strong offensive bomber power.

At the same time, it is important to stress the limitation of the impact of changes in the nuclear balance on the thinking of top Soviet leaders. Their view of the correlation of forces is far broader and more complex than the simple comparison of strategic nuclear weapons deployed on both sides or various forms of elevated bean counting. Even the military component of the correlation of forces would not focus solely on the strategic nuclear balance. Rather, viewing strategic nuclear forces as only one aspect of military power, it would integrate strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces, and conventional military forces under one rubric. This dimin-

ishes the impact of the new strategic systems as changes in the strategic balance can be offset by Soviet conventional superiority (as in the 1950s) or by European theater nuclear advantages (as seen in the large-scale SS-20 deployment).

Furthermore, in the Soviet view military power has never been considered a central or autonomous factor in foreign policy. The Soviets do not emulate the American predilection for analysis of abstract force exchanges irrespective of the larger political goals or strategic context. Rather than simply representing the quantity and quality of men and weapons available to the armed forces, military power has been often seen as a function of other factors, such as political and economic causes. In this context new military challenges need not be met by military power at all. Robert Legvold has well understood this perspective in his observation of the Soviet Union in the 1980s: "Her ability to integrate her economy into a larger order, beginning with the energy sector, for example, will have as much to do with her security, and perhaps even more to do with that of her allies, than any plausible erosion of the strategic nuclear balance."¹⁴

Indeed, there has been no clear correlation between Soviet foreign policy and the state of the intercontinental nuclear balance. Stalin made great gains in Eastern Europe after World War II in the face of the American nuclear monopoly. Khrushchev steadily advanced the Soviet cause in the Third World, proclaimed the inevitable victory of communism, and repeatedly (if unsuccessfully) challenged the United States over Berlin during an era of American strategic nuclear superiority. And despite the achievement of strategic nuclear parity, Brezhnev actually pursued a more conservative and less bellicose foreign policy than his predecessor, one emphasizing détente, East-West trade and SALT agreements, especially before 1979 and the freezing of Soviet-American relations.

Finally, the Soviet notion of correlation of forces is a very broad concept, in which the military balance is only one aspect of a very complex balance between the two sides. The correlation of

forces includes long-term social, economic, and historical processes embedded in the "objective" course of history which will, they are convinced, witness the ultimate triumph of Marxism-Leninism. Great stress is placed on the growth of international movements, such as the peace movement and national liberation movements, and economic factors, such as the deep recession in Western capitalist countries. Domestic politics, allies, and classes are all given significant roles. So too are qualities of national leaders and national resolve. The anti-Vietnam War movement is cited as an example where internal class contradictions forced a change in American foreign policy. Most important, the Soviets are likely to see strategic modernization not simply in a military context but as symbolic of a broader political context. Vernon Aspaturian, writing at the end of the Carter administration, argued:

Widely prevalent in Soviet commentary is the view that the United States is not merely interested in reclaiming military superiority but yearns to restore itself to the apex of the international system as principal arbiter of the planet's destiny, to renounce its agreement to accept the Soviet Union as an equal partner and to behave once again as if it were the world's only authentic global power, with a self-asserted right to set the international agenda, resolve disputes and in general regulate and manage the international system.¹⁵

Everything that has occurred in the first two years of the Reagan administration has only intensified these Soviet views.

Soviet Succession Struggle

The new and threatening American strategic initiatives come at a particularly sensitive period in Soviet politics. The death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 has intensified a sharp succession struggle already well under way before Brezhnev's death at age 76. Historically, Soviet succession struggles have been protracted and even dramatic battles lasting several years. It took five years after Lenin's death for Stalin to smash the left and right oppositions before gaining the

undisputed mantle of leadership in 1929. The Stalinist succession struggle lasted four years before Khrushchev's final ascendancy in 1957, highlighted by the liquidation of Beria in 1953, dismissal of Malenkov in 1955, and dramatic defeat of the "Anti-Party Group" Politburo majority in 1957. Even the relatively consensual ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 precipitated a moderate struggle that lasted several years between Brezhnev and Kosygin. Given the multiplicity of factions and groups, institutional rivalries, mobilization of peripheral groups, and complexity of issues, any fast and final resolution of the succession struggle and reintegration of the polity is rather unlikely.

This is especially true given the nature of personnel elite turnover on the agenda. While there have been four changes in the top leadership (1924, 1953, 1964, 1982), the elite leadership has changed only once—and that time (1937) did not coincide with a change in the top leader. While the Soviet elite from 1917 to 1937 was dominated by Old Bolsheviks, the Great Purges in 1937 decimated this group. A new, young postrevolutionary generation, with working class and peasant origins and technical education, rose to power in the wake of the purges. This generation (exemplified by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny) is now rapidly passing from the scene. Seweryn Bialer showed in *Stalin's Successors* that in 1978 the average age range of a full member of the Politburo was 66-70, 65 among members of the Councils of Ministers, and 65 among the high command of the Armed Forces.¹⁶ Thus a massive turnover at the elite level coupled with a change in top leaders will ensure true ferment and instability in the Soviet system. This is even truer since the advanced age of Yuri Andropov (69) ensures that, even if he consolidates his power, there will probably be yet another succession struggle at the top by the end of the decade.

Finally, intense internal struggle is virtually guaranteed by the large, complex, and often unpalatable agenda facing any new Soviet leadership in the 1980s. The last years of the Brezhnev

era were marked by petrification and stagnation in Soviet policy abroad and at home. The growth rate of the overly centralized Soviet economy continued to drop inexorably from the 5 percent annual GNP rise of the 1960s to 4 percent in the 1970s to 1-2 percent in the early 1980s. Soviet agriculture suffered several disastrous years, energy production flattened out, and labor productivity growth dropped sharply.¹⁷ In foreign policy the Soviet Union found itself overextended and even floundering. In Eastern Europe massive Soviet military pressure and economic help were needed to defeat the Polish Solidarity trade movement. In the south more than 105,000 Soviet troops were still bogged down in Afghanistan with little prospect of gaining a decisive victory. In the east the Soviet Union has 43 divisions tied down along the Chinese border while its Vietnamese allies are still trying to complete their occupation of Cambodia. Soviet influence beyond its borders has dropped notably. In Latin America, Castro's Cuba has become an expensive obligation while in the Middle East, Soviet impotence was highlighted in the recent defeats of its clients in Lebanon and subsequent exclusion from Lebanese and Arab negotiating efforts. And, finally, relations with the world's other superpower, the United States, have deteriorated markedly in recent years.

These problems, however, will be discussed, debated, and analyzed against the policymaking framework created during the Brezhnev era, and that is where the difficulties will arise. Under Brezhnev the regime managed to provide both guns and butter. Consumers benefited from the doubling of national income during the first twelve years of his rule. A sharp increase in consumption of high-quality foods, a massive housing program, and a new expanded retirement system have all whetted consumer expectations.¹⁸ Similarly, all major central bureaucratic institutions received significant real appropriations increases yearly from the expanding economic pie. Brezhnev cemented the consensual conservative system of decision-making in 1973 when he added the Foreign Minister (Gromyko), Defense

Minister (Grechko), and KGB head (Andropov) to the Politburo.

But in the 1980s, the politics of economic stringency will not permit a continuation of politics as usual. The vast and important investment needs of European Russian reindustrialization, Siberian energy development, and Soviet agriculture will compete directly with consumer expectations and the wants and desires of the powerful military-industrial complex. This will lead inevitably to bruising political confrontations on a scale not seen in Soviet politics for two decades. All this will occur, too, against the backdrop of a rearming and more menacing America bent on a strategic nuclear modernization program that threatens to overturn hard earned Soviet claims to nuclear parity. Myron Rush has well captured the tenor of the coming political collisions when he observed:

By the mid 1980s defense may receive more than half the increment, leaving very little for additional civilian investment and for the consumer. Stepped-up increases in defense expenditures in a continuing arms race against an American economy that is roughly twice the size of the Soviet economy could be achieved only by making repeated cuts in consumption. Reducing Soviet living standards at a time of tight labor supply, however, could further weaken the economy, creating a downward spiral.¹⁹

The Military in the Succession Struggle

In this context it is especially important to see the role rather likely to be played by the military and its allies in heavy industry in the succession struggle. The response of the Soviet leadership to the American military challenge is also likely to be significantly influenced by the military. As Arthur Alexander has cogently observed about the nature of the Soviet military decision-making process:

... the lengthy complex process of weapons acquisition and great inertia and sheer survivability of organizations and their behavioral patterns ensure that the outcome of that process will be heavily influenced by the organizations involved—by their goals and procedures. This influence derives from

the organizations' control over information, generation of alternatives and implementation of political choices.²⁰

The Soviet military thereby enjoys key advantages in framing the military aspect of a response to American programs. With its almost total control of all aspects of national security affairs, from analysis and intelligence to production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet military enjoys a degree of autonomy not found in the American military. Its predominance in all spheres of military and strategic thought and monopoly of military expertise enable it to frame military problems and define the parameters within which those problems are to be solved.²¹

The military has historically played a significant role in succession struggles since the death of Stalin. It played a key role in the arrest and execution in 1953 of Beria, who led the secret police, a notorious enemy of the military. In 1955 military support of Khrushchev helped him to oust Malenkov, his chief rival. In 1957 Khrushchev prevailed over the "Anti-Party Group" Politburo majority with the aid of Defense Minister Zhukov, who used military transport planes to bring Central Committee members to Moscow to help Khrushchev. In 1964 Brezhnev was able to oust Khrushchev at least in part because of military disenchantment with his policies. And, as we shall see, Andropov's rapid ascension to power after Brezhnev's death in 1982 results in large measure from the backing of the military-industrial complex.

In addition, the military and its heavy industrial allies have made great strides over the last three decades. Under Khrushchev the military became a legitimate and significant political actor, a status denied it under Stalin. The size and power of its Strategic Rocket Forces expanded enormously. Khrushchev in his memoirs recounted how difficult he found it to withstand military pressures:

Unfortunately there's a tendency for people who run the armed forces to be greedy and self-seeking. . . . "Some people from our military depart-

ment come and say, 'Comrade Khrushchev, look at this! The Americans are developing such and such a system. We could develop the same system but it would cost such and such.' I tell them there's no money; it's all been allotted already. So they say, 'If we don't get the money we need and if there's a war, then the enemy will have superiority over us.' So we discuss it some more, and I end up by giving them the money they ask for."²²

Under Brezhnev the armed forces flourished, receiving real appropriations increases of 3 percent to 5 percent a year and sustaining a powerful military buildup in nearly every sector.

But this is not to suggest, as Roman Kolkowicz has done, that the Soviet military will become a dominant political force in an increasingly militarized post-Brezhnev Soviet society.²³ For the Soviet leadership throughout history has successfully prevented any military challenge to its power—and there must be serious doubts as to whether the military even would desire such a position. Stalin excluded the military from decision-making and ruthlessly and massively purged the officer corps in the late 1930s. Khrushchev ousted the popular Marshal Zhukov from the Politburo in 1957 and sharply reduced the size and influence of the ground forces. Even Brezhnev, closely allied with the military, overrode military objections to reach the SALT I and SALT II agreements in the 1970s, in the process reintegrating the military in the negotiating scheme. Brezhnev's generous treatment of the military in terms of appropriations, personnel stability, and professional autonomy was in line with his treatment of other key central institutions, such as the secret police and government bureaucracy.

Furthermore, the military faces certain key problems in maintaining its position. Unlike in earlier battles, the military is now a satisfied, status quo power, seeking to defend its position. Given minimal growth and the rise of reformism in the succession struggle, it may become the object of wrath of other dissatisfied interest groups seeking a share of its large pie. Nor is the military homogeneous. Leaders such as Khrushchev demonstrated considerable success in play-

ing one faction against another (as Zhukov versus Konev). Numerous internal splits, such as conservative ground forces versus radical strategic rocket forces, navy versus air force, and commanders versus commissars may provide ground for the political leadership to consolidate themselves at the expense of the military. Recent military setbacks suffered by the Soviet military in Afghanistan and Soviet clients in the Middle East (Syria at the hands of Israel in Lebanon, Iraq by Iran) may diminish its prestige and legitimacy. Overall, then, the military is likely to play a strong but hardly dominant role in a succession struggle in which it may find itself on the defensive.

The Ascension of Andropov

The rapid ascension of Yuri Andropov to the post of Party General Secretary in the wake of Leonid Brezhnev's death in November 1982 signaled the initial victory of the hardliners over the moderates. His background as Soviet Ambassador to Hungary during the 1956 crushing of the revolt and fifteen years as head of the KGB greatly appealed to the hardliners. His strong ties with the defense establishment were reflected in his declaration in November 1982 that "the Politburo has considered and continues to consider it mandatory, especially in the present international situation, to provide the Army and Navy with everything they need."²⁴ In response in December, Defense Minister Ustinov praised the "complete clarity" of Andropov's policies while Army General V. Varrenikov called Andropov's speech "brilliant and deeply meaningful."²⁵ Similarly, his strong ties with the KGB, which he had headed for 15 years, were seen in the promotions of his former associates to the Politburo (Geydar Aliyev), post of U.S.S.R. Minister of Internal Affairs (Vitaly Fedorchuk), and post of KGB head (Viktor Chebrikov).


Many factors promoted Andropov's triumph over his moderate challenger, Konstantin Chernenko. The wave of deaths (Brezhnev, Suslov, Podgorny, and Kosygin) and incapacitating ill-

nesses (Kirilenko and Pelshe) of the older generation in the last two years removed many of Brezhnev's associates. In terms of experience, intelligence, and pragmatism, Andropov possessed the best qualifications for the post. His move to the Central Committee Secretariat in May 1982 defused fears of his secret police background. His support for arms negotiations and détente and ties to Georgi Arbatov have shown a moderation that lessens opposition to his rule, as well as the fact that at age 69 he is unlikely to rule for many years.

Finally his initial policies have shown a marked cautiousness in domestic policies and moderation in foreign policy. His stress on fighting economic corruption avoids challenging the interest of powerful economic institutions. His calls for arms negotiations with the West on strategic arms and theater nuclear weapons, coupled with appeals for negotiations over Afghanistan and China, show an attempt to defuse international crises and insulate domestic politics from their volatility.

The Context of American Strategic Nuclear Modernization

The Soviet Union has with Brezhnev's death entered into a period of intense political struggle over the future shape of Soviet politics. This process will undoubtedly be lengthened by the




fact that Yuri Andropov is 69 years old. Even if he succeeds in consolidating his power, a new succession struggle to determine who succeeds him is likely by the end of the decade. Given the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship in Soviet eyes, moves made by the United States will affect the succession. Moderate American moves can, under certain circumstances, help beget moderate Soviet responses. Similarly, hardline American moves can provoke hardline Soviet responses. For, as Uri Ra'anana has astutely argued,

The fractional nature of Soviet leadership, if borne in mind, presents options to other powers—as a potential “brake” upon adventurous tendencies that appear to be surfacing in Soviet actions . . . Certain elements in the Soviet elite may be beginning to feel that there are actions in the international arena of a bold and militant nature, which, basically, no longer “pose risks” that would prove really costly to the USSR. Consequently, it could prove advantageous for other powers to be able to “manipulate” factional strife at the apex of Soviet leadership, if only by supplying political “ammo” to those who, in their own interests, would wish to demonstrate that their domestic rivals really are “adventurists.” Groups in the Kremlin raising “the banner of caution” could show that actions proposed by these rivals might involve very high international costs and that these were Western signals, not necessarily of a declaratory nature, intimating the gravity with which such ventures would be viewed.²⁶

Given the threat that American strategic nu-

clear modernization poses to the major and expensive Soviet attainment of achieving perceived nuclear parity with the United States, it will surely become a major issue in Soviet politics. Soviet hardliners and moderates would agree that the American program, if carried through, would pose a serious danger to the Soviet position in international politics. But Soviet hawks will see it as a harbinger of an overall attempt to dethrone the Soviet Union as a superpower. In this view only a “hard” Soviet response, in the form of competition with the West and use of force, would deter the West. Conversely the doves, seeing the American strategic program as more purely military in scope and denigrating the military factor in the correlation of forces, will argue for détente and arms control agreements to restrain an economically and technologically superior enemy. Interestingly the more moderate position was previously adopted by both Khrushchev and Brezhnev after they had gained power with the support of the hardline camp. For as George Breslauer has perceived:

Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev presented their collaborative designs at a time when they perceived themselves to be in a position of “effective strategic parity” with the United States but when they greatly feared that unless the parity relationship were codified and regularized, the United States could make a technological burst forward and leave the Soviet Union behind once again.²⁷



The Soviet perception of the overall context of the American program thereby becomes quite important. If it is perceived as the dominant feature of an overtly hostile American policy seeking to revive the Cold War, it will strengthen Kremlin hardliners. This policy would confirm traditional Marxist-Leninist views on the irradicable warlike, aggressive, and hostile tendencies of capitalist states. If they felt that America had adopted this policy, it would revive deep-seated historical fears of capitalist encirclement and foreign invasion. There will be a strong "rallying around the flag," patriotic reaction in which consumer concerns will be shelved for an ongoing Soviet buildup. This would weaken the moderates who have argued for greater contact and trade with a West which seemingly had accepted Soviet strategic parity. There would seem to be little to lose from an outright renewal of the Cold War. The worst fears of Soviet military and civilian leaders will have been confirmed. Soviet hardliners will be able to use the American program to further their own ends.

If American policy helps to promote a new, hardline post-Brezhnev leadership, the consequences will be considerable. During the last two decades the decline of the Cold War has led to the emergence of a new and tenuous Soviet-American relationship, symbolized by the signing of two SALT agreements and the Helsinki Accord. As a result, China has replaced America as the most immediate threat to Soviet security. Now, if partly through American actions, the United States were to be restored to its old status of the Soviet Union's major enemy, the impact will be immediate and possibly military in nature. The Soviet Union lacks the ability to compete on a global basis with the United States in either the economic or cultural realms. Economically, far from being an economic superpower, the Soviet Union imports high technology goods and industrial products while exporting natural resources (gold, gas, and oil), the classic pattern of an underdeveloped country. Culturally, Soviet-style communism has long since lost its appeal in Europe and the Third World. Therefore, any

hardline Soviet response to the American buildup must be military in nature since this is the only arena in which the Soviet Union is truly globally competitive and even enjoys some marginal advantages.

The first Soviet response might be to launch an increased arms buildup of its own to match the American program and maintain parity. Although this would harm key domestic interests, it would be readily sustainable over a short run of several years. The trillion dollar Soviet economy, already far more militarized than the American economy, would find it easier than the American economy to step up military production.²⁸ The visible American threat would allow the Kremlin leadership to contain domestic dissatisfaction arising from the downgrading of consumer spending. The Soviet leadership could also doubt the long-term commitment of the United States to such a course, given the volatility of American politics, frequent electoral changes in leaders, economic difficulties, and strong nuclear freeze movement.

A further Soviet response could be for them to use their military forces in a much more aggressive fashion than heretofore. Since World War II the Russians have deployed their forces outside the Warsaw Pact area only once (Afghanistan)—and that time in a neighboring country with no possibility of direct Western intervention. A more aggressive Soviet policy could take advantage of several favorable conditions. The attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States has freed the Soviet Union from the fear of having to back down (as in Cuba in 1962) in the face of American threats and countermeasures. By a number of measures, Soviet ground forces possess means substantially in excess of those necessary for the defense of the homeland. Geographically, as a massive Eurasian power, the Soviet Union has a unique ability to intervene quite easily in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. And even if the Reagan administration succeeds in a major strengthening of American conventional forces, this is a protracted process requiring a number of years to complete. In the interim

Soviet conventional superiority could be exploited in a number of areas of opportunity. In short, the real "window of vulnerability" in the 1980s might well lie not in nuclear weaponry (whose use is highly unlikely) but in conventional weaponry.²⁹

The Russians could find a number of areas around the world where it might be profitable to use, or threaten to use, forces by themselves or through surrogates. In Asia they could stage maneuvers or border incidents along the Chinese border. The Chinese, intent on pursuing their ambitious Four Modernizations program, would then have to choose between some form of accommodation with the Russians or building up their forces at the cost of development. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union could contemplate resolving its own future energy problems through pressure or actual force on the weakly armed emirates. Or it could massively supply Syria with enough advanced weapons to ignite another Arab-Israeli conflict in which the Soviet Union could hope to demonstrate that it is the only reliable Arab ally against Israel. Throughout the Third World, from Central America to southern Africa, there are numerous areas where the Soviet Union might profitably contemplate direct or indirect military intervention.

This is *not* to say that there are no positive benefits to be derived from American strategic nuclear modernization. Indeed, there are important benefits to be gained. For if the United States were to continue to allow the Soviet Union to alter the military balance in its favor, this would undoubtedly aid the hardliners in the succession struggle.³⁰ The potential benefits from the threat or actual use of force would soon outweigh possible costs. Given the enormous economic, political, and social problems facing Russia in the 1980s, the temptation would arise to resolve them partially through the now attractive conventional military option. With the vast Soviet nuclear capabilities inhibiting any likely use of American nuclear assets, the Soviets could more freely utilize their conventional forces. It was in America's interest to redress the balance so as to

help push the Soviet Union away from such a military solution to its problems.

But if the American strategic modernization program were coupled with positive American proposals (as serious trade and arms negotiations), they will strengthen the moderate position in the succession struggle. For as Alexander Dallin perceptively observed about the interdependence of the two superpowers:

The mutual perceptions of the superpowers are shaped, in large measure, by each other's behavior along with domestic pressures and constraints. The United States is thus an unwitting participant in internal Soviet arguments and reassessments, and this is likely to be the case particularly at times of genuine debate and uncertainty in Moscow—times which are once again upon us.³¹

In this context moderate American actions can show the potential benefits from dealing with the United States while the strategic modernization program demonstrates the futility of the Soviet hardline position of pursuing a military option vis-à-vis the West. Such an American position would show that the United States is not intent on depriving the Soviet Union of its hard-won status as a superpower.

The key to the moderate position will be the credibility of the proposals offered to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership believes that the United States in the 1970s undermined détente by not keeping its promises. Militarily, the United States initialed the SALT II Treaty—and the Senate never ratified it. Economically, the United States never granted the Soviet Union "most favored nation" trade status—while China and Romania were granted the status. Trade between the two superpowers never rose above the paltry level of several billion dollars a year. Politically, America accepted the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship—and then actively played the China card. Constant American policy flip-flops and temporary restrictions on the Soviet-American relationship during the Carter and Reagan administrations undermined American credibility.

Three areas are most important for such a

moderate policy. The critical problems facing the Soviet economy in the 1980s and the dominant role of domestic policy in resolving the succession struggle ensure the primacy of economic issues. Although the eagerness of America's Western European and Japanese allies to trade with the Soviet Union has somewhat diminished the value of American trade, it still remains important. The United States, even today, remains the economic engine of the non-Communist world and provides its direction. Especially in the 1980s, the Soviet Union needs American wheat, nonmilitary high technology, and capital investment to overcome domestic economic difficulties. Both direct and indirect American involvement could be vital to such massive projects as the development of Siberian energy resources and European Russian reindustrialization. Such projects would also aid the ailing American economy and suffering major trade deficits. Overall, then, heightened Soviet-American economic relations would be mutually beneficial, especially to a Soviet economy suffering from low productivity and technological backwardness.

Similarly, the United States, as the world's other superpower, is seen by the Soviet Union as holding important cards in the military sphere. Arms control agreements provide public confirmation of the great power status of the Soviet Union. They can provide a cap (albeit a high one) on the arms race, which would allow limitations on the growth of military expenditures. By easing tensions between the superpowers and decreasing the possibility of accidental nuclear war, they serve the interests of both sides. As Leonid Brezhnev reflected this view in June 1982, five months before his death, "The destinies of war and peace largely depend on whether there will be reached a Soviet-American accord on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, an honest, fair accord which infringes the interests of nobody."³² Perhaps most concretely, by providing contact and dialogue between the two sides, arms talks provide a positive climate for economic and political relations.

Finally, the United States holds important political cards as well. The Soviet Union, with a vulnerable 4700-mile border with China, is eager to avoid American modernization of the obsolete but large Chinese army. In the Soviet view, any final resolution of the crises in Poland and Afghanistan requires American noninterference in areas vital to Soviet interest. As reflected in Soviet inactivity in Lebanon in 1982, the Soviet Union continues to seek to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in areas of competition in the Third World. Overall, then, the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship offers considerable opportunities for significant political negotiations between the two sides.

Finally, it is important to stress the limitations on the development of such relations. For as Seweryn Bialer has perceptively argued:

The difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations do not have as their source mutual misperceptions of the two powers by each other. At the heart of the conflict is the real diversity of their interests, a real difference in their evaluation and perception of the international situation, a real diversity of their priorities in approaching the world system, and a real asymmetry in the development of their international appetites and their consciousness of what is possible and obtainable for their respective countries in the international arena.³³

Soviet Perceptions of American Politics

If Western observers have often perceived Soviet politics as a riddle wrapped up in an enigma, then Soviet observers of American politics have often been equally puzzled. This unease has only been partially reduced by the academic work of Georgi Arbatov's Institute for the Study of U.S.A. and Canadian Politics. The very chaotic, volatile, decentralized, and media-oriented nature of American politics seems alien to the highly centralized, disciplined, and controlled practitioners of Soviet politics. What is a Soviet observer to make of the role of "gypsy moths" and "boll weevils," Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority and nuclear freeze activists, Tip

O'Neill and Jesse Helms (the "Six Million Dollar Man")? How could any system generate no fewer than six presidents in the last twenty years, including a Texas rancher, California red baiter, Michigan All-American football player, Georgia peanut farmer, and a fading Hollywood movie actor? Finding a thread that can explain (or worse, predict) American politics must seem a Herculean task to the Soviet leaders.

Mirroring the American image of a dualism in Soviet politics, the Soviet leaders possess a similarly dualist view of American politics. They see a contest between hardliners and moderate "sober realists" within the capitalist camp. Their initial concerns about Reagan's hardline rhetoric were tempered by relief at the demise of Jimmy Carter and positive recollection of the last Republican President who had espoused hardline rhetoric (Richard Nixon). But Reagan's massive defense buildup, continued strong anti-Communist rhetoric, and slashing of domestic social programs are now seen by many in the Soviet leadership as the work of an unregenerate hardliner. His arms control proposals are perceived as one-sided and propagandistic, reflecting the interests of the powerful military-industrial complex. Moscow hardliners thereby see Reagan as demonstrating the innate correctness of their position.

Others perceive the Reagan administration as being forced into a more realistic, moderate position by a series of domestic and international pressures. Perhaps the most important impetus are the dangers arising from a superpower arms race, dangers directly threatening the American position. For an unstable arms balance increases the dangers of war rather than enhancing American security. For as Georgi Arbatov wrote in April 1982:

Actually, armaments programs, rather than correcting the strategic disproportion, destabilize the military balance. Attempts to gain unilateral advantages, to threaten some particular elements of the other side's defense capability, inevitably lead to countermeasures and rebound on the initiators. The stockpiling of armaments for more effective use of arms, instead of making deterrence stronger, adds to the probability of a global confrontation.³⁴

Furthermore, an arms race with strengthened first-strike capability on both sides increases mutual suspicions and enhances the possibility of an accidental war. In July 1982, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov obliquely warned that the Soviet Union might be forced to resort to a launch-on-warning system to counter an enhanced American threat.³⁵

A series of domestic factors will also, in this Soviet view, push the United States away from a hardline position. The severe American difficulties, which *Pravda* has highlighted by reprinting American unemployment figures monthly by key states, will be intensified by unproductive military expenditures. The massive nuclear freeze movement, reflecting the broad progressive aspirations of the masses, will restrain American militarism. So, too, will the sharp internal contradictions within American society, such as intense racial problems.

Foreign pressures will also play a role. Strong Soviet pressure for arms control agreements will combine with the Soviet capacity to match any American buildup. As P. G. Bogdanov wrote in May 1982:

... if the government of the U.S.A. and its allies in NATO would create a real additional threat to the security of the Soviet nation and the allies of the USSR, this would force the Soviet Union to take such responsive measures which would place in analogous position the other side, including directly the U.S. and its territory.³⁶

Large-scale European nuclear freeze demonstrations will push European governments, already favorable to détente, into pressuring the United States against a new arms race. According to V. Kovalev in June 1982:

There has also been pressure on Washington from its Western European allies in NATO who in turn are forced to come to terms with the mood of the societies of their own countries, disconcerted by the absence in the White House of preparedness to carry on real negotiations with the USSR.³⁷

Finally, the changing nature of world politics, which is shifting in favor of socialism, will influence American policies. As A. K. Slob-

denko has recently written, "The strongest influence on the development of U.S.A. military strategy at the contemporary stage is the relation of forces in the world arena."³⁸ Overall, then, many forces will reinforce a new realism in Washington.

IN HIS first year in control, Yuri Andropov has moved cautiously to consolidate his power. While promoting his former KGB associates (Geydar, Fedorchuk, and Chebrikov), he has avoided domestic initiatives except for a relatively safe campaign against economic corruption. Abroad he has sought to ease tensions in Afghanistan and China along the long Soviet border. Andropov has made major arms control proposals at the strategic and theater nuclear level in an attempt to insulate domestic politics from volatile international politics. As a hardliner, he has little to lose from such moves.³⁹

Although domestic policy issues and actors

will decide the future shape of Soviet politics, the American strategic nuclear program will certainly have an impact. By threatening to upset the existing strategic nuclear balance in favor of the United States and render vulnerable the massive land-based Soviet nuclear rocket forces by the end of the decade, the American program endangers hard-earned Soviet nuclear parity with the United States. This American buildup, coming during the sensitive period of the Brezhnev succession struggle, threatens the Soviet Union in the only arena in which they are truly a global superpower—the military arena. If American policy is perceived as part of a new hardline, it will strengthen the position of Soviet hardliners. If seen as integrated with new moderate initiatives, it may deter the hardliners and reinforce the moderates on the Soviet side. To this extent American policies may make a difference in the Soviet succession struggle.

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Notes

1. For details of the experience of the 1970s, see Richard Burt, "Reassessing the Strategic Balance," *International Security*, Summer 1980, pp. 38-40; and Kurt Lewis, "The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance in the 1980s: Missing the Trees for the Leaves," *Survival*, May-June 1982, pp. 110-15. Joseph Nye has attributed the relative decline in American power in the 1970s to the short-run effects of the Vietnam syndrome, Soviet military growth, American energy vulnerability, and declining economic productivity growth. He also cited the long-run problems of an increasingly dispersed world economy and complex international political environment in which the role of the United States has declined. For his interesting article, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "U.S. Power and Reagan Policy," *Orbis*, Summer 1982, pp. 391-411.

2. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security*, Fall 1979, p. 33.

3. Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Winter 1982/1983, p. 174. It is important to note that strategic nuclear weapons account for only a relatively small proportion of total military spending. Conventional weapons and manpower costs tend to be a more significant part of military spending.

4. For a good summary of the Reagan plan, see the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1982-1983* (London, IISS, 1982), p. 3.

5. Weinberger's testimony is reproduced in *Survival*, May-June 1982, p. 132.

6. As, for example, the remarks of Presidential counselor Edwin Meese in Los Angeles in August 1981.

7. V. V. Potashov, "Arms Race in the United States—Threat to Peace," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, June 1981, p. 37.

8. Quoted in Leon Gouré and Michael Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1981, pp. 43-44.

9. See *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 4, 1982, and *Pravda*, June 4, 1982.

10. *Pravda*, December 7, 1982.

11. See Herschel Kanter, "The Reagan Defense Program: Can It Hold Up?" *Strategic Review*, Spring 1982, p. 24.

12. Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, p. 8.

13. Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence, Parity and Strategic Arms Limitations in Soviet Policy," in Derek Leebaert, editor, *Soviet Military Thinking* (London, 1981), p. 111.

14. Robert Legvold, "The Concept of Power and Security in Soviet History," *Adelphi Papers* No. 151, p. 10.

15. Aspaturian, p. 8. For a particularly telling analysis in this area, see Lambeth, pp. 25-38.

16. See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (London, 1980), chapter 5.

17. For a useful overview of the subject, see Morris Bornstein, editor, *The Soviet Economy: Continuity and Change* (Boulder, Colorado, 1981).

18. See Bialer, pp. 149-51.

19. Rush, p. 175.

20. Arthur Alexander, "Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurements," *Adelphi Papers* Nos. 147, 148, p. 2.

21. For further analysis, see Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," *International Security*, Spring 1978, p. 90.

22. *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970), pp. 519-20.

23. Roman Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, editors, *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats* (Winchester, Massachusetts, 1982), pp. 109-38.

24. *Pravda*, November 22, 1982.

25. *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 8, 1982 and *Izvestiya*, December 16, 1982.

26. Uri Ra'anani, "Soviet Decision-Making and International Rela-

tions," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1980, p. 47.

27. George Breslauer, "Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, p. 48.

28. See Jacques Gansler, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" *International Security*, Spring 1982, pp. 102-21.

29. Unlike in the nuclear arena, the Soviet Union has traditionally enjoyed a strong quantitative superiority over the United States in conventional weaponry. Given the deterioration of the defense industry, high cost of a conventional buildup, and serious problems with manpower, changes in the conventional balance are likely to proceed far slower than in the strategic nuclear balance. This creates possibilities for the Soviet Union in the conventional arena where the initial stakes are far lower than in the nuclear arena.

30. It is important to keep in mind that the new American strategic modernization program was a bipartisan effort which started well before the Reagan administration in the last two years of the Carter administration.

31. Alexander Dallin, "The United States in the Soviet Perspective," *Adelphi Papers* No. 151, p. 20.

32. *Pravda*, June 4, 1982.

33. *Bialer*, p. 435.

34. G. Arbatov, "The Strategy of Nuclear Madness," *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1981.

35. *Pravda*, July 12, 1982.

36. P. G. Bogdanov, "Klyuchevoi vopros'—predotvrashenie yadernoi voyny," *SShA*, May 1982, p. 51.

37. *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 4, 1982.

38. A. K. Slobodenko, "Formirovanie voenno-politicheskoi strategii administratsii Reigana," *SShA*, June 1982, p. 125.

39. Hardliners often have unusual room for political maneuver. Charles de Gaulle was able to extract France from Algeria. Richard Nixon was able to create a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. Menachem Begin was in a position to sign a peace treaty with Egypt while withdrawing from Sinai.

The Dnieper made Russia Byzantine, the Volga made her Asiatic; it was for the Neva to make her European.


Sidney Harcave
Russia: A History

Many a man like Napoleon crossed the Niemen proudly only to return miserably across the Berezina.

Russian Proverb

Russia has two generals in whom she can confide—Generals January and February.

Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia
Punch, 1853



THE FACTORS IN THE SOVIET STRATEGY

COMODORO (R) JOSÉ C. D'ODORICO
ARGENTINE AIR FORCE



AS with any school of strategic thought, the Soviet school recognizes the need for a combined and balanced use of the classic elements of strategy. Tactical exercises show how those elements interplay. Up to this point, there would seem to be no significant differences between the strategic concepts of socialists and nonsocialists. That is precisely why students of this discipline make the mistake of comparing these two groups, using the same criteria to analyze the strategic styles of Marxist and of non-Marxist states.

The drive to simplify the intellectual content

of strategic thought takes us unwittingly in the direction of error. At times, the same criteria are used to assess ideas that only appear to be similar. Naturally, the findings are unrealistic and bear little relation to the truth. To attempt to immerse oneself in a study of Soviet strategy without first understanding the principal foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory is the kind of rash impulsiveness that ends in confusion. Indeed, there is a very close and unyielding bond between Soviet strategy and Marxist-Leninist theory. Generally speaking, research into the official philosophical theory of the Soviet Union is not carried out properly with qualified experts and in appropri-

ate institutions. As a result, some professionals use commonplace parameters to examine Soviet strategic thought.

The root of the differences between Soviet strategy and nonsocialist strategy is the way man's nature and his value as an intelligent social being are perceived. This is reflected vividly in Soviet strategic thinking. It may be that the very close relationship between Soviet philosophy and Soviet strategy has scarcely any counterparts or precedents in other parts of the world, which in itself would be a very important reason to examine the substance of those relationships more closely.

Reduced to its most basic elements, modern general strategy is developed on the basis of space, time, and maneuver, with much creativity and an increasingly greater technological foundation. Strategy development relies increasingly on data sciences, electronics, communications, and other services that, little by little, are bringing strategy into a closer relation with the sciences. Despite these new circumstances, the traditional elements of strategy are just as important as ever. The Soviets are fully convinced of this, although it does not prevent them from adjusting the variants to their own patterns of behavior. For the socialists, strategy is meaningful only as part of a philosophy which gives that strategy its vitality and the means to express itself. This indissoluble bond makes Communist strategy unique; it is essential that we understand its distinctive nature merely to survive as free societies.

The accuracy of our knowledge will determine the probability of success against the basic enemy and give new meaning to the principle of strict economy in the use of available means. Our success in continuing the battle against Marxism-Leninism will in large part depend on how carefully we observe that principle. The philosophy developed by the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in 500 B.C. is just as applicable today, despite its having been put to the test for more than 2000 years: "Know your enemy and know yourself, and you will win 100 battles without ever running any risk of defeat." This simple, wise

maxim applies today to students of Soviet strategy.

Neither the social system nor the set of human values that Marxist socialism adopted is the same as ours in the nonsocialist world. Hence, they cannot be judged or evaluated by the same criteria. Some specific examples will help clarify this point: the concepts of democracy, freedom, and peaceful coexistence as defined by a Marxist would be completely at odds with the same concepts as defined by a nonsocialist. These differences repeat themselves in countless ways and ultimately establish the cosmography of two diametrically opposed worlds.

Why, then, would the strategic elements of *time*, *space*, and *maneuver* have the same meaning as in the nonsocialist world? Why wouldn't they be used to denote something totally contrary to what we in our world usually understand them to mean?

Some countries comprehend the true nature of international Communist strategy, which spawns bloody confrontations that seriously jeopardize our lives as free nations. If these countries were able to withstand the initial onslaughts, it is because they have responded to that strategy adequately and effectively and have remained alert because they know the danger persists. Such is the case with my country, Argentina.

THE *time dimension* of the prolonged offensive that the Soviet Union has undertaken tells us in advance how communism interprets the time element in strategy. Red strategy has been figuratively labeled a "strategy without time," but not because the time factor was not provided for in the technique. Marxist strategy measures time by other criteria that follow from the principle of dialectical materialism, which Marx adopted from the philosopher Hegel and adapted to his own particular perception of the cosmos.

Without entering into a critique, the cycle in Marxist theory established by the laws of "opposites" (theses), "negations" (antitheses), and "transformation" (synthesis) is repeated over the course

of time as a function of the quantitative and qualitative changes that matter undergoes. Apparently, the repetition of this theoretical cycle is endless, although when applied to the case of "social matter," Marx believed that perfect communism would be achieved at some point, thus ending the cycle. That very special state, which is the utopian goal of political communism, governs the temporal dimension of the U.S.S.R.'s global strategy.

If this were true, what could possibly delay the achievement of that illusory objective when, according to Marx, the capacity of each individual will be evaluated so as to deliver to him goods that are commensurate with his needs? Our experience, logic, and the history of mankind show that that goal is beyond reach because it will never be possible to produce sufficient goods to satisfy the individual's *free* needs. But what interests us in this case is the amount of weight given to time in achieving that very impracticable goal. Since the true Communist believes that perfect communism will indeed come about, he makes the time factor subordinate to the achievements of the objective and thus makes himself part of an almost infinite process, i.e., a process that is moving toward a moment that cannot be foretold. If the period of time necessary to reach the ideal state "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs" can only be measured in theoretical terms, one can predict that the struggle being waged to achieve that ideal state will go on endlessly. The vagueness of the time element is very much in keeping with the "strategy without time" that the Soviet Union, as the leader of the socialist world, has kept intact and employed since 1917. A review of the 65-year history of the Red superpower is an invitation to reflect on the way the *time factor* has been dealt with when developing strategy and the importance that would have to be attributed to this *modus operandi* to preserve the security of the nonsocialist world.

How do the Soviets interpret the presence of the time factor that is such a substantial part of our strategy? Briefly, technically speaking, the

search for utopian communism will go on without any preset time limit, so that it will last an indefinite number of years or generations. This fact, which is clearly evident in Communist strategy, is a source of concern to us since it leaves no room for a truce; the battle (*praxis*) has no foreseeable end. Where is genuine peace in this world that the Soviets force us to share and that they explain on the basis of their dialectical materialism? Is peace nothing more than an abatement of the intensity of a battle that has no end? The *pax sovietica* is the subjugation of all peoples to Marxism. Therefore, one cannot expect any political agreement between the U.S.S.R. and other states to lead to any real alleviation of world tensions, since the strategy being implemented does not allow for that option.



The endless battle to which the official policy line of the U.S.S.R. condemns the West makes no provision for any cease-fire until the basic goal has been achieved, which is very unlikely. This is a grim conclusion inasmuch as it indicates that the Yalta, Geneva, and SALT I and SALT II agreements, to mention some of the most salient, have only momentary importance in the Soviet Union's strategic approach. Further, in an unmeasured time frame, defeats have no more importance than passing events. They represent a partial setback while the monstrous war continues to be waged, a war wherein time loses its practical dimension and has nothing whatsoever to do with time as routinely understood. It becomes an accidental circumstance that will unfavorably affect only immediate generations. What is important is to bring about that golden dream of all Marxists, one that systematically becomes more and more remote, slipping through their hands like some unattainable fantasy.

In the past, wars alternated with periods of

peace that could be clearly identified by the absence of violent confrontations between nations. Today, the concept of war that communism has introduced—it is the center of Communist policy, according to Lenin; it is a policy with bloodshed, according to Mao Tse-tung—has put an end to any hope for a true and lasting peace. The strategy that is employed to transform such novel notions of war into fact is consistent. We can understand from that approach why all triumphs do not end in achieving the purpose of the war and why defeats are not considered final. The search for the Marxist paradise in which the Soviet Union is engaged feeds the maelstrom that its "strategy without time" produces, where time as a factor, so vital to a beleaguered world such as our own, takes on another dimension that serves dangerously to confound any attempt to develop suitable responses.

THUS far in history, no state or group of states has undertaken to conquer the world with such resolve and dedication as the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, if so many difficulties arise in putting together reasonably happy national societies, it can be assumed that a political undertaking that involves the entire planet will automatically become something colossal.

But Marxist theory has shaped the intellect of Soviet leaders and has given them a heavy strategic responsibility: the ideological and physical conquest of a very divided and diversified world that has never achieved lasting agreements, shared common objectives, or established stable agreements to make for better understanding among nations. Notwithstanding this apparent political madness, one must consider carefully the events that have happened since the Bolshevik machinery first went into operation in 1917, make allowances for the nonbelievers and remind them that the successes achieved through that course of action are proof of the efficiency of the Leninist revolutionary method which, moral judgments aside, has yielded positive results for Kremlin administrators.

Regardless of which country they live in, Marxists are convinced of the viability of expanding the Red internationalist project to the most remote corners of the planet and work relentlessly to achieve that ideal goal. While the classic schools of strategic thought give more moderate weight to the *space factor*, Marxist-Leninist strategy puts the space factor on a global scale. In other words, the space factor is on the same colossal dimension as the time factor, whose philosophical horizon is the practical fulfillment of perfect communism. Although the breadth of the space factor is beyond the comprehension of nonsocialist orthodox strategists, it has been patiently analyzed by the first Communist power to find a strategic *modus operandi* that will enable it to keep that factor under control. In this respect, the Soviets have already achieved decisive territorial and political successes that are visible to any observer. More than one-fourth of the world's population is governed by socialist rules which, though not completely uniform among all countries, are in keeping with the general principles of the Communist philosophy. This fact shows us clearly that the techniques that Soviet communism has used are sufficiently effective to make us question whether it is indeed impracticable to operate strategically within a worldwide spatial framework. The ups and downs experienced over the course of the prolonged world ideological offensive that the Soviets have led may misguide those who do not have an in-depth understanding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. A rapid reading of the official theory prevailing in the Soviet Union shows how its disciples are obligated to make every effort to obtain the seemingly unobtainable.

Logically, expansion of the strategic space to include the entire planet is unrealistic. However, when that factor is coupled with discretionary use of time, the image of the fabulous undertaking that both strategic elements entail again becomes a matter of serious concern. In Western terms, the likelihood of conquering and subjugating the entire world, without correcting for the diversity of races, religions, and cultures that

now coexist, is a plan that is in the realm of the psychedelic, one that is impossible to accomplish within reasonable time periods. However, the Marxist-Leninist concept of "strategy without time" could, if it encounters no adequate opposition, work the alchemy that we now regard as pure fantasy.

In any event, control over the space factor under the Soviet Communist conception would have been much more difficult had the enormous theater of war created thanks to the existence of the Marxist philosophy not been ingeniously compartmentalized. The systematic division of the world into large-scale operational sectors keeps the uniqueness of the various regions and countries that make up each region intact. This is a priority, the means to deal separately with the questions that arise in each geopolitical unit.

The Soviet Union has already selected its global strategy model for spreading communism beyond its borders, in accordance with the dictates of "proletarian internationalism." It has opted for the indirect strategy, where face-to-face confrontation between the major protagonists in this human drama is a very remote possibility. On the other hand, the entire organization and all forces have been harnessed to develop revolutionary war worldwide—expansion of the fraternal internationalism by way of actual deeds—as a well-integrated *modus operandi* directed at defeating the external monster that capitalism supposedly represents within the traditional class struggle that Marxists hold sacred.


Using this practical definition of their indirect strategy, the Soviets decided without exception that their theater of revolutionary war would cover the entire world. However, for that political undertaking to be controlled by the Soviets using their available means or resources, they set up as many theaters of operation as there were Communist parties in the various countries. If it is acknowledged that at present there are 91 parties that under various names adhere to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, we must suppose that there are 91 theaters of operation that are kept fully operational, even though one might not detect

warlike acts or even the presence of organized violence.

In those 91 theaters that have been set up in the countries around the world that harbor within their territory, knowingly or unknowingly, legal or clandestine Communist parties, the strategic method employed is that of subversive warfare. This is a perverse offshoot of revolutionary war, often silent but in some instances fraught with violence, when the opposition of those who refuse to allow themselves to be subjugated is forceful and effective. In each of those theaters of operation, under the zonal responsibility of the Communist party established in the area, the subversive warfare is fitted to the specific national circumstances like a glove to the hand. Each of those political centers of subversive operations is supervised from the headquarters of international operations headed by prominent leaders who are little known publicly; Yuri V. Andropov, for example, was little known in his role as Director of the KGB, as is Boris N. Ponomarev, Chief of the International Department of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Some recent examples of that subversion are reflected in the current situations in Afghanistan, Somalia, Namibia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, to cite only a few countries where the presence and activity of the so-called local Communist parties have achieved various stages of Marxist-Leninist domination.

Thus, the Soviets are moving ahead in the world. They are achieving consistent gains and are confusing the nonsocialist politicians and military men who are neither accustomed to nor professionally educated in the strategy of macro-dimensional factors. The solution that has been found to put the space factor into practice has brought splendid results to the Soviet Politburo, without its having had to exert efforts that could not be sustained with the resources available. This type of warfare (i.e., subversive warfare) is one of the most economical and least prone to verifiable indictment by other states because by preference the leaders resort to local human



and material means to carry out their superior tactics. When outside assistance is needed from socialist countries, the support required is relatively small and at little cost. What at the outset would seem to be a utopian objective becomes much more realistic with this administrative and operational division of labor, and the probabilities of success increase significantly.

Thus far in history there has never been a strategy where the space factor was on such a massive scale. Not even the insane machinations of Adolf Hitler were organized and carried out in such a way as to pose any real threat except to the European countries that had already been invaded. The British, Spanish, Romans, and Mongols saw huge empires collapse before their very eyes, but none of them ever attempted the physical and ideological expansion to which the Soviet leaders now aspire with manifest determination and aggressiveness. What differences do we detect between the earlier empire builders and those who now aspire to world conquest?

The interests that motivated some of the leaders of the past—Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Philip II, Victoria, and even Hitler—were basically the classic ambitions of political and economic power. The interests

that move the Soviet Marxist-Leninists to revolutionary action have much more deep-seated and durable roots than any of these others because the conquests to be made were no longer confined to the realm of material power. Rather, the priority target is the total takeover of the human mind so that men will learn to obey the doctrine that forcefully imposes egalitarianism and ideological slavery on the masses (“from each according to his capacity, to each according to his need”).

In the face of these disturbing facts, the nonsocialist world has the obligation and responsibility to ponder carefully and calmly the threat that the Soviet Communist strategy poses through the manipulation of its time and space factors. The apparent absurdity implicit in the content of the strategy is no cause to abandon its analysis because if that attitude were to be adopted, our freedom and independence would be handed over to Soviet forces because of our own naiveté and ingenuousness. The evidence compiled in the last forty years is sufficient to arouse our intellectual and moral defense.

IN Soviet strategy, the notion of *the ploy* is in no way inconsistent with what we have

said with respect to the utilitarian exploitation of the time and space factors. On the contrary, civilian and military leaders, in a close political communion born of identical indoctrination, have understood the need to standardize the practical interpretation of these instruments so that together they may faithfully serve the final and lasting ends obscurely described in Communist philosophy.

For these reasons, it should come as no surprise to us that Soviet strategic ploys involve political, economic, social, and military forces indiscriminately when this is in the interest of the ends established. We should not forget that the Soviets are conducting a revolutionary war; by any yardstick it is an unconventional conflict because of the heterodox means and type of tactics used. The important point to remember is that the complex Soviet strategic activity is aimed solely at achieving a political objective, represented in the theory by the triumph of Marxist dogmas. Hence, the strategic ploy does not identify with any one camp in particular but rather feeds on any of them indiscriminately and tends to be stronger where opposition is weaker. The reason for this phenomenon is that Marxism-Leninism is a totalitarian doctrine intrinsically weakened by its internal contradictions and lacking in natural powers, thereby forcing solid defenses used to oppose it by those who know its congenital weaknesses. That is why this doctrine thrives only in regions where defensive barriers are ideologically tenuous.

In the meantime, the Soviets continue to deploy a strategy that has no temporal limit and is mapped out on a worldwide spatial dimension; they keep the maneuvering factor flexible so as to adapt it to suit the conditions that evolve as the battle progresses. For example, let us cite one of the most conflict-ridden strategic ploys that the leaders in the Kremlin planned and conducted behind the scenes during the last decade, with the complicity of the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist front. Although that ploy did not achieve the desired success, it at least served to promote more than one polemic among

the democratic European sectors.

The so-called Eurocommunism, or communism assimilated by Europeans who are under democratic regimes, sought to hide the wolf in sheep's clothing. Had Eurocommunism rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, had it played its part fairly in pluralistic elections and on an equal footing, had it accepted democratic coexistence without harboring messianic political ambitions, it simply would have ceased to be communism and would have become a pseudo-socialist hybrid that had reneged on the Marxism of Marx. But the Eurocommunists betrayed themselves for what they were when they refused to condemn the international policy of the Politburo which, under the pretext of proletarian brotherhood, intervenes in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations.



Another example of a Soviet irregular strategic ploy typical of the Soviet revolutionary doctrine is the relaunching of the concept of so-called peaceful coexistence, a scheme for political advancement totally lacking in peaceful intent. The peaceful coexistence that the Soviets foster is fully in keeping with Leninist dogma which states that coexistence between two different societies is impossible. Peaceful coexistence rules out open confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. merely in order to avoid the holocaust that the indiscriminate use of the world's biggest nuclear arsenals would mean and which would not in any way be to the advantage of Soviet communism. In this kind of "catch-as-catch-can" that admits coexistence, the only thing prohibited is the generalized use of atomic weaponry; all other methods and means of political, economic, social, and military combat are legitimate and hence usable, according to Soviet strategic thought.

Ploys of this type suggest that the means of confrontation are frequently mingled among various fields of human activity, where subversive warfare is an undeniable fact and operations take on strange forms that defy the conventional understanding of nonsocialist leaders. The use of one type of variant or another (be it political, economic, social, or military) is a response to the specific circumstances prevailing in each theater of operations—each state where a Communist party exists—and therefore the examples must be evaluated with particular care since they are not always useful as experience in other theaters. The solutions applied in the United States-Vietnamese conflict are of little use in the Salvadorian-Guatemalan-Honduran case, since it must be recalled that each theater of operation where a subversive war is being conducted with the intervention of local Marxist-Leninist organizations backed by the Kremlin is unique. Hasty comparisons in this area lead to dangerous and irreparable mistakes.

It is no wonder that nonsocialist strategists feel somewhat disconcerted because of the odd mixture of ingredients that the Soviet operators bring to their strategic ploys, parading a considerable political-military agility. The best means to detect in advance strategic situations that are likely to crop up in the context of a total world confrontation is to make an in-depth study of the theory of subversive warfare as the most advantageous political-military scheme selected by the U.S.S.R. to carry Marxist-Leninist doctrine beyond its borders. When war compulsively becomes the center of policy, separate and isolated study of each one of the instruments that is being manipulated in the gigantic confrontation is totally meaningless because one runs the risk of losing sight of the real center of gravity that the Soviets have established to unleash their strategic offensive; even more so when countries under attack are targets of an insidious and well-orchestrated psychological campaign conducted with the support of the social communications media and organizations associated with Communist parties. What happened on the United

States domestic front between 1965 and 1975 is a crude example of what can happen when. On one side there are strategists who are experts in subversive warfare, and on the other side an attempt is made to respond to the attack by using classic and conventional means. The result of that campaign, which was so well planned, was a corrupting sense of national frustration, whose side effects have only recently begun to dissipate.

Just as the space and time factors of Soviet strategy are consistent conceptually and in terms of dimension, a pattern repeats itself in the ploys. It continues when it yields positive effects over the course of time and is interrupted only when it has achieved its objective or when there is evidence of failure. It is not subject to either time or space; there are no outside pressures or limits, only decisive success or decisive failure. These operational criteria apply in manipulating the strategic factors; they give the leaders of the Soviet Politburo significant freedom of action, which they know how to use to support novel initiatives and ethical-moral standards that are contrary to man's nature.

WHAT is the material purpose of the huge global Soviet strategy? In summary, it is to organize a double claw or set of pincers with colossal arms that will enable the Soviets to surround, via exterior lines (outflanking maneuver), the heart of its most difficult enemies: Washington and Peking. In the meantime, interior lines (local subversive wars) rush upon each one of the geopolitical units in succession. These are the countries that, when combined, form the arms of the pincers that will make that deadly embrace possible. How long will the maneuver in that global strategy last? Its importance is relative; what is vital is to make the idea set forth in Marxist-Leninist theory a reality. Is what we have said a gross exaggeration? To those who think so, we invite you to look at any political map of the world and affix red flags to those countries that at the present time are threatened by or governed by Marxist socialist regimes and

pseudo-Marxist regimes, and either supported by or looked kindly upon by the U.S.S.R.; then draw a line to connect those red flags. You will see with surprise that the lines take on the shape of rudimentary pincers that hovers over the two capitals mentioned earlier.

No one can honestly deny that there are gaps in those lines that indicate fissures caused by a variety of reasons such as the so-called European arm that so gallantly took on the Berlin blockade (1949), the Portuguese fiasco in 1974, the freezing of the Eurocommunist campaign, which has caused a persistent atrophy. However, one must not fail to recall that the political-geographic gaps have not appeared because of the absence of subversive action but rather because of the momentary triumph of peoples and governments that refuse to become new "popular democracies." In this particular regard, it is wise to recall that the defeats of the Marxist-Leninist praxis are temporary. The fact that the Soviets still cling to

this concept should alert the nonsocialist world to the fact that it must cease to be so easily trapped by the temptations of a false security.

This interpretation of the strategy of the most aggressive Communist-spreading center of our time indicates that mankind has a critical period ahead, during which we will have to fight off the domination of the Red wave. The seriousness of the situation described here should not transform us into incurable pessimists who assume that all is lost. Nevertheless, a solid and united response to the offensive strategy that the Soviet Union is conducting is essential to neutralize the freedom of action with which it currently operates. To accomplish this, it is essential that we begin by knowing every detail of the enemy that threatens our lifestyle and our basic freedoms. What hangs in the balance is nothing more and nothing less than the security of our world.

*Buenos Aires,
Argentina*


1984 Air University Airpower Symposium

The eighth annual Air University Airpower Symposium, featuring the topic "United States Air Force Role in Security Assistance," will be held 5-7 March 1984 at Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Papers will be presented to illustrate problems, policies, developments, and recommendations. Panel topics for subdivisions of the theme are the following:

- Security Assistance Policy, Responsibilities, and Organization;
- Implementation of Current USAF Security Assistance Program / Training;
- Impacts of Security Assistance on the USAF; and
- Issues, Initiatives, and Trends.

More information on the symposium may be obtained from Lt Col Richard J. Eyermann, Airpower Symposium, Air War College (AWC/EDRP), Maxwell AFB, AL 36112 or AUTOVON 875-2831/Commercial (205) 293-2831.




MUROMETS TO BLACKJACK: THE VVS AT 66

DR. ALBERT L. WEEKS

THE new *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (1976-80) boasts of one of the Soviet Air Force's firsts: the Ilya Muromets, a four-engine bomber designed by Igor Sikorsky and first flown in 1913, during the reign of Nicholas II.¹ Under General Mikhail Vladimirovich Shidlovsky, these aircraft proved themselves the world's first heavy bombers, participating in 422 World War I raids, some of which involved four and one-half-hour sorties. Seventy years later, as the Soviets prepare to celebrate the 66th anniversary

of the establishment of the Red Air Force, they can boast of a forthcoming major addition to their long-range bomber force—the NATO-designated Blackjack, a manned bomber capable of speeds in excess of mach 2.² This plane, which is 20 percent larger than our B-1B, can fire air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) or penetrate air defenses to drop gravity weapons. The Tupolev plant could be producing as many as 100 of these planes a year by 1986. Photo reconnaissance satellites detected the new aircraft in 1981; currently



it is undergoing tests at Ramenskoye. The Blackjack could be operationally deployed with the Soviet Air Force—the *Voyenno-vozdushnye sily* or *VVS* by 1987.

The old Muromets and the new Blackjack should remind us of a recurrent theme in Soviet strategic planning: the capability to deliver ordnance as far as possible from the landlocked frontiers of Mother Russia, thus expanding her frontiers at minimal risk to the “spark” of the world revolution. V. I. Lenin appreciated the importance of a strong air force to the future of world revolution. All succeeding leaders—including today’s General Secretary Yuri Andropov—have renewed their commitment to Lenin’s position.

Neglect of Bombers

Although long-range aviation as epitomized by the four-engine bomber has been a part of the *VVS* since the surviving Muromets were drafted into the Red Air Force, and despite the strategic importance of keeping war as far as possible from Russia, the Soviets have seldom attempted to develop more than a modest air-breathing capability in this area. Why? Although Soviet revolutionary expansionism is linked to the military power necessary to achieve Lenin’s goals, Soviet expansionist ambitions—until the 1950s—outpaced their mastery of aerial technology. Not even the great Russian aircraft designer Andrei N. Tupolev (1888-1972), whose first long-range bombers were manufactured in limited quantities in the early 1930s, could convince Stalin of the wisdom of heavy bombers. Furthermore, engines for such aircraft were too small or too unreliable to meet Tupolev’s advanced airframe designs.³ Thus, the country that led the world in heavy bombers in 1917 spent the next 18 years struggling with technology in an attempt to regain her leadership and was without a new, indigenously produced four-engine bomber for virtually the entire period. The Soviets again achieved their pre-eminence in the field in 1935, but it was short-lived because of the role that Stalin played.

Josef Stalin has often been accused of paranoia, and that paranoia was perhaps best evidenced in his suspicion of the professional military and the intelligentsia. The purges of the general staff and the senior officer corps in the later 1930s attest to the more dreadful side of his nature. Tupolev fell from favor not for any failings of his scientific work but because Stalin suspected him—as he did Marshals M. N. Tukhachevsky and V. K. Blyukher, army commanders I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir, and many scores of thousands of others—of being Nazi sympathizers. One theory holds that the Gestapo passed incriminating “evidence” to tsarist émigrés in Paris who gave the information to NKVD agents who then passed it on to Stalin. Whatever the reason, the purges removed the brain trust of Soviet aviation. Most were never to reappear, but, fortunately for the U.S.S.R., some were merely put into cold storage. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Tupolev, like many other Soviet scientists, was released from prison and brought back into the defense fold.

Despite this turn of events, the use of long-range bombers was never fully accepted by Stalin as a viable method of waging war. Nor have many Soviet professional soldiers or uniformed strategists accepted it until recently. For example, the contemporary Soviet officer’s library textbook, *Military Strategy*, edited by a team of military thinkers headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, vehemently rejects the recommendations of Italian theorist Giulio Douhet.⁴ The latest edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* echoes Sokolovsky:

. . . Douhet’s theories suffer from the bourgeois disease of fear of the revolutionization of mass armies [by] commending the use of bomber aviation . . . to decide the outcome of war. The experience of World War II proved the complete unsupportability of Douhet’s views on air war; the experience learned from later local wars [since World War II] also exposes the groundlessness of the Douhet point of view.⁵

Although some large Tupolev-designed airplanes like the Maxim Gorky were produced in

the early years of the Soviet state, they were not part of a concerted effort to produce a strategic force of heavy bombers. Aviation theory in the Stalinist era stipulated the use of air power primarily in close coordination with ground forces and for transport of troops and supplies. In large measure, technological shortcomings—particularly in engine design—inhibited the development of heavy bombers, so that the Russians did not keep pace with the British and Americans. The small number of large aircraft produced in the Soviet Union in the 1930s were primarily used for display over Red Square (for foreigners) and on tour (for the native population), to garner propaganda benefits and achieve specific aviation records.

At first glance, one is tempted to point to the Stalinist theory of "socialism in one country," the ideological manifestation of Stalinist communism, as inhibiting long-range bomber development. Some have interpreted the expression of this doctrine as evidence that Stalin had renounced Trotsky's and Zinoviev's—indeed the Communist International—goal of revolutionizing the globe and reforming it in the Soviet image. Stalin, however, rejected this interpretation:

The very development of world revolution . . . will be that more rapid and thorough the more Socialism strengthens itself in the first victorious country [the USSR], the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of world revolution, into the lever for the further disintegration of imperialism. . . . The development of world revolution will be that more rapid and thorough, too, the more effectively aid is rendered the workers of other countries by the first Socialist country.⁶

Thus, Stalin did not reject but, rather, wholeheartedly endorsed Lenin's admonition to revolutionize the world. The echo of Stalin's statement has been heard and heeded by each succeeding generation of Soviet leaders, and Yuri Andropov has said that he adheres to the same commitment.

Neglect of the long-range heavy bomber arm of the Soviet Air Force until the 1950s did not stem from "socialism in one country" or any

"abandonment" of Leninist goals for world revolution. Rather it resulted from a combination of factors including Stalin's predilection for ground forces and a traditionally Russian commitment to defense in depth. There were also technological limitations which, despite the brilliance of many of the early Soviet aircraft designers, were not overcome until after the Second World War. Finally, there was the effect of the purges on the professional and technical classes.

A Look at the VVS

The Soviet VVS was not born like an Athena full-blown from the brow of Zeus—or even Lenin. Lenin's military advisers, including Leon Trotsky, wanted to exploit and adopt whatever they found to be useful in the tsarist military. Besides co-opting the Ilya Muromets, Lenin's ad hoc "Bureau of Aviation Commissars" began rounding up as many *spetsy* (tsarist aviation specialists, including pilots and mechanics) as they could find in December 1917. Within two years the Red air arm included 500 aircraft, 270 qualified pilots, enough ground crews to suffice, and sufficient knowledgeable technicians to establish a number of aviation schools.⁷ Former tsarist officers made up 80 percent of the pilots, 60 percent of the detachment commanders, and 62 percent of the frontal and army air commanders. Some 40 percent of the enlisted ground crew had served in the old Imperial Army.

Aviation proved crucial in defeating the White and Green forces* as well as the interventionist forces during the Russian Civil War. Later, the Red Air Force assisted in the tremendous task of sovietizing the whole of the vast tsarist empire, including the non-Russian borderlands such as the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, central Asia, and the Tatar regions, areas that comprised nearly half of the former imperial population.

From its earliest period until the mid-1930s, aviation contributed to the emerging Soviet state

*The Greens were originally those who evaded the White "draft." Later the term referred to White deserters who banded together and defied Red attempts to control disputed territory in 1919-20.

in a number of ways. Among significant firsts were the original over-the-pole flight to the United States in 1937. Politically, the quest for air power helped lay the foundation for an elaborate Soviet-German collaboration, which continued until the Nazi legions poured across the Soviet border on 22 June 1941.

In the interwar period, while the Soviets generally lagged in bomber development, they kept pace with or led most Western countries in the development of fighters and light bombers (though a good deal of their equipment was of foreign design).⁸ More important, Soviet strategists developed a viable doctrine for coordinating air and ground forces. To some degree, they have the Germans to thank for progress in this area. After Junkers built its factory in Fili outside Moscow in 1922 to avoid the restrictions imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty, the Soviets began enjoying the best of all possible arrangements: Not only did they get the direct benefits of aid from German technicians but they were also able to send officers to Germany for extended sojourns. The training of Russian aviation technicians and military personnel proved a significant by-product of this symbiotic relationship that lasted, in one form or another, for nearly twenty years.

The expansiveness of the vast Russian Steppes facilitated the testing of airplanes and, incidentally, rockets. On the Steppes the Russians constructed their *aerodromy* and testing facilities. In charge of this effort was Andrei Vasiliyevich Sergeev (1893-1933), a former tsarist flyer who headed the Main Directorate of the Air Fleet in 1921 and 1922.

Under Sergeev, who was to become a central figure in the development of Soviet aviation, and subsequent administrations, the Red Air Force began to field planes that were a credit to their Russian designers. Between the early 1920s and the mid-1930s these designers produced an ever-improving series of fighters including the *I-2*, *I-3*, *I-4*, and *I-5*.^{*} These designers also produced a

reconnaissance aircraft of considerable capability, the *R-3*, and two heavy bomber versions, the *TB-1* and *TB-3*.^{*9}

Early Developments

In the early 1930s, with the aircraft industry firmly established, Soviet military strategists began to focus on an air strategy. Two traditions emerged. First, there was to be close coordination between tactical support aircraft and the developing armored component of the Red Army. Unlike other air forces of that time, the Red Air Force did not move toward independence as a separate service. Second, long-range aviation continued to stagnate.


The period was rich in innovation. There were significant improvements in the parachute, which had first appeared in tsarist Russia in 1913.¹⁰ In 1926, the *BICH-3*,^{**} the world's first "flying wing," was flown.¹¹ Soviet pilots set a number of international long-duration flight records.¹² Finally, the Soviets formed the world's first paratroop and airborne divisions, with the enthusiastic support of Red Army Marshals K. Y. Voroshilov and M. N. Tukhachevsky.¹³

Still, it was the development of close cooperation between the tactical air components and the ground units that dominated this period. These developments enjoyed not only the blessings of army commanders like Tukhachevsky (whose exhaustive writings reveal some amazing anticipations of current Soviet doctrine and strategy) but also had the benefit of the innovative thinking of Soviet designers and inventors who contributed their own creative notions. Not only was there A. N. Tupolev but also K. E. Tsiolkovsky, pioneer rocketeer, as well as N. N. Polikarpov and D. P. Grigorovich, fighter designers, and literally dozens of other engineers who were perhaps not so well known but just as important to the future of Soviet aviation. Together, each in his own way, these designers worked to keep the

^{*}*I* is the abbreviation for *istrebitel'* or fighter-pursuit aircraft.

^{*}*R* is the abbreviation for *razvedchik* (reconnaissance) while *TB* stands for *tyazhyolyy bombardirovshchik* (heavy bomber).

^{**}*BICH* is an acronym for Boris Ivanovich Cheranovskyy.



While imprisoned in 1936 and 1937, A. N. Tupolev designed the Tu-2 (above) as a counterpart to Germany's Ju-88. The Tu-2s performed both close air support and interdiction-type missions during the Red Army's thrust into Europe in 1944-45. . . . Soviet pilots favored the Il-28 (below) over a competing Tupolev design. Built by the thousands, many Il-28s still serve in the Soviet Air Force as target tugs, meteorological aircraft, and trainers.



Soviet Air Force thinking about airlifting heavy loads, flying long distances with significant payloads, and, above all, in combining and coordinating the air arm with the ground forces.

Prewar Developments

As noted earlier, the purges took a tremendous toll among the Soviet General Staff and from the commanders of the various services. During the first purges in 1934, the Red Army was left relatively unscathed, but in 1937 the Soviet dictator turned his full fury against the professional officer corps. Of the 75,000 senior and field grade officers in the Red Army, 30,000 were either executed by the NKVD or imprisoned. The purge claimed 90 percent of the general officers and 80 percent of the colonels.¹⁴ Three of the five Soviet marshals were executed, among them Marshals Tukhachevsky and Blyukher. A similar portion of the Red air command was also swept away.

Combined with the setbacks it suffered in the latter days of the Spanish Civil War and the embarrassment of its performance in the Winter War with Finland in 1939 and 1940, the Red Air Force faced significant problems on the eve of the war with Germany. On paper, however, the Soviet military seemed impressive. The defense-centered five-year plans had produced an awesome military-industrial complex by the late thirties. The Red Air Force was larger than any of the capitalist air forces;¹⁵ the Russians accomplished this by doubling the number of aircraft to be produced under each successive five-year plan starting in 1928. Just before the German invasion in 1941, the Soviets were mass-producing Yak-1, LaGG-3, and MiG-3 fighters, Pe-2 and Pe-8 light bombers, and Il-2 Shturmovik single-engine attack planes, but this was too little, too late.

World War II Experience

When the German war machine rolled across the Soviet frontier, the Red Air Force consisted of an imposing 8000 to 10,000 aircraft in 12 air

divisions. Unfortunately, despite advances in fighter design, much of the fighter strength of the Red Air Force consisted of obsolete I-15 and I-16 aircraft of Spanish Civil War vintage. Furthermore, the German attack caught most of the Red Air Force on the ground. Soviet pilots who engaged the Luftwaffe found that Me-109s and Me-110s generally outclassed their fighters. Ignoring the effect of the purges, the greater skill of the German aircrews, and the technological superiority of the German machines, Chief Marshal of Aviation Pavel S. Kutakhov, the present Commander in Chief of the *VVS*, insists that the losses suffered in the summer and fall of 1941 were due primarily to German planning and surprise. It was these factors that, according to Kutakhov, enabled the Germans to achieve air superiority over the crucial sectors. Despite this handicap, Kutakhov notes, Soviet airmen flew some 6000 sorties "which inflicted serious damage to the enemy's tank forces as well as to the Luftwaffe, which lost 200 aircraft" early in the war.¹⁶

Kutakhov also points out that the early losses prompted sweeping measures "aimed at reconstructing the Soviet aircraft industry, strengthening the *VVS*, upgrading the preparedness and training of aircrews." Soon to follow were new aircraft including the Yak-3 and Yak-9, the La-5 and La-7, the two-seat Shturmovik Il-2, and new Ilyushin, Petlyakov, and Tupolev bombers. Kutakhov notes that significant improvements were made in airborne armament and ordnance; aerial photography; air navigation equipment; radio communications and ground-based radar; and in optics and other technologies. However, Kutakhov fails to mention that the few heavy bombers in the *VVS* fell behind their Western counterparts by lacking such advanced equipment as radar aids to navigation.

Above all, Marshal Kutakhov's article stresses the usefulness of deployments of "air armies" (*vozdushniye armii*) during the latter phase of the war. According to the Marshal, after deploying their air assets to the greatest advantage for supporting the advancing Red Army, Soviet

airmen struck enemy airfields and destroyed many German planes on the ground. Nevertheless, throughout the advance the Air Force "gave constant attention to supporting the infantry, to massing air forces in conjunction with combat actions of the ground forces."¹⁷

The Modern VVS

Modern Soviet aviation theory has gone through a number of phases roughly conforming to the phases through which Soviet military strategy has passed.

During Stalin's reign, the Red Air Force served as an arm of the ground forces. Reflecting the tactical and strategic thinking of Frunze, Tukhachevsky, and others, the Red Air Force formed part of the "combined operations" aspect of Soviet war-fighting. Accordingly, the Soviets continued to fill their inventory with fighters, medium bombers, and transports.* The few heavy bombers they had played only a small role in prosecuting the war against the Nazis.

In the late forties, Soviet science took a quantum leap with the development and detonation of nuclear weapons and the building of the Tu-4 heavy bomber. Tupolev copied the Tu-4 from three U.S. Army Air Forces' B-29 bombers that made emergency landings in Siberia after raids on Japan in 1944. Since the U.S.S.R. was not at war with Japan, the bombers were interned and then exploited by Tupolev and his engineers. By the end of Stalin's reign, the Soviet Air Force had over 1200 Tu-4s. At the same time, mass production of the Tu-4 may have seemed like a mistake just when Soviet inventories of the aircraft were skyrocketing. Imagine the consternation in the VVS when the Korean War proved the B-29 defenseless against Soviet MiGs! While the MiG-15, as an interceptor, was superior to anything

the United States had operational, the B-29 was also superior to the Tu-4. Hence, just when the U.S.S.R. had developed a significant bomber capability, their advantage evaporated overnight.

Production of the Tu-4 ceased after Stalin's death. In the early fifties a new generation of bombers, including the Tu-16 Badger medium-range jet, the Mya-4 Bison long-range jet, and the Tu-95 Bear long-range turboprop bombers entered the Soviet inventory. It seems that intercontinental bombers like the Bison and Bear were seen as a temporary expedient until rockets of sufficient power and reliability could be developed.¹⁸ During this period, American intelligence overreacted and overestimated the prospective size of the Soviet bomber fleet to prompt an illusory "bomber gap."¹⁹

With the death of Stalin, Soviet military thinkers enjoyed new freedom to be innovative. This led to an all-out effort to build missiles capable of carrying nuclear and thermonuclear warheads. Soviet strategy, previously subject to the whims of Stalinist dogmatism, began to develop along more logical lines.


Strategy and Technology

Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU intelligence officer executed in 1962 for spying, discussed the increased vitality in Soviet strategic and military thinking in the post-Stalinist period in the famous *Penkovsky Papers*. In the midfifties, Penkovsky notes, a decision was made to move away from heavy bombers and to concentrate on building the Strategic Rocket Forces as an independent branch of service.²⁰ While it is difficult to determine the order in the relationship between technological innovation and political-military planning and doctrine (and, specifically, which drive which), it is clear that in the post-Stalinist period—and especially since Khrushchev's fall in 1964—doctrine and strategy have worked synergistically with technology.

As the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces grew in the late fifties and into the sixties, the Soviets continued to

*The Soviets produced more than 125,000 aircraft during World War II; this number was supplemented by several thousand aircraft from Great Britain and the United States. The U.S. total of approximately 14,000 Lend-Lease aircraft to the U.S.S.R. included 9000 P-39, 40 63 types, about 4000 A-20 and B-25, and 700 C-47. No heavy bombers were included.

In 1951 Stalin ordered V. M. Myasishchyeu to build an intercontinental jet bomber. The technological state of the art demanded that it be large, but the Mya-4 was also underpowered and only 200 were built. Approximately 45 remain in the SAF as long-range bombers, and 30 serve as in-flight refuelers.




support Marxist-Leninist revolutions throughout the world. Even though Khrushchev announced in January 1961 that the Soviets would confront the West through wars of national liberation, the importance of a strategic striking force not only remained but perhaps grew in importance. While missile development was emphasized in this period, long-range bombers continued to play a role in the VVS.²¹


Enter the Blackjack

Soviet air doctrine calls for the VVS to support the army, defend the homeland from bomber and missile attack, and maintain transports to deploy troops to overseas hotspots. Traditionally, although they have great theoretical value, long-range bombers have played only a minor practical role in Soviet strategy. Why then has the U.S.S.R. opted to build a new supersonic intercontinental bomber?

The answer to this question is to be found in how the Soviets might use the Blackjack. The bomber may be the result of a major change that took place in Soviet military thinking at the end of the sixties and in the early seventies when Soviet planners began thinking in terms of waging large-scale conventional as well as nuclear war.²² The Soviet concept of protracted war is that warfare might go through several prolonged stages.* It might start as a conventional war and move into nuclear conflict and revert to a form of warfare that would include the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons. The development of the Blackjack suggests that the Kremlin's



*On the declaratory policy or propaganda level, Soviet civilian writers, when discussing controlled escalation and the U.S. strategy of "flexible response," criticize the notion of phased escalation, attributing it to a "capitalist plot" to legitimize nuclear war.



The An-22 (left), which first flew in 1965, represents the U.S.S.R.'s initial effort at building a heavy transport capable of supporting Soviet power projection over long distances. . . . The Tu-22 (above), a contemporary of the B-58, is a supersonic bomber which, with in-flight refueling, threatens all of Europe, Japan, and shipping in the North Atlantic and western Pacific.



The Tu-95 Bear intercontinental bomber (below) has been part of the S.A.F. since the midfifties. It still is the backbone of the strategic bombing fleet and also performs long-range reconnaissance and antishipping roles.



strategists have accepted the view that their bomber—like the American B-1B—could perform as an ALCM-carrier or be used to deliver either conventional or nuclear weapons in the period after the initial nuclear exchange. Certainly the Blackjack—unlike a missile—has the advantage of being recallable, and the ability to recall a strategic striking force means that the force can be used with greater flexibility to intimidate or demonstrate resolve during crises.

Yet another possibility is that Blackjack, with its long-range capability, may be part of a new Soviet effort to enhance their force projection potential. If, for example, the U.S.S.R. were to acquire additional basing rights in the Western Hemisphere—perhaps in the Caribbean island of Grenada, where a new long runway is under construction “for civil purposes,” or elsewhere in Central America—Blackjack would be able to deploy with ease and perform missions from these bases which would have the bomber ranging all over the hemisphere. Furthermore, the Blackjack could be used in the European theater to strike crippling blows in the opening phases of a conflict and do so with blinding speed. The Soviets seem to have adopted what they call the “Douhet philosophy” previously rejected with vehemence. Certainly there is evidence to suggest that Soviet military thinkers are once again examining their World War II experience from the standpoint of aerial bombardment and its uses in nonnuclear conflict.

For the present, the main tenets of Soviet aviation doctrine are likely to remain unchanged:

- Support ground forces in mass attacks of conventional, partly nuclear, or totally nuclear constitution;
- Carry out a variety of theater or intercontinental missions involving transport and bombing raids;
- Intimidate potential foes throughout the world; and

- Gain aerial supremacy in any military confrontation.

To these ends, the Soviets seem to be restructuring their strategy to develop their own version of flexible response.

The latest innovation in air force organization in the U.S.S.R. reveals a reassessment of the assignment of air forces and their organization by *fronts*, military districts, and so on. New aircraft such as the Su-25 Frogfoot close-air-support fighter and the Su-24 Fencer interdiction fighter-bomber promise new flexibility across the battle front and extending to the enemy’s rear.²³ Helicopters will play a large part in any Soviet blitzkrieg attack into Asia or Europe. Choppers like the Mi-24 Hind, under the direct control of ground commanders, will provide assets for a form of close air support that has the advantage of being able to move with the offensive and, if required, provide continuous air coverage for a unit.²⁴ Furthermore, we might expect the Soviets to overhaul their air forces to combine the command of long-range aviation with that of the Strategic Rocket Forces to create an entity that would more closely resemble the U.S. triad.²⁵

THE SOVIET VIEW remains as it has since the 1960s and 1970s and echoes Stalin’s behest that the first socialist state must hold the initiative at every stage and be prepared to go to war with the capitalist powers. Moreover, Soviet military literature abounds with terms like *frustrate*, *preclude*, *crush*, *forestall*, etc., a nuclear attack. Indeed, both the “short war” thesis and the “long war” thesis are but alternate parts of the arsenal of Soviet strategic thought. In either or both scenarios, tactical and strategic air power occupy very important niches. The *VVS* has a varied and rich history, and it most certainly seems to have a promising future.

New York University

We wish to thank Major Gregory Varhall of the Air War College for his editorial assistance.

Notes

1. Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov, editor, *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia)* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1977), vol. 3, p. 512. Henceforth referred to as *SVE*.
2. *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83*, pp. 232-33. A picture of Blackjack, formerly known as Ram-P, appeared in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Fall 1982.
3. Air Vice-Marshal S. W. B. Menaul, *Russian Military Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 61.
4. Harriet Fast Scott, editor, *Soviet Military Strategy* by V. D. Sokolovsky (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1968). See pp. 266, 270, 390, and 543-44 for discussion.
5. *SVE*, vol. 3, p. 276.
6. J. V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), vol. 6, pp. 415 and 418. These and similar statements are compiled in Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, *War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks* (National Strategy Information Center, 1983).
7. Colonel General I. M. Moroz, editor, *V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya aviatsiya (V. I. Lenin and Soviet Aviation)*, (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979), p. 179. Figures on the percentages of tsarist officers and men in the Red Air Force are found in this work on p. 180.
8. Harriet Fast Scott, "Soviet Air Commanders," *Air Force*, March 1982, p. 53.
9. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army* (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 115.
10. *Soviet Military Review*, No. 2, 1982, p. 24. The inventor's name was G. Ye. Kotel'nikov (1872-1944).
11. *SVE*, vol. 4, under "letayushcheye krylo" (flying wing), p. 626.
12. O'Ballance, p. 114.
13. The Germans were keenly aware of the Soviet mastery of this technique, yet they were baffled as to why the Soviets had not used paratroops throughout the war on the (Russian) western front. (Note: The Russians did make use of airborne landing in their one-week war with the Japanese later in 1945.) Cf. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York: Quill, 1979), p. 222.
14. Boris I. Nikolaevsky, editor, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era Special Report to the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *New Leader*, 1962, pp. 39-40.
15. Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov, "Voyenno-vozdushnye sily," [Soviet Air Force], in *SVE*, vol. 2, p. 203. Succeeding statistics are also drawn from this article.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
18. Menaul, p. 64.
19. Mark E. Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority* (Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982), pp. 43, 44.
20. Oleg Penkovsky, *The Penkovsky Papers* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965). For discussion, see Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, second edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 75-76.
21. See successive editions of *Soviet Armed Forces Review* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1981 and 1982) for discussion by Alfred L. Monks. For example, between 1980 and 1981, aircraft within Long Range Aviation—The Soviet Air Force bomber arm—decreased by 76 airframes. The Backfire-B strategic bomber seems to have a dual role: as a tactical weapon (in an open "conventional war" phase of a European Theater conflict) and as an intercontinental bomber (requiring, however, in-flight refueling). The former appears the more important role.
22. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, pp. 53-56.
23. Colonel Lynn M. Hansen, USAF, "Soviet Airpower: Behind the Buildup," *Air Force*, March 1981, pp. 68-72; Colonel William F. Scott, USAF (Ret), "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Organization and Concepts," *Air Force*, March 1982, pp. 43-48.
24. Hansen, p. 72.
25. Scott, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Organization and Concepts," p. 47.

Marxism is not only not accurate, it is not only not a science, has not only failed to predict a single event in terms of figures, quantities, time-scales or locations . . . it absolutely astounds one by the economic and mechanistic crudity of its attempts to explain that most subtle of creatures, the human being, and that even more complex synthesis of millions of people, society.

Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn
Letter to the Soviet Leaders



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
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by Cadet David Walker, CA-25 Squadron, AFJROTC, El Dorado High School, Placentia, California

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We gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation for funding this essay competition by a permanent grant through the United States Strategic Institute of Washington, D.C., and look forward to next year's contest with great enthusiasm.




A POSSIBLE FALLBACK COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPTION IN A EUROPEAN WAR

DR. RICHARD B. REMNEK

IN recent years serious doubts have arisen about the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to withstand a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe. Several factors underlie this concern: the numerical superiority and improving quality of the Soviet armed forces; the narrowing technological gap in U.S.-U.S.S.R. combat systems; new Soviet operational concepts designed to counter NATO's defense strategy;

the Soviets' ability to achieve tactical surprise through deception and by selecting the time and place of attack; and strains within the NATO alliance that hinder our efforts to strengthen Western Europe's defenses.

A major part of these efforts centers on improving our ability to reinforce the key central region. For this purpose the United States has decided to preposition equipment for six divisions planned



to be airlifted to Europe within ten days. (This is the POMCUS or Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured in Unit Sets program.) The Navy has acquired eight SL-7 fast container ships, each capable of transporting 56,000 measurement tons of equipment to Europe within five or six days. The crucial importance of these and other plans to enhance our strategic mobility has been stressed in a recent NATO study of military balance:

The Warsaw Pact can . . . mobilize its manpower more readily than NATO. It can also reinforce more quickly. . . . NATO cannot sustain an effective defence against these reinforced Warsaw Pact forces solely with in-place forces. Therefore, a successful defence is largely dependent upon the timely arrival of substantial reinforcements . . . However, the problems would be considerable even if there were to be reasonable warning time. Rapid reinforcement is a very complex operation that demands the timely availability of numerous resources, particularly transport aircraft and shipping.¹

However, it is unclear whether the early reaction to advance warning and close coordination among NATO allies needed for NATO's mobilization plans to work would take place during a crisis leading to war. To be sure, Soviet preparatory activities would probably be detected fairly

early, but determining what they meant would be difficult, mainly because the Soviets would undoubtedly attempt to disguise their intentions. There is no reason to believe there would be any greater consensus among and within NATO countries about Soviet intentions than now exists. The Soviets would try to work through the European peace movement to exert pressure against mobilization. On both sides of the North Atlantic, there would be reluctance to mobilize, since diverting civilian aircraft, merchant ships, airfields, ports, railroads, and other facilities to military uses would disrupt local economies.

Moreover, should our allies be slow to declare mobilization, it would delay our own buildup as well. In part, that is because much of the support infrastructure necessary for the deployment and reinforcement of U.S. forces belongs to our West European allies.

And even after mobilization had been declared, the required intricate timing and close coordination might be lacking. NATO's consultative mechanisms are cumbersome; its communication system could be overloaded, especially if key communications relay points were sabotaged during the crisis phase. In general, there is serious concern whether NATO is well suited to wartime crisis management.

Should mobilization be delayed and impeded, it would follow that much of the manpower and materiel scheduled for early air and sealift to Europe might not be in place by D-day. Indeed, they may not even have reached their forward-basing and staging areas before the latter were overrun or so damaged as to be essentially unusable.

Following the initiation of hostilities, the Soviets would try to interdict supplies and troop reinforcements to Europe. As the Soviets have begun recently to think that a war with NATO could be fought and won by conventional means alone, they have upgraded the antisea line of communication mission accordingly.² Should they interdict effectively the flow of supplies to Europe, their chances of achieving a break-



through on the Central Front would also improve significantly. In such circumstances the National Command Authorities (NCA) could be pressed by field commanders to employ theater nuclear weapons. The NCA, however, might be reluctant to do so for fear of uncontrollable escalation to an intercontinental nuclear exchange. And even if the NCA were willing, it might be unable to employ theater nuclear weapons effectively. The Soviets have developed "operational maneuver groups" to counter NATO's strategy by exploiting penetrations of NATO's forward defense lines to disrupt its rear and destroy primary targets like nuclear storage facilities.³ Should they succeed, they would destroy much of NATO's forward-based nuclear assets and at the same time mix so closely with NATO's forces in the rear as to make employment of remaining theater nuclear weapons difficult.

In a scenario where, partly as a result of delayed and disorganized mobilization, the military situation along the Central Front deteriorates beyond the point of stabilization, I believe there may yet be a conventional alternative to vertical escalation. This alternative would be to launch a counteroffensive from NATO's southern region.

The idea of a counteroffensive is not new. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in his annual report to the Congress for FY 1983, pointed to the peacetime deterrence value of a counteroffensive that would seek to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe.

A wartime strategy that confronts the enemy, were he to attack, with the risk of our counteroffensive against his vulnerable points strengthens deterrence and serves the defensive peacetime strategy. This does not mean that any allied offensive, using any means whatsoever and at any place other than the point attacked, would serve our purpose. Our counteroffensives should be directed at places where we can affect the outcome of the war. If it is to offset the enemy's attack, it should be launched against territory or assets that are of an importance to him comparable to the ones he is attacking.

Some important Soviet vulnerabilities have to do with the fact that the Soviet empire, unlike our alliance, is not a voluntary association of demo-

cratic nations. . . . Our plans for counteroffensive in war can take account of such vulnerabilities on the Soviet side.

Strategic planning for counteroffensive is not provocative. It is likely to increase the caution of the Soviet leaders in deciding on aggression, because they will understand that if they unleash a conventional war, they are placing a wide range of their assets—both military and political—at risk.⁴

To the limited extent the idea of a counteroffensive along these lines has been considered, it has usually been within the geographic context of NATO's central region.⁵ The counteroffensive option I am proposing here, however, takes the collapse of the Central Front as its point of departure. This does not mean I believe the Central Front would collapse. Rather I am simply exploring courses of action that might be available in the event the Soviets prove stronger than anticipated.

MY aim here is to stimulate discussion about alternative strategies in a European war by considering one of them, a *fallback counteroffensive option* that has two variations. This first variation could be to stage the counteroffensive from southern France. The counteroffensive could proceed directly north through the Rhone Valley or flank main Soviet forces by swinging west and then north, around the Massif Central and through Toulouse and Limoges, or in both directions simultaneously in an envelopment maneuver. The counteroffensive would then move east to the West/East German border, thereby restoring most of the status quo ante. (Should the Soviets overrun West Berlin, it would be extraordinarily difficult to retake it short of liberating East Germany.)

The second variation of the counteroffensive option could be staged from northern Italy and move east through the Ljubljana gap and then north toward the Baltic. It would advance by the shortest route and path of least resistance through the "weakest links" in the Warsaw Pact—Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. By interdicting Soviet lines of communication, it would

flank a Soviet thrust into Western Europe. Its objective would be not simply to reverse a deteriorating military situation but also to liberate Eastern and thereby Western Europe as well.

My assumption is that the Soviets may be able to check either West or East European counteroffensive operations, but they could not deal with both simultaneously, especially after the (probably major) losses they would have suffered during the first week of the war. And should the Soviets commit themselves to countering one variant, it would make available the other one. In short, we would take whichever avenue of advance the Soviets would leave us.

Furthermore, their unfavorable geographic position would induce them to make the first move. It is roughly 150 miles between Marseilles and Genoa, the two principal ports for offloading equipment and supplies for West and East European counteroffensive operations, respectively. In contrast, it is a little less than 500 miles between Lyon, a likely jumping off point for a Soviet assault on remaining NATO forces in southern France, and Bratislava on the Danube, which could serve well as a line of defense against a U.S. thrust into Eastern Europe.

Besides the greater distances involved, Soviet movements of men and materiel across northern continental Europe would likely be hindered by NATO air interdiction and hit-and-run attacks by NATO military and paramilitary forces still holding out behind enemy lines. A U.S. commander on the other hand would be able, with relative ease, to swing forces over a far shorter distance from one staging zone to the other, especially since NATO would probably control the air above the staging areas. Also, the transfer of men and materiel between staging areas would be assisted by hundreds, if not thousands, of vessels of all types and sizes that would have put into the numerous French and Italian Mediterranean ports during the prehostilities crisis period. Because it would be far easier for the United States than the Soviet commander to switch forces from one European "theater" to another, we could keep the Soviets guessing about the

direction of our counteroffensive. Because of their unfavorable situation, the Soviets would probably not be able to wait and react to our move; they would probably have to commit themselves first.

It is difficult to predict in advance which variant the Soviets would first try to counter. To a major extent their response would be based on their strategic war objectives and priorities, but these would undoubtedly be unclear, to us at least, particularly if the Soviets were able to disguise their intentions to achieve tactical surprise at the outset of war.

In the absence of certainty about Soviet strategic priorities, one can nevertheless hypothesize that the Soviets would probably choose to commit forces to the defense of Eastern Europe. This is not because they think it would be easier for us militarily to carry out an East European rather than a West European counteroffensive. It isn't. An East European operation would have to cross some very difficult mountainous terrain in Yugoslavia and have much longer logistical supply lines, which could be attacked along both flanks.

Rather, they would tend to recognize they have more to lose in Eastern Europe than gain in Western Europe, for the stakes, and hence the dangers, are far greater in their own backyard. A U.S. victory in Eastern Europe means the liberation of both East and Western Europe. That is because an exchange of occupied territory would be politically unacceptable for the United States, for unlike the first Sinai disengagement agreement after the October 1973 War, the bargaining would not be over miles of sand but the fate of millions of human lives with strong kindred ties to the West. The Soviets would also anticipate that anti-Soviet elements in East Europe would be mobilized to assist the allied counteroffensive operation in numerous and potentially important ways. Orchestrating that support would require clandestine preparatory organizational activities well before the counteroffensive started. Moreover, it would take time to overcome the demoralization of pro-Western elements in East Europe that would have set in after Soviet victo-

ries along the Central Front. Major East European support would probably follow, not precede, initial successes of a counteroffensive, and only then if the objective of that operation were clearly seen to be the liberation of Eastern Europe. Should the East Europeans distrust U.S. intentions and believe we were willing to trade East for West European territory, they would probably not even cooperate with U.S. military authorities in "liberated" areas, much less support our forward advance.

An East European counteroffensive would be a response proportional, in an international legal sense, to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. However, since an East European operation would not restore the status quo ante, it would be far more destabilizing and hence less desirable an option than a West European campaign to retake lost territory. Faced with the loss of their East European buffer, the Soviets would be more likely to employ theater nuclear weapons and thus escalate the war perhaps out of control. Given these inherent dangers, an East European counteroffensive should be selected only when the alternatives—capitulation or escalation—seem worse.

However, the feasibility of the preferred West European counteroffensive may well rest on the military credibility of the East European variant. Without the United States' demonstrating the capability and willingness to exercise that option, the Soviets would have little incentive to withhold forces to protect their deep rear. And this in turn might doom any attempt to regroup and counterattack against the main Soviet combat forces in Western Europe. Our willingness to undertake an East European operation could be demonstrated convincingly only in practice. Inserting at the outset of hostilities the large numbers of U.S. Special Forces and covert operatives needed to orchestrate support for the counteroffensive among East Europeans might serve as an early indicator of our intent to initiate the operation if necessary. The military capability to perform this operation can be demonstrated in peacetime.

The feasibility of this fallback counteroffensive option with the forces currently available can be determined reliably only through extensive war gaming and campaign analysis at a level of detail and classification beyond the scope of this article. My objective here is simply to identify and briefly consider some obvious problems connected with the operation. The key issues are the availability of men and equipment; the security of the sea lines of communication, receiving ports, and staging areas; the physical and political problems connected with crossing Yugoslavia; and, as the forces advance, the long logistic lines and their vulnerability to flanking attack.

The Availability of Men and Materiel

No reliable prediction is possible about what the military balance of remaining NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would be after a successful Soviet offensive in the central region. But planning estimates can be made in peacetime to determine what ratios of U.S. to Soviet forces and supplies would be needed to provide some confidence that a counteroffensive plan would work. And these ratios could then be compared with real-time intelligence information to determine whether the counteroffensive had a reasonable chance of success.

There is no way a priori to know whether *enough* men and materiel would be available when needed. However, in a scenario where mobilization had been delayed and, partly as a result, the Soviets broke through early (say on or about D+7), large numbers of U.S. combat forces and materiel should still be in the pipeline. Some, if not most, of the six divisions scheduled for early reinforcement of the central region might be available, as might mobilized reservists, any withheld forward-based strategic reserves, and evacuated frontline troops. U.S. troops could be augmented by Italian, French, Spanish, and NATO's southeastern flank were reasonably quiet, Greek and Turkish forces as well. Even with prepositioning of equipment in Europe

and the enhanced sealift capability of eight SL-7 fast container ships, the bulk of the heavy equipment would still be shipped to Europe by slower vessels, which might not have reached their destinations by D+15. Thus, large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other heavy equipment, which could be used in a sustained operation requiring high mobility, could be available for the counteroffensive. This might not be sufficient to accomplish the mission unless a considerable amount of equipment prepositioned in the central region could also be saved and deployed.

The Security of Sea Lines of Communication

Of all the issues related to the feasibility of the counteroffensive operation, this one appears to be the least problematic. The sea lines of communication to the Mediterranean ports should be safer than those extending directly to the Channel ports. Routing transatlantic convoys farther south to the Mediterranean would reduce the effectiveness of a Soviet air interdiction campaign directed from the north.

The potential Soviet submarine threat to our shipping lanes in the Atlantic does not appear to be serious. The Soviets recognize that the more cost-effective way of performing the anti-SLOC mission would be by destroying ports or mining straits, not by sinking cargo vessels on the open ocean. The Strait of Gibraltar would be difficult to mine because of its width, depth, and fast currents. Moreover, any Soviet attempt to mine it would be ineffective because of Western military control of the area. A Soviet surface ship or submarine could be detected and destroyed before it could lay many mines. And the few mines that might be laid could be cleared before safe passage through the Strait would be required.

The Soviet threat in the constricted waters of the western Mediterranean would be far more serious. There the Soviets' primary target would be NATO naval forces, especially the U.S. Sixth Fleet carriers; ports and other shore facilities

would be a secondary target and cargo shipping a tertiary one.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron consists on average of 45 ships, roughly 12 of which are submarines.⁶ During a local crisis such as the October 1973 War, the Soviets doubled their routine peacetime presence. In a war crisis that focused on central Europe, however, the Soviets would probably commit their Northern Fleet attack submarines, which normally service the Mediterranean Squadron, to perform a higher-priority mission—protecting their own SSBNs withheld as a strategic reserve in the Norwegian and Barents seas. While the Soviets would be unlikely to augment their submarine force in the Mediterranean, neither would they be likely to draw it down if NATO carrier groups were deployed there. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron normally has enough combatants to form three anticarrier warfare (ACW) groups,* enough to target two U.S. and one French carrier battle groups.⁷

In the western Mediterranean, Soviet submarines probably pose the main threat to Western naval forces. The noise generated by the great volume of peacetime seaborne traffic there undoubtedly hinders our ability to detect Soviet submarines. Our ability to listen to (noisy) Soviet submarines would improve significantly if the thousands of fishing vessels and smaller craft were called to port in a crisis leading to war.

The Soviet air threat is probably less problematic since the western Mediterranean is beyond the range of unrefueled Backfires operating from Crimean airfields. To be sure, the U.S.S.R. might deploy its Backfires to Libyan airfields before hostilities if it believed it had a reasonable chance of disabling our carriers thereby. But such forward deployment of Backfires during the prehostilities period would be a risky exercise in crisis management.

Soviet surface combatants pose even less of a threat provided they are not allowed during the

*A Soviet ACW group usually includes one SSM-equipped major surface combatant, a SAM-equipped surface combatant, an SSM-equipped submarine, and one or more attack submarines.

crisis period to interposition themselves with U.S. warships, as they did during the October 1973 Middle East War. Should Soviet combatants be located beyond the SSM range of U.S. ships at the outset of war, they would be highly vulnerable to U.S. land- and sea-based attack aircraft.

In general the Soviets would seem to pose a serious but manageable threat to our naval forces in the Mediterranean. With our naval and land-based air forces, we should be able to neutralize the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron in time to protect the SLOC through the western Mediterranean.

The Security of Ports and Staging Areas

There is a reasonable prospect that the ports and staging areas would be secure long enough to initiate a counteroffensive. The underlying assumption here is that the Soviets do not possess the resources or capabilities to break through on central and southern regions simultaneously. With their forces concentrated along the Central Front during the initial phase of the war, a simultaneous sweep in the southern region to the Mediterranean ports would be beyond their capability. In peacetime, there are four Soviet and six Hungarian divisions, equipped with over 2300 tanks and 1400 artillery pieces, stationed in Hungary.⁸ In a crisis, these divisions could be reinforced from the Kiev Military District. This augmented force would then be available for a push against northern Italy. Given their questionable reliability, however, it seems unlikely that the Hungarian divisions would be used in front-line combat operations. The reinforced Soviet combat forces even with the Hungarian divisions are a little more than 200,000-men strong. They would probably be supported by most of the 2300 Warsaw Pact aircraft estimated to be available in the region. These Warsaw Pact forces would face at minimum 8 Italian divisions, or some 128,000 men, equipped with 1250 tanks and 1550 artillery and mortar pieces,

and with 3127 tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided and Milan antitank-guided weapon systems on order. These ground forces would be supported by most of the 990 NATO aircraft committed to the Southern region's defense. Although the Warsaw Pact would have 50 percent more troops, more than three times as many tanks, and more than twice as many aircraft available, it might not be sufficient to offset the Italians' defensive advantage.

Furthermore, the Soviets would have to push through difficult mountain passes in Yugoslavia, which could be blocked by the Yugoslav Army. Even in the worst and highly unlikely case that the Yugoslavs permitted the Soviets to pass through to the Italian border prior to hostilities, a Soviet advance into northern Italy would be impeded by numerous river obstacles. And if the Soviets succeeded in moving up the Po Valley, they would be entering a cul-de-sac, which could be surrounded by Italian forces defending mountainous terrains along the Apennine ridge and Dolomites. Even in the worst case the Italians should be able to hold the high ground above their Mediterranean ports and thereby defend the staging area needed for a counteroffensive.

One wonders, moreover, whether the Soviets would be willing to bear undoubtedly heavy combat losses for initial objectives limited to taking out specific targets such as NATO airfields and any theater nuclear assets. These could be targeted perhaps just as effectively by saboteurs or long-range SS-12 Scaleboard or follow-on SS-22 surface-to-surface missiles, whose employment would have the diplomatic bonus of not violating Swiss, Austrian, or Yugoslav airspace.

While the Soviets probably could not overrun the Mediterranean ports and staging areas in time, they might be able to saturate them with enough missiles equipped with chemical weapons to force cancellation of the operation. It is worth noting that the Italian ports are no further from East Germany than are the French channel ports and are well within the range of SS-12 and SS-22 missiles. However, the Soviets are esti-

mated to have 170 of these missiles.⁹ And should they have other targeting priorities when the battle in the central region was in doubt, there may be too few of these missiles left afterward to get the job done.

Finally, there seems to be a reasonable chance that NATO forces would be able to control the air above the staging areas with land-based aircraft supported by sea-based fighter aircraft from U.S. and French carriers. Should the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron be eliminated early on, the Sixth Fleet carriers might then move into the western Mediterranean. When the Central Front collapsed, the carriers could be stationed where their aircraft could cover the ports and staging areas as well as possible withdrawal south of surviving NATO forces. Our ability to maintain air superiority would also be enhanced through aircraft attrition. After the first week of the war, the number of Soviet long-range Su-24 Fencer A and MiG-27 Flogger D/J ground-attack aircraft would probably have been significantly reduced. Destruction of forward airfields, including any of those the Soviets may have captured, would make it difficult for them to employ their older and shorter range tactical aircraft in either a ground-attack role or as fighter escort for bombers. Also, if our air defense system, including C³ and AWACS, remained intact in the region, we should have the advantage when performing the easier air intercept mission with the support of surface-to-air missiles over our own territory. Therefore, we should be able to hold and defend the ports and staging areas long enough to launch the counteroffensive. But once it started, the severe military challenge would come.

Crossing Yugoslavia

The winding, narrow roads of the Ljubljana gap make passage difficult for any army. Should the Soviets already possess that territory, say as a result of having penetrated northern Italy, it would be doubly difficult to retake it. At a minimum this would require tactical surprise, which might be achieved by timing airborne operations

to coincide with the start of the counteroffensive. There are two obvious problems connected with an airborne attack: First, would there be enough airborne forces available after the first week of war to seize the Yugoslav passes? Second, if their drops were successful, could the airborne forces hold long enough for link up with main force elements? I believe the first problem would be the more serious of the two.

It is unlikely there would be any U.S. airborne forces that had not been committed to battle within the first week of war. And should any paratroops survive a Soviet breakthrough, it would be difficult in the extreme to reconstitute them for another airborne operation. Of the forces currently available, the reserve airborne forces would probably come from Italy's airborne brigade and perhaps France's airborne division. If they succeeded in taking the passes, they should be able to hold them until ground forces arrived. The lead units could be Italian forces that had earlier taken up defensive positions in the Trentino-Alto Adige region, only 120 miles from Yugoslavia's Julian Alps. (Should the Po Valley be overrun, the Italians could fall back to defensive positions north and south of the Soviets and then proceed to counterattack from both directions at the start of the counteroffensive.)

But what might happen if the Soviets had not breached the Ljubljana gap and Yugoslavia decided to defend it with front-line troops? If the Yugoslavs, perhaps "fraternally" assisted by the Soviets, had dug in, it would seem to be extraordinarily difficult to dislodge them. One can only hope, perhaps wishfully, that with the fate of both East and West Europe in the balance, Yugoslavia would be willing to cooperate with a U.S.-led counteroffensive.

It is in Yugoslavia, furthermore, that the war could well turn nuclear. Soviet employment of tactical nuclear weapons to attempt to check our advance would be far more effective in the Yugoslav mountain passes, where our forces would be concentrated, than in the Hungarian plain, where our troops could spread out. The Soviets would also try everything they could, perhaps

including the use of nuclear weapons, to keep us from entering Hungary and unleashing thereby the force of anti-Soviet nationalism in Eastern Europe.

However, while the dangers of escalation to nuclear war may be great as U.S. forces push through Yugoslavia, so too would the opportunity be for a peaceful resolution of the war. This is not simply because of the heightened tensions that would surround our movement into Yugoslavia. It is also because both sides would be reluctant to proceed further—the Soviets toward initiating nuclear war and the U.S. toward entering and hence liberating Eastern Europe, a militarily demanding and politically provocative mission whose incalculable consequences could well push the war out of control. Yugoslavia might be the interlude that would give both sides reason to pause and perhaps end the war on mutually agreeable terms.

Long Logistic Lines and Their Vulnerability to Soviet Counterattack

Should the counteroffensive continue into Eastern Europe, the long logistic supply lines would become a problem, though how serious it would be is unclear. The narrow roads through Yugoslavia could become a major bottleneck that would slow the advance. Ammunition and spare parts in particular might then be in short supply.

The longer the logistic lines became, the more vulnerable they would be to a Soviet counterattack along their flanks. However, the Soviets would have problems in mounting a counteroffensive. It would certainly be difficult for them to do so from the west, since that would draw down on their main forces in Western Europe, perhaps enough to allow us to open a second front in France. Also, Soviet troop movements along north European roads would be harassed by a NATO air interdiction campaign. The Soviets' air interdiction capability from the north might be far more constrained, however. Were Switzerland and Austria to declare neutrality at the outset

of war, the U.S.S.R. would probably prefer that they continue to remain neutral with a U.S. counteroffensive under way. Were Moscow to believe that violating their airspace would give them a pretext to support NATO, it might opt to respect that airspace. With the shorter-range strike aircraft they would probably have left, they would almost be unable to fly around the 420-mile-wide zone of Swiss and Austrian territory that would shield the movement of U.S. troops and equipment across Italy through Yugoslavia and into Hungary.

A flank attack with less capable reserve forces from the east poses other difficulties for the Soviets. Given the terrain features, the Soviets would probably counterattack across the Hungarian plain. Their advance could be resisted by the local population supported by U.S. Special Forces. After U.S. forces had entered Hungarian territory, local support for the counteroffensive would probably be at its peak.

Should the Soviets use airfields and staging areas in the Western Ukraine for this counterattack, we could wage unconventional warfare there to hamper their operations.*

To be sure, expanding the war to Soviet territory and energizing centrifugal ethnic strains in the process would raise the stakes considerably and push the Soviets toward vertical escalation of the war. Nevertheless, were the United States to demonstrate beforehand its capability to infiltrate and organize one of the most nationalistic regions of the U.S.S.R. (e.g., by organizing a Ukrainian detachment within the Special Forces), it might deter the Soviets from mounting a counterattack from their soil. Therefore, it is not as easy as it first might seem for the Soviets to attack the flanks of an East European counteroffensive.

*It is worth noting that the Western Ukraine was officially incorporated into the U.S.S.R. only in 1945. In the interwar period the Western Ukraine was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia. It has always had strong ties with the West through the Uniate Church. Since 1945, the region has been a major seedbed of dissent nationalism. As that part of the Soviet Union most likely to welcome U.S. liberation of Eastern Europe, it would be a fertile ground for covert operations deep in the enemy's rear.

The discussion thus far has focused on problems connected with an East European counteroffensive. This is not to suggest that the preferred West European counteroffensive thrust is problem-free. Although the problems are fewer and similar (e.g., securing the SLOCs and staging areas), there is one problem that is unique and deserves attention. And that concerns the French role. French military doctrine calls for a nuclear countervalue riposte to a Soviet invasion of French soil. The French Army is not configured for a prolonged conventional war but for brief offensive operations employing tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁰ For the counteroffensive to work, the French would have to forgo their doctrine, employ their forces in a defensive role for which they are ill-prepared, and permit their territory to be used as the principal battleground of choice. This presupposes a degree of cooperation well beyond that which now exists as a result of recent French moves toward closer coordination with other NATO countries. One can only hope that at the crucial moment the French would desist from unilateral nuclear escalation and subordinate their plans to ours.

Alternatively, the Soviets might promise not to attack France in exchange for French neutrality. That transaction would leave us with only the Eastern Europe option and would also facilitate the release of Soviet forces to counter it. However, such a bargain would be far more likely to be struck in a limited war that involved only issues in which France had no interest than in an all-out war that threatened the viability of the West European economic system.

One final issue that pertains to both counteroffensive options concerns the allocation of scarce resources. To remedy any deficiencies in our ability to carry out a fallback counteroffensive it might be necessary to divert resources for this purpose from strengthening our defenses in the central region. This would be worse than "robbing Peter to pay Paul," since it would make greater the need for a fallback plan.

However, in a scenario where mobilization was delayed, large numbers of men and amounts

of materiel should be available, though whether they would be sufficient would depend on the correlation of remaining military forces at the time. Our needs are likely to be specific (e.g., expanding U.S. Special Forces for multiple missions). Some improvements in our ability to undertake a fallback counteroffensive might also strengthen our overall defenses (e.g., developing an air assault and airborne reserve force). In the final analysis, developing the capability for a fallback option is somewhat like purchasing life insurance. For both there are opportunity costs to be paid in anticipation of future need.

It is worth adding that acquiring the capability to undertake a counteroffensive option is not simply a military matter. Political factors are equally important. Yugoslavia and France, for example, would play pivotal roles in determining the success or failure of the counteroffensive. Hence, effective diplomacy in support of specific military objectives would be essential.

THIS DISCUSSION suggests that a fallback counteroffensive could become a realistic option should the need arise in a European war. More detailed analysis and planning, changes in our force structure, and successful joint exercises would be needed to gain confidence that such an option could be successful. However, what is perhaps more important for the purpose of peacetime deterrence is that even with our current capabilities, there is no certainty that the counteroffensive would fail. And that should create uncertainty in the Soviets' mind about our response to the collapse of NATO's Central Front. It would certainly heighten their caution about the dangers of starting a war if they believed that even were they able to place at risk our valued assets in Western Europe, we might still be able to threaten their control of their vital East European buffer. Given their acute sensitivity to their strategic vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe, it would not take very much convincing for the Soviets to take an East European counteroffensive option seriously. If they were to do so, it would also induce them to reallocate forces from

offensive to defensive purposes and to improve the flexibility and adaptability of their forces to deal with unexpected military responses—areas in which the Soviets are currently deficient. By exploiting Soviet political and military vulnerabilities, an East European counteroffensive op-

tion can thus enhance our overall deterrence posture.

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Notes

1. *War or Peace: The Official NATO Study of the East-West Military Balance*, in *Current News* (Special Edition), 13 July 1982, pp. 10-11.

2. For evidence that the Soviets have introduced within the past two years an independent option for a protracted conventional coalition war, see James McConnell, "The Soviet Anti-SLOC Mission in the Context of Soviet Doctrine," *Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum* 82-0700 (12 May 1982). Previously, the Soviets contemplated only a conventional phase, approximately one month in duration, of a war that would inevitably escalate to the nuclear level.

3. For a full discussion of the operational concepts underlying these units, see C. J. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group—A New Challenge for NATO," *International Defense Review* (No. 9, 1982), pp. 1177-86.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger*, 8 February 1982 (Wash-

ington: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 1-16.

5. See, for example, Sir John Winthrop Hackett, *The Third World War: The Untold Story* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy" in *The Strategic Imperative*, edited by Samuel P. Huntington (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 21-32.

6. United States Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, third edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 13.

7. See Charles C. Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations," in *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, edited by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell (New York: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 49-50.

8. See *War or Peace: The Official NATO Study of the East-West Military Balance*, p. 18; I. S. S., *The Military Balance 1982-83*, p. 22.

9. See *Air Power*, December 1982, p. 145.

10. See Diego Ruiz Palmer, "French Military Doctrine for Theater Warfare," *Ground Defence International* (December 1980), pp. 10-12.

The policy of Russia is changeless. . . . Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star.

Karl Marx, 1867

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.

Winston Churchill, London,
October 1, 1939

LEVELS OF STRATEGY AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

DR. DONALD M. SNOW

THE DEBATE over American nuclear strategy for deterrence is clearly in disarray. Deep divisions separate scholars, defense analysts, and policymakers about the nature of the nuclear threats that confront us, appropriate strategies to counteract those threats, and proper force configurations to support the deterrent purpose. Disagreement covers the intellectual spectrum of possible advocacy. At one extreme, harsh assessments of the Soviet threat have led analysts like Colin S. Gray to advocate a much more robust force structure and a plausible "the-

ory of victory" in a nuclear conflict as the necessary ingredients for continued deterrence of Soviet nuclear aggression.¹ Such suggestions appall other analysts and bring about ringing appeals for a return to more conventional deterrence conceptions grounded in assured destruction.² As one British observer dourly concludes, "From the surreal world of the analysts have emanated hypotheses about how to fight and survive a nuclear war that corrupts the Western concept of deterrence." As a result, "the outlook at the start of the 1980s is quite surprisingly grim.



tive, but each generally changes declaratory strategy to some degree, reflecting changed perceptions of the threat and the balance of capabilities, among other things.

The other two levels of strategy are more implementary in nature, falling within the realm of military strategy or Desmond Ball's action policy. Development and deployment strategy actually refers to two distinct operations that are related, since one cannot deploy a weapon system that one has failed to develop in the first place. (The obverse, however, is not true: one can decide not to deploy a successfully developed system.) Generically, development and deployment strategy refers to the process that begins with investigation of the weapons potential of some physical principle to the point that a finished weapon system or component enters the operational inventory. Collectively, the two processes have the purpose of force acquisition, but different actors and dynamics are prominent in each phase.

The development phase of development and deployment strategy refers to the process of scientific endeavor that begins with ideation of weapon systems possibility through the point that a successful weapon system prototype is produced. As such, it is roughly equivalent to the familiar research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cycle. In turn, RDT&E can be divided into two subphases suggested by the different operations conducted: research and development, followed by testing and evaluation.¹³

Different actors predominate and make decisions that cumulatively constitute strategy within each subcycle. Research and development is the primary province of basic scientists (e.g., physicists and chemists) and engineers. Decisions about what to investigate and how to solve engineering problems are largely based on scientific criteria about physical properties of the universe. As W. K. H. Panofsky explains, scientific endeavor is relatively insensitive to strategic or policy direction because "'pure scientists' take pride in their ability and success in pursuing science for its own sake, unaffected by the poten-

tial application of end products of their achievements."¹⁴ Therefore, it is difficult to influence or control what will be discovered; if one already knew what scientists would find in their research, there would be no need for the inquiry. Moreover, the time line on scientific discovery is difficult to predict, much less control: scientific discoveries are made when they are made and cannot be ordered to meet a politically dictated strategic timetable. Efforts to influence the pace and direction of scientific endeavor are indirect, stimulating, or depressing specific research efforts through differential funding levels. As well, many weapon possibilities arise from scientific and engineering in nonmilitary research that may be related to military programs or be wholly unrelated. Often, these contributions are entirely serendipitous.

When basic research yields promising weapon possibilities the fruitfulness of which is a matter of developing practical applications, some decisional discretion occurs. Development is largely an engineering concern, seeking applications of basic ideas and designing prototype weapon systems incorporating the research findings and making engineering improvements on current designs. At this point, however, outcomes are not assured, making assessment difficult, so that decisions tend to be made primarily on the basis of likely technical feasibility rather than on some broader criteria of strategic desirability, and there is a natural tendency to pursue as many promising areas as budgetary constraints will allow. Those individuals responsible for making such decisions, mostly scientists and career officers, bring their own viewpoints and perspectives on the nature of the threat, desirability of certain weapons, and the like, which may or may not reflect the perceptions of political authorities up to and including the President. A classic case in point was President Carter's purported "discovery" of U.S. neutron (enhanced-radiation) bomb research in a newspaper account of a congressional subcommittee hearing where an Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) official unintentionally made reference

to the project during testimony.

During the testing and evaluation subcycle, when prototypes undergo operational tests, the results are noted and evaluated and necessary modifications are made; the critical point is in deciding whether deployment recommendations will be forthcoming. To some extent, the criteria for these recommendations are likely to be purely technical: Does the weapon system work at all or up to some usable standard, and is there a mission for it? Two decades of failure in the cruise missile program (largely because of guidance system deficiencies) comes immediately to mind as a major system whose deployment recommendation was delayed because of technically based deficiencies.

A bureaucratic dynamic in this process provides a bridge from development to deployment strategy. In the RDT&E process, weapon systems tend to develop constituencies within the industrial defense bureaucracy that create internal pressures for positive deployment decisions. The most obvious advocates are those individuals with a direct interest in the system: the scientists and engineers who designed and developed the system; the agency or agencies that sponsored stages of development; and the service or services that would add the system to the operational inventory. Since no one wants the reputation for developing or sponsoring bad ideas, this basis for advocacy is natural and understandable, as is service interest in adding new (and presumably superior) components to the arsenal. Also, those defense industries that would be primary contractors or subcontractors for a system have a direct vested interest in positive procurement decisions.

Although those associated with developmental strategy remain active advocates in pushing for particular deployment decisions, they are not the central actors. Decisions about what weapon systems in what quantities enter the inventory and which cumulatively define deployment strategy are economic and hence political in character. The economics and accompanying politics are evident at a minimum of two levels: in the

interservice allocation process of proposing and later dividing up the defense budget; and in the political decision process where defense allocations must compete with other budget priorities. Different actors with differing interests and motivations are involved in each phase of the economic process that supports deployment recommendations, with technologists interested in specific systems and theoreticians concerned with effects on the structure of deterrence in a support role offering expert advice in support of the various contenders. If it is true that policy is what receives funding, deployment strategy is at the heart of nuclear strategy *writ large*. The large points to be made are that the criteria used in making budgetary decisions are political and economic, they are made by politicians, and those decisions may or may not be swayed significantly by abstract notions about deterrence.

Determining what kind of defense budget will be proposed is largely an executive branch in-house affair. At one level, it is a competition between the services, where each presents its needs and where outcomes expressed as proportions of defense requests and allocations for each service (as well as trends in those percentages) take on both great substantive and symbolic value. At another level, the competition is between the Department of Defense and other agencies, where the chief arbiter and devil's advocate (especially in the current administration) is often the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The role of OMB Director David Stockman was particularly prominent within the early months of the Reagan administration.

Ultimately, of course, deployment is based on what Congress appropriates. Internal executive branch political processes result in budgetary tradeoffs and compromises where procurement patterns are altered on the bases both of strategic and nonstrategic requirements. More of the same is likely to occur in Congress when budget recommendations must compete with other national priorities for funding. Although both houses have members expert in defense issues on their Armed Services committees, the ultimate

disposition of the defense budget, including those systems that can be procured and deployed, is done by the entire membership, many of whom may vote up or down a particular allocation on grounds entirely divorced from any notion of deployment strategy. The budgetary process is politics in its purest form, and since deployment strategy is the result of decisions about what to buy in what quantities, that level and hence overall nuclear strategy are guaranteed a political content.

Employment strategy, the third level, represents planning for the actual use of nuclear weapons in combat should deterrence fail. The most concrete manifestation is the single integrated operational plan (SIOP). The term SIOP is itself a bit misleading, because the SIOP is and always has been a complex series of different attack scenarios emphasizing varying levels of destruction and different kinds of target sets. Guidance regarding targeting priorities for the SIOP is provided by Presidential memoranda, such as President Nixon's National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242 that sought to bring about limited nuclear options and President Carter's aforementioned Presidential Directive 59. This guidance in turn is "spelled out in the *Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy* (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense."¹⁵

Within the parameters established by the NUWEP and the various Presidential memoranda, the detailed SIOP is crafted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), a body composed primarily of professional military officers. As a nuclear "battle plan," the SIOP serves two broad purposes. First, although its details are secret, its broad objectives are openly available through statements by public officials like former Secretary Brown's announcement of P.D. 59 (he cited the priorities as "the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most—political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capacity to support a war,"¹⁶ a list essentially identical to the priorities listed by Ball in the current plan, SIOP-5D)¹⁷ and unclassified congressional tes-

timony. Making general contours public serves the deterrent purpose of informing our adversaries of the potential kinds of destruction they might have to endure in response to their nuclear aggression. Second, the plan provides the President with a carefully elaborated set of options for fighting a nuclear war at whatever level of intensity seems appropriate.

That the planning process for employment strategy should be "designed by military men, as a military operational plan"¹⁸ comes as no surprise, since it is the military's role to plan for, and if necessary to fight, wars. Dominance of the operational element of employment strategy by the professional military does, however, enter yet another distinct set of actors with distinct orientations to the strategy process at this level. Professional officers rarely become involved, at least publicly, in discussions over declaratory policy, and, until recently, most theoreticians have demonstrated only passing interest in employment matters beyond a general preference for counter-value or counterforce targeting. The result is to facilitate a general lack of awareness by one group about what the other is doing and, when interaction does occur, to increase the prospect that dialogue will occur within separate frames of reference.

The fact that different actors operate at the various levels of strategy facilitates independent development at each level, but there is another vexing dynamic that virtually ensures some discontinuity. That problem is the time frame within which each level operates: all three levels have distinctive and independent time lines for their activities that make it virtually impossible to synchronize them at any given time.

Declaratory statements of strategy have the least sensitive constraints imposed by time: a President or Secretary of Defense can issue statements of declaratory strategy whenever he deems it appropriate. Certainly, there are constraints arising from the other levels and externally. A President cannot change strategies too often without appearing indecisive or foolish, and strategy must reflect judgments about what the

public will support. Declaratory formulations also reflect the state of activity in the other levels of strategy in two distinct ways. First, declaratory strategy must reflect the current state of the art at other levels, or the declaration will lack credibility (for example, even if one has the perceived will to carry out a strategy, one must also have the hardware).

Second, declaratory strategy is used to provide guidance to and influence other levels of strategy. The motivation underlying assured destruction, as a means to influence the deployment portion of development and deployment strategy, illustrates the point. As Laurence Martin argues, "finite assured destruction was originally more a way of constraining procurement than an operational strategy clearly thought through and actually intended for execution."¹⁹ In support of this contention, it must be remembered that there was active support within the military and elsewhere to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force of 2000-3000 missiles during the 1960s. Moreover, the emphasis on targeting noncombatants was never fully accepted by those responsible for the SIOP, for whom counterforce targeting was always more military and hence natural. As a result, in operational planning "'assured destruction' measures were no more than an insensitive—and quantitatively conservative—shorthand for the hideous reality of nearly any full-scale retaliation."²⁰

Whether the function of declaratory strategy is or should be to reflect reality at the other strategic levels or whether the function should be to provide policy guidance from which the other levels deductively flow is, of course, the central question, but the answer is prejudiced by the time line function. Of the three levels, declaratory strategy is least influenced by temporal constraints. Ball's action levels, however, are much more sensitive to time constraints that are internal to their own processes rather than being the product of external assessments.

Development and deployment strategy is the most obvious case in point. Science proceeds at its own pace, and scientific and engineering dis-

coveries cannot be finely calibrated to a precise timetable. The period from the time of conceiving the idea for a weapon to the time a usable system reaches inventory is generally measured in years. During that process, breakthroughs in development occur but cannot be predicted. The development stage of this strategy level is long and uncontrollable. Furthermore, deployment decisions are made over long periods of time. The arsenal components deployed today are products of research and development efforts initiated in the 1940s and 1950s (the designs for systems in the air-breathing leg of the triad are 1940s vintage), and the predicted life span of strategic systems is measured in decades. Given these facts, current development and deployment decisions affect and must be measured against strategic needs in the 1990s and beyond, just as decisions made two or more decades ago influence capability and hence strategy today.

Finally, the ultimate transition from strategy to war plan (employment strategy) has its own distinctive temporal dictates. The basic dynamic is that targeting as reflected in the SIOP will inevitably lag behind declaratory strategy and reflect capability resulting from developmental and deployment decisions. The reason follows from the way operational employment strategy is fashioned; the SIOP is constructed using the various methods described earlier as guidance, and it is a time-consuming technical task. According to Desmond Ball, the current plan, SIOP-5D, "includes some 40,000 potential target installations, as compared to some 25,000 in 1974 when NUWEP was promulgated and the development of SIOP-5 initiated."²¹ Since the warhead arsenal is less than one-quarter that size, a significant amount of time goes into setting target priorities. There is also the extremely technical, complex task of matching appropriate warheads from different sources to targets. In this matching process, one must allow for problems like MIRV footprinting limitations and consider cross-targeting requirements. All of this means that it can take years for a fully operational new SIOP to be developed. Thus, there will be a time

lag while the new plan is being developed. To the extent the new guidance creates demands for change, a declaratory-employment strategy mismatch is inevitable. Because declaratory strategy and guidances change fairly often, this problem is dynamic and constant.

Too much of the literature and defense debate proceeds as if the problems associated with the interactions between levels of strategy do not exist. The academic debate, centering around assured destruction and its alternatives, rarely gets past the theoretical underpinnings of declaratory strategy, and when it does, its contribution is often a Greek chorus of appall and despair. At the same time, a great deal of the debate occurs as if it were divorced from any political context. At least implicitly, the debate over declaratory strategy assumes a fundamental rationality to the enterprise; once one has accepted certain principles about what deters, the rest is a mechanistic application of those principles. Viewed from the levels of strategy, however, the political elements are revealed as fundamental and critical. Declaratory strategy is made by the nation's chief politician and his assistants and reflects a variety of political purposes (most prominent of which, of course, is preserving the national existence), and bottom-line deployment strategy is the culmination of the political process, appropriations.

The failure of so much analysis to view strategy in its political context is the most damning indictment of avoiding the levels of strategy problem. Decisions that cumulatively define nuclear strategy are made by politicians, and it is not surprising that those politicians regard strangely recommendations from theorists ignoring that basic reality. The scholarly debate emerges as a theological contest that can safely be relegated to the cloisters. The lack of communications between theorists and politicians frequently results in politically unacceptable strategy and strategically deficient policy.

Implications

In an analytically tidier world, the relationship between the various levels of strategy would

be a simple deductive exercise where declaratory strategy was translated precisely into development and deployment and employment strategies. As has been argued, such a view oversimplifies and distorts reality. In fact, there are discontinuities and even contradictions among the various levels arising at least partially from the two broad dynamics cited earlier: there are different individuals and institutions with different perspectives involved in strategic formulations at each level, and the internal dynamics of each level dictate a temporal sequence to strategic activity that virtually guarantees some discontinuity at any time. It is worthwhile briefly to view the current state of the nuclear debate in the levels of strategy framework.

The heart of the debate that has been going on since the early 1970s has largely been over declaratory strategy (limited nuclear options versus assured destruction),²² with residual concern over development/deployment strategy (MX is or is not necessary given a mutual assured destruction [MAD] or limited nuclear options [LNOs] declaratory posture) and employment strategy (counterforce or countervalue targeting is or is not compatible with MAD or LNOs). Particularly when the debate is extended beyond declaratory strategy, there is at least the *implicit* assumption that development/deployment and employment strategies do or should flow deductively from current declaratory positions. Whether such a relationship ought to exist is a philosophical question that can be debated; such a formulation contradicts the way the process operates.

In one sense, the whole debate is, in Shakespeare's phrase, "much ado about nothing." Certainly the debate about MAD and LNOs is overblown, in the sense that, at the operational level, MAD has always contained more finite targeting objectives (employment strategies) and the LNO position admits all-out countervalue exchange as the ultimate possibility, whether it is featured or not. A debate focusing on "pure" MAD or LNO positions hence distorts the policy debate, which occurs over shades of emphasis rather than at the extremes.

Understanding that declaratory strategy is neither MAD nor LNOs but rather the part of the mix emphasized serves two essential purposes. First, it moves the debate away from the extreme ends of the poles back toward the middle ground where real policy debates among those political and military actors who devise strategy occur. In the process, we create the possibility that academics and strategy makers can engage in dialogue instead of talking past one another. Second, understanding that changes in declaratory strategy are matters often of subtle reemphasis and repackaging creates a greater sense of continuity to the strategy process than does viewing the formulation of declaratory strategy questions in either-or terms. In the process, this recognition promotes an appreciation of the continuities rather than the discontinuities between the levels of strategy.

Linkage becomes apparent with both employment and development/deployment strategies. At the employment strategy level, recognizing that declaratory strategy in fact has always dictated a range of strategic options makes more natural a dual emphasis on countervalue and counterforce targeting, since limited options imply selectivity in targets attacked and these quite naturally contain counterforce objectives. Given the natural military professional inclination toward attacking combatants (counterforce objects) rather than noncombatants (countervalue objects), a counterforce-oriented SIOP (and guidance therefore as in P.D. 59) represents not so much a change in philosophical positions over what kinds of threats deter best as it does an improved linkage between declaratory employment, and development/deployment strategy. Developments in weapon systems capabilities are expanding the list of counterforce objectives that can be targeted. Furthermore, these advances in weaponry permit greater flexibility in one's response to changes in adversary offensive and defensive capabilities. Such developments are a natural outgrowth of technological processes both in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and reflect no more than the dynamic nature of weapon science.

Strategy that emphasizes a variety of options also suggests a development and deployment orientation investigating a wide variety of possible capabilities. This observation is clearly true within the development cycle of this level of strategy, but true discrimination occurs when deployment decisions are made. Within this cycle, political actors are most prominent, and deployment strategy is often effectively formulated on bases that are largely nonstrategic (for example, budgetary tradeoffs) rather than on the basis of clearly articulated deterrence grounds. Tradeoffs and compromise are the basic stuff of politics, and as long as the process does not produce strategically unacceptable outcomes (which it has not to date), it is natural and not pathological.

These dynamics, suggesting both sources of continuity and discontinuity, are complex and have some clear implications for theoreticians and practitioners alike. Two implications stand out for theoreticians (undoubtedly there are others). On the one hand, deterrence strategy as a complex interaction of the various levels of strategy clearly suggests that concentration on any one level is inadequate. The disservice such an emphasis provides is vividly demonstrated in shock and dismay over P.D. 59. If one had been looking at questions of MAD versus LNOs exclusively, the pronouncement appeared a dramatic and definitive statement of philosophy; viewed from the level of employment strategy as influenced by development and deployment strategic decision-making, P.D. 59 was little more than an incremental link in an ongoing process.

On the one hand, and relatedly, this mode of analysis suggests that theoreticians need to broaden their horizons to encompass all levels of strategy if they are interested in influencing policy decisions that affect the deterrent condition. Probably most critically, this implies the need to become involved in the critical deployment level where decisions are made that define arsenal characteristics, targeting possibilities, and limitations, and, hence, the capabilities that make different declaratory strategies credible or incredible.

That involvement is likely to be the most effective in pointing out the relationship between the theoretical and the concrete. If nothing else, the contribution may be best in pointing out the long-range, nonobvious impact of discrete decisions on the structure of deterrence. If policy is indeed that which receives funding, the critical intervention point, where the greatest impact can be registered, is the political processes leading to funding decision for various patterns of force deployment.

For practitioners, the problem is not understanding the process, it is coordinating the levels better. At the operational levels of development/deployment and employment strategy-making, there is too often only a shallow awareness of the theoretical implications of various decisions and a resultant surprise when objections are raised. At the same time, coordinating activity at the various levels more tightly can avoid logistical difficulties in selling strategies, as the P.D. 59-MX controversy illustrates. In logical fashion, the sequence of policy decision would have flowed from countervailance as declaratory strategy (emphasizing limited options) to P.D. 59 as employment strategy (to determine target coverage patterns necessary to carry out identified options) to developmental/deployment strategy to provide the necessary hardware for the employment strategy (the most obvious need arising from such assessment being additional warheads, which MX would provide). Steps two and three

were reversed, and the result was contention. MX was criticized as providing excess, redundant counterforce capability, and P.D. 59 was condemned as revolutionary heresy. Closer coordination among the levels of strategy would not have removed controversy because the whole concept is controversial. Viewing the process as a sequential levels-of-strategy problem would, however, have reduced the confusion.

THE BOTTOM LINE is a plea to look more closely at all the levels that produce nuclear strategy, with the hopeful result that those making decisions at the various levels will be capable of meaningful dialogue that will produce better strategy at each level. Targeters need to realize that strategy is more than the SIOP, politicians need to understand that budget-driven decisions may have strategic implications far beyond the impact on the federal debt, and theoreticians need to realize that the constraints of the real world make deterrence strategy-making something other than an exercise in deductive logic. It all seems so obvious that it hardly bears emphasis, yet the evidence suggests that the obvious has not been so self-evident after all. Recognizing that there is a levels-of-strategy problem does not solve the disorder of nuclear strategy, but it at the least makes more sense out of why the disorder exists.

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Notes

1. See particularly, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security*, Summer 1979, pp. 54-87; "Targeting Problems for Central War," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1980, pp. 3-21; and (with Keith Payne), "Victory Is Possible," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1980, pp. 14-27.

2. For a particularly eloquent statement, see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics*, January 1979, pp. 289-324.

3. Nigel Calder, *Nuclear Nightmares: An Investigation into Possible Wars* (New York: Viking, 1980), pp. 13, 10.

4. My own assessment of these sources of contention, including documentation, can be found in "Strategic Uncertainty and Nuclear Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1981, pp. 27-41.

5. Some of my thoughts can be found in *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Strategy in the 1980s* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981), pp. 96-99 and 205-16.

6. For an overview, see Donald M. Snow, "The MX-Basing Mode Muddle: Issues and Alternatives," *Air University Review*, July-August 1980, pp. 11-25.

7. For a somewhat speculative overview of the prospects, see Donald M. Snow, "Lasers, Charged Particle Beams, and the Strategic Future," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1980, pp. 277-94; or Barry J. Smernoff, "Strategic and Arms Controls Implications of Laser Weapons: A Preliminary Assessment," *Air University Review*, January-February 1978, pp. 38-50.

8. "Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Convocation Ceremonies

- for the 97th Naval War College Class," Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 20 August 1980, p. 6. Emphasis in original.
9. Dennis M. Drew, "Strategy Process and Principles: Back to the Basics," *Air University Review*, May-June 1980, p. 39.
10. *Ibid.* Emphasis in original.
11. Desmond Ball, "Dynamics of the US Strategic Nuclear Policy Framework," *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, April 1981, p. 5.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
13. One of the best discussions of this process remains Richard G. Head, "Technology and the Military Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, pp. 544-63.
14. W. K. H. Panofsky, *Arms Control and SALT II* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979), p. 3.
15. Ball, p. 4.

16. Brown, p. 7.
17. Ball, p. 6.
18. McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?" in Christoph Bertram, editor, "The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Part I," *Adelphi Papers* No. 160 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1980), p. 8.
19. Laurence Martin, "The Determinants of Change: Deterrence and Technology," in Christoph Bertram, editor, "The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Part II," *Adelphi Papers* No. 161 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1980), p. 13.
20. Bundy, p. 8.
21. Ball, p. 6.
22. Donald M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking: An Overview and Review," *International Studies Quarterly*, September 1979, pp. 445-86.

Airpower Research Institute

Airpower Research Institute (ARI), a part of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), is recruiting military and civilian research associates for the 1984-85 academic year. ARI began operation in October 1981. Its primary purpose is the production of detailed background studies and monographs that address fundamental issues affecting the Air Force now and in the future.

Airpower Research Institute is a predominantly blue-suit organization that seeks to bridge the gap between the operational Air Force and thorough academic research. While most ARI researchers are one-year military research associates sponsored by a major command, the Air Staff, or some other Air Force organization, eight officers are assigned to ARI for a full three-year tour. There are also four civilian research associates assigned to ARI to complete one- or two-year research projects of interest to the Air Force.

In addition to completing their research project, military research associates have the opportunity to satisfy a professional military education (PME) requirement. Interested officers may complete a program leading to the award of an ARI-designated Air Command and Staff College or Air War College diploma.

ARI research efforts are focused in three main areas: (1) past, present, and future air power employment concepts in terms of doctrine, strategy, and technology; (2) technical, politico-economic, and military trends that can contribute to the long-range planning efforts of the USAF and its component elements; and (3) military professionalism and the challenges of military officership in a changing environment. The unifying theme is the search for more effective Air Force war-fighting capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.


For more information about the Airpower Research Institute, call 205-293-2213 (AUTOVON 875-2213) or write to Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Sims, CADRE ARI, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112.

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military
affairs
abroad

OBATO: SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET AIR REGIMENT

JAMES L. WADDELL



Soviet technicians service the engines and tail section of a Tu-22 Blinder aircraft.

Without the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces Rear Services, there is no troop combat readiness. War may begin, but without a well-prepared rear, without precise and comprehensive rear support, it would end sadly a few days later. That is why we must make every effort to see that the Soviet Armed Forces Rear Services are always as combat ready as the forces they are supporting.¹

THIS statement, taken from a speech made by the Soviet minister of defense at the conclusion of the Neman major exercise in 1968, is a useful reminder that an understanding of Soviet Air Force (SAF) operations is incomplete without an understanding of the Soviet Air Force Rear Services, their logistics system. The basic combat element of the SAF is the air regiment. Although there are several elements in the support structure of an air regiment, the principal element is the independent airfield technical support battalion (*otdel'nyy batal'on aerodromno-tekhnicheskogo obsluzhivaniya*—OBATO).

The predecessor of the OBATO was first formed in early 1941 in the course of a major reorganization of the Soviet Air Force Rear Services.² It was designated an airfield service battalion (*batal'on aerodromno/obsluzhivaniya*-BAO) and was, in the words of a World War II BAO commander, intended to be the

basic unit of aviation rear services, an independent unit intended to support two flying regiments, equipped with any type of aircraft, with everything necessary for the life and combat work of the personnel. Quarters, rations, clothing, financial support, transport, munitions, armaments, fuel, and lubricant materials, weather data for flights—all this and much more were the responsibility of the BAO.³

This mission statement, with a few modifications, could apply to the current OBATO.

The Airfield Technical Support Battalion Today

In the transition to jet aircraft after World War II, the Soviet Air Force made organizational changes in both its flying and rear services units.




In late 1945, the highest elements, the air basing regions, were reorganized as aviation technical divisions and given the mission of supporting an entire air corps. The next lower level in this new organizational scheme was the aviation technical regiment, designed to support an entire air division. The technical regiment, in turn, consisted of aviation technical battalions, each supporting one air regiment at a separate airfield.⁴ The continued existence of the technical divisions and regiments cannot be confirmed from the available literature, but the battalions were redesignated independent airfield technical support battalions by at least the 1960s, and they continue to operate under this designation today.

As a component of the Soviet Air Force Rear Services, the battalion is assigned to an entirely

different chain of command from the flying unit it supports.⁵ The battalion commander is operationally subordinate to the air regiment commander, but he remains administratively subordinate to the next higher echelon of his battalion. Seemingly, this arrangement could lead to conflicts, but reports of any problems in this respect are virtually nonexistent. The reason, perhaps, is that the air regiment commander normally has a higher rank and, within the military district or group of forces, ultimately reports to a commander whose rear services chief is only one of several deputies.

The accompanying chart shows the general organizational structure of a typical battalion, which is normally commanded by a major but may also be commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

Structure of the Independent Airfield Technical Support Battalion



The commander has deputies for technical matters, supply, and political affairs, the last of which, normally a major, is at least first among equals.

The battalion deputy for political matters controls the unit's political department and is presumably a second reporting official for the deputy commanders for political matters in the companies. The functions of a political officer at any level include not only organizing and directing political work but also overseeing ideological development among the troops; to some degree, he also functions as information and educational officer and counsels people with regard to family and personal affairs.⁶ The political department itself and the immediate staff of the deputy for political matters are usually small elements of not more than three or four officers. The department is probably also responsible for the unit's enlisted and officers' clubs.

Internal security and counterintelligence are the responsibility of the special department (*obsobyy otdel*) headed by a KGB officer. Neither the title nor the functions of the special department are mentioned in contemporary Soviet literature. Primary sources of information about this department are defectors,⁷ but it appears rather likely that these officers operate entirely outside the military chain of command.

Routine battalion planning and administrative matters are handled by the chief of staff, usually a major, and his small section. The actual mission of the battalion—providing services and material to the regiment—is performed by a number of services and other elements.

fuel and lubricants service

The mission of the fuel and lubricants service (*sluzhba GSM*) is to receive, store, maintain quality control, and issue aviation fuels, gasolines, various alcohols, fire-extinguishing materials, and special liquids such as hydraulic fluids and antifreezes.⁸ The service, normally directed by a captain, is responsible for one or more fuel and lubricant dumps, a fuel analysis laboratory,

vehicle refueling points, and portable pumping stations. The portable pumping stations are used frequently in units that receive fuel shipments by rail.⁹ The service is also responsible for the operation and maintenance of centralized refueling systems at airfields with such facilities.

A handbook for the Soviet Armed Forces Rear Services mentions both underground and above-ground storage of fuels but provides specifications only on horizontal steel tanks with capacities of 4.1 to 26.9 cubic meters. Rubberized cloth bladder tanks, probably used during deployments, are available in capacities of 2.5 to 25 cubic meters. When empty, the tanks weigh from 47 to 250 kilograms and probably can be easily transported by truck.¹⁰

automotive-tractor and electric-gas service

This service normally directed by a major, formerly consisted of two separate services, but it has functioned as a single service since at least 1981.¹¹ The motor transport and motor technical companies in the service are commanded by either a senior lieutenant or a captain who has deputies for political and technical matters. The motor transport company is organized into at least three platoons and a motor pool (*avtopark*) and is used to transport personnel and equipment. Trucks are the most frequently mentioned vehicles, but the company's inventory probably includes cars, crew busses, and aviation refueling trucks.¹²

The motor technical company, the "electric-gas" component of the service, is often called the "special equipment" (*spetstekhnika*) unit because of the nature of its vehicles. These vehicles include the MZ series of oil replenishment vehicles, AKZS oxygen trucks, AUZS carbon dioxide vehicles, VZ and MS series of compressed air vehicles, APA series of aircraft starter trucks, AZS battery-charging stations, AKV air-conditioning units, MP series of engine heaters, aircraft and general-purpose tugs, and fire trucks. One reference indicates that a platoon of aircraft starter trucks has at least nine APA vehicles, but the

actual strength is probably much greater.¹³

Many of the services provided by both companies obviously must be available at precisely specified times to satisfy requirements of flight operations, and the chief of the service faces a complex managerial problem in meeting these requirements. He resolves the problems on a day-to-day basis by appointing an airfield technical support duty officer (*derzhurny po ATO*) who coordinates all relevant support activities on a given day and normally works from a central control point with radio communications.¹⁴ Although this system apparently functions quite well, it depends entirely on the skill and experience of individual officers. For long-term solutions, the use of network planning, similar to the "decision tree" method used in the West, in airfield technical support operations has been discussed and apparently even used in some battalions since the early 1970s.¹⁵

the airfield operations company

All functions relative to operation and maintenance of permanent and natural surface runways, taxiways, and hardstands are performed by the airfield operations company (*aerodromno-ekspluatatsionnaya rota*). This unit is commanded by a senior lieutenant or captain and organized in specialized platoons headed by warrant officers. The priority mission is keeping permanent surface runways operational. Although the problem of removing sand from runways appears occasionally in Soviet literature,¹⁶ heavy snowfalls—apparently the only kind in the Soviet Union—are mentioned far more frequently. The company uses several models of heavy rotary snowplows or scraper blades mounted on trucks to remove snow. Ice is removed with so-called heat machines. These vehicles, apparently unique to the Soviet Air Force, consist of old jet engines mounted in movable frames on special chassis. Spreader devices are mounted on the exhaust nozzles to ensure even distribution of hot air. Fragments of ice left by the heat machines or less extensive ice

formations are removed by KPM combined self-propelled sprinkling and sweeping systems. These machines and the AP-60 and V-63 vacuum sweepers are used during warmer weather to keep runways and other areas free of debris and thus prevent possible foreign object damage to aircraft.¹⁷

The Soviets apparently make widespread use of precast ferroconcrete slabs for runways and taxiways. These slabs, designated PAG-XIV, are 14 centimeters thick, 2 meters wide, and 6 meters long and weigh 4.2 metric tons.¹⁸ The company devotes much time throughout the year to inspecting and caulking seams between slabs. The combination of severe cold and extremely rapid thawing in most of the Soviet Union also means that runways and taxiways must have very efficient drainage systems.¹⁹

The airfield operations company also maintains natural-surface runways used as emergency landing strips at most permanent fields. These runways can be built with either packed earth or sod, depending on local conditions, and they must be periodically packed or sown with grass, fertilized, and mowed. In winter, these strips must be cleared of snow, or, if the accumulation is too great, it can be rolled and packed until the surface becomes suitable for landing. To perform these tasks, the company uses equipment ranging from mowers and seeders to rollers, bulldozers, and graders.

Although aircraft crash barriers are not frequently mentioned, the airfield operations company is also responsible for installing, maintaining, and operating these systems. The system mentioned most often is the ATU-2, which is suitable for aircraft of the MiG-17/19/21 weight class, but indications are that more advanced models are available.²⁰

guard company

The security and defense of the entire airfield, including aircraft and separate facilities, is the responsibility of the battalion's guard company (*rota okhrany*). This unit consists of at least two

platoons commanded by warrant officers, but the company is normally commanded by a captain. The company normally mans a series of fixed guard posts connected by landline to the guard control point, and it may use patrol vehicles.²¹ Its weapons are assault rifles and machine guns, and it has some organic communications equipment. With the exception of training in heavy weapons, the company apparently receives training similar to that received by a Soviet motorized rifle company. The emphasis in specialized training includes exercises in defending against enemy airborne assault and dealing with hostile penetrations by diversionary groups.²²

supply services

Soviet Air Force Rear Services units are expected to supply flying units with virtually all essential items except complete aircraft. One official handbook lists spare parts for aircraft, engines, air equipment (presumably instruments and the like), armament, ground support equipment, airfield equipment, and other classes of items, such as metals, paints, chemicals, pressure vessels, and the like. The same source also provides a general list of special clothing items, such as flight coveralls, G-suits, full pressure suits, winter clothing, life vests, and life rafts. The battalion's deputy commander for supply is apparently responsible for general supply, and a number of other services handle specific classes of supply items. For example, one report of the activities of a battalion's aviation technical supply service indicates that it accepts written-off jet engines and scrap for salvage and is responsible for forwarding "time-expired" engines to the manufacturing plant for overhauls. Another source refers to unpacking and issuing ammunition by an aviation armaments service (*sluzhba aviatsionnogo vooruzheniya*) to squadrons of a flying unit. Presumably, such a service would also be responsible for operating the missile storage facilities mentioned in the late 1960s by a former SAF deputy commander-in-chief for rear services.²³

food service

The food service (*prodovol'stvennaya sluzhba*) of the battalion operates separate dining facilities for aircrew and maintenance personnel of the air regiment and, presumably, other facilities for support personnel. Soviet flying personnel receive a special high calorie diet known as the "flight ration" (*letnyy payek*) in four meals per day.²⁴ At permanent bases, the food service employs many civilians in capacities from chief of dining facilities to waitresses.* The service is probably also responsible for operating the auxiliary farms assigned to many Soviet military units. In one instance, a battalion reportedly raises 350 pigs and maintains a 400-square-meter hothouse producing eight tons of vegetables per year.²⁵

other services

The battalion has its own finance service, which, in addition to paying the troops, develops and controls the unit's budget. Whether the same services are provided to the air regiment is not clear. Other operating elements provide critical medical and meteorological support, but I was unable to determine whether these elements are part of the battalion or whether they function directly under the air regiment. High-level Soviet interest in housing and working conditions at SAF bases suggests that the battalion has considerable responsibility for quarters, buildings, general maintenance, and provision of such services as heat, electricity, water, gas, sewers, and the like, but the general officer addressing this topic does not identify a specific element as being responsible for such functions.²⁶

deployment operations

The capability to move rapidly to remote and often unprepared locations and begin immediate

*Despite propaganda claims to the contrary, waiting tables is considered "woman's work" in the U.S.S.R. Consequently, women are employed virtually exclusively in this function at Soviet bases.

air operations is an important element of combat readiness for all units, particularly for SAF Frontal Aviation. A deployment of this nature, however, requires much support from the battalion. Once such a move is ordered, the battalion forms a deployment support group (*komendatura*) consisting of sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies to begin operations at the new location. Heavy equipment will be necessary if a totally unprepared site requires construction of a runway. One SAF general officer noted that rear services units have accomplished training deployments with their own vehicles, railroads, helicopters, and transport aircraft.²⁷ Two more recent accounts, both describing support of deployments of helicopter units, mentioned only the use of organic motor transport. However, the author of one of these articles aptly described the purpose of such activities as "practical training under complex conditions as close to combat as possible."²⁸

personnel strength and sources

The personnel strength of a technical support battalion cannot be precisely determined, but it probably includes several hundred officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees. Officer personnel are apt to be graduates of a Soviet Ministry of Defense school that trains rear services specialists for all the services. They may also be graduates of reserve officer training pro-

grams at one of five Soviet automotive and highway institutes.²⁹ Warrant officers are recruited from enlisted personnel of the battalion and presumably remain with their units almost indefinitely. Enlisted personnel are conscripts who arrive in biannual contingents and apparently do not receive specialist training. Civilians are recruited locally for a variety of support functions. For military personnel in general, assignments appear very stable, but promotion opportunities are very limited, particularly in comparison with flying personnel.

THE CONCEPT of air unit support embodied in the independent airfield technical support battalion has substantial historical roots. It originated in the search for more effective uses of air power, played a major role in World War II, and has undergone surprisingly few changes over a span of more than 40 years. It reflects both Soviet military conservatism and reluctance to tinker with a system that has proved itself. Major changes are not likely to occur in the near future, but support for deployment will become increasingly important as a growing number of attack helicopters and new tactical aircraft are introduced into the Soviet inventory. One can reasonably expect that operations from unprepared locations, such as meadows, will become more common.

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Notes

1. S. K. Kurkotkin, editor *Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil V Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voynye 1941-1945 gg.* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), p. 546.

2. *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya (SVE)*, s.v. "Aviatsionnyy Tyl" by V. D. Galov. See also John T. Greenwood, "The Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945," in *Soviet Aviation and Air Power*, Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp, editors (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 79-80.

3. Ye.V. Ovcharenko, *Na Frontovykh Aerodromakh* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 6.

4. See Galov.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier—Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 277.

7. There is one reference to a special department officer on page 36 of Ovcharenko's book (note 3). A more recent work that also includes a list of the general duties of special department officers is Aleksei Myagkov, *Inside the KGB* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1976).

8. See A. G. Blok et al., *Spravochnik Spetsialista Tyla Aviatsii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972), pp. 214-24, for a list of such items.

9. Arrivals are sometimes unexpected as indicated in Captain V. Sokolov, "Eshelon Pribyl Nozh'yu," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, March 1981, p. 38.

10. Blok, pp. 227-28. A partial photograph of horizontal steel tanks may be found in *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, June 1982, inside front cover.

11. One of the earliest instances of this change appears to have been

in Major O. Mvchko, "Aerodrom—Nash Post Boyevoy," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, January 1981, p. 38.

12. Aviation fuel truck specifications, including capacities of 4 to 22 cubic meters, are given in Blok, pp. 159-62.

13. See Blok, pp. 166-86, for designations and specifications of individual equipment. The reference to APA platoon strength is taken from Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Stadnik, "Usloviya Odn. A Rezul'taty," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 June 1980, p. 2.

14. Duties and functions of this officer are discussed in Lieutenant Colonel I. Sysolyatin, "Oni Trudyatsya Dlya Poletov," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, October 1969, p. 20; Captain B. Obukhov, "S Garantivoy," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, March 1972, pp. 28-29, and occasionally in other articles.

15. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel V. Abramov, "Setevyye Grafiki v Aerodromno-Tekhnicheskoy Obespechenii Poletov," *Tyil i Snabzheniye*, November 1971, pp. 84-86, and Lieutenant Colonel-Engineer V. Slivkin and Major-Engineer Yu. Titov, "Ispol'zuyu Setevyye Grafiki," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, July 1973, p. 21.

16. Such as Major M. Kamvshnikov, "Posle Peschanov Buri," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, September 1980, p. 35.

17. Specifications for these machines may be found in Blok, pp. 134-40.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

19. Major General-Engineer A. Panenkin, "V Period Talykh Vod," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, April 1978, pp. 42-43.

20. *SVE*, s.v. "Aerodromnyye Avariynyye Tormoznyye Ustanovki"

by L. P. Kartashev.

21. Lieutenant Colonel V. Kar'min, "Poka Grom ne Gryanet . . .," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 17 April 1980, p. 2.

22. Captain N. Antonov, "Bespokoynaya Dolzhnost'," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, February 1982, pp. 16-17.

23. Blok, p. 194, pp. 234-42; Colonel A. Sorokin, "Kogda U'molkli Turbiny," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 May 1981, p. 2; Colonel General of Aviation F. Polynin, "Opyt Aerodromno-Tylovykh Ucheniy—V Praktiku Obucheniya," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, March 1969, p. 10; Major Yu. Zhabkov, "Aerodrom K Rabote Gotov," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, February 1981, p. 12.

24. Blok, pp. 250-55.

25. Major A. Tkachenko, "Rezervy Pod Luchom," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, August 1980, p. 35.

26. Major General of Aviation A. Kondioglo, "Gorodkam Aviatoram—Obraztsovoye Soderzhaniye," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, September 1977, p. 37.

27. Colonel General of Aviation F. Polynin, "Opyt Aerodromno-Tylovykh Ucheniy—V Praktiku Obucheniya," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, March 1969, pp. 10-11.

28. Colonel G. Kiyayev, "Chto Pokazalo Ucheniye," *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, March 1975, p. 5.

29. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 347; *Spravochnik Dlya Postupayushchikh V Vysshiy Uchebnyy Zavedeniya SSSR* (Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola, 1980), pp. 223-24.

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CUBA AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY


DR. P. EDWARD HALEY

A NATION's vital interest, as Charles Burton Marshall once observed, is what it will fight to protect or achieve. The United States has a vital interest in the maintenance of a favorable political and military environment in Central America and the Caribbean, but it has lost military and political initiative in the region. A hostile revolutionary government in Nicaragua and civil war in El Salvador, together with the growing military power of Cuba, threaten to transform the political and military circumstances in the region to the detriment of the United States.

In its efforts to overcome these adverse developments, the Reagan administration has concentrated on vigorous programs of economic assistance, propaganda, covert support of military intervention, and military aid and training. These measures have provoked an intense debate over the wisdom and morality of the course the administration has chosen. To the responsible critics—such as Senator Christopher Dodd and Wayne Smith, former chief of U.S. interests in

Havana—this course reveals fundamental errors of understanding and judgment. They insist that the disturbances in Central America are local in origin and do not threaten U.S. security. Also, if a genuine threat to U.S. security developed—such as direct Soviet intervention—Dodd and Smith allege that the United States has the military power to deal with it.¹

Supporters of the administration's policy reply that U.S. security is endangered not because of local grievances but as a result of Cuban and



Soviet intervention. The National Security Planning Group observed:

Strategically, [the United States . . . has] a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes and pose a direct military threat at or near our borders. This would undercut us globally and create economic dislocation and a resultant influx to the U.S. of illegal immigrants.²

However, for different reasons, neither the critics nor the supporters of U.S. policy have examined the military dimension of the issue about which they so fervently disagree. Critics avoid it because they oppose anything having to do with the use of force in Central America, even the careful discussion of it. Ironically, their arguments depend on an invalid military premise: that the United States possesses overwhelming military superiority in Central America and the Caribbean and could crush Cuba and any combination of anti-U.S. revolutionary governments there if it chose to. Supporters of the administration are silent about the military questions, either because they, too, are unaware of the actual military weakness of the United States in the region or because they wish to avoid embarrassing admissions.

As a result, the public debate about U.S. policy in Central America is incomplete and misleading. It is based on the false premise that the United States has a military trump card to play. Such a trump may exist if Castro is foolish enough to take an extremely provocative action—such as basing Cuban warplanes in Nicaragua—or if relations deteriorate severely between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Neither appears likely. More important, such extreme contingencies provide an unsuitable basis on which to plan U.S. foreign policy. Because neither the critics nor the supporters of this policy are prepared to acknowledge the military realities in the Caribbean, they are unable to recognize the advantages and disadvantages of the United States as it attempts to transform the situation there.

The unavoidable military reality is that the

United States is without adequate military support for its foreign policy objectives in Central America. In practical terms, this means the United States is unable to take more drastic measures in opposition to pro-Castro forces in Central America other than those developed by the Reagan administration. In this sense, the non-nuclear strategic military weakness of the United States has predetermined U.S. policy.

A Comparison of Caribbean Powers

Cuba is free to support revolution and subversion in Central America because Cuban leaders know that the United States is unable to force them to stop. The inability of the United States to coerce Cuba may be demonstrated in two ways: by comparing the military forces available to each country in the event of a showdown and by comparing U.S. forces presently available to those that participated in two other amphibious campaigns; these campaigns were the seizure of Okinawa during World War II, a military campaign that would be roughly comparable to an invasion of Cuba, and the British recovery of the Falkland Islands in April-May 1982.

The U.S. military is constituted for the nuclear defense of the United States and for the conventional and nuclear defense of Western Europe. There are other vital U.S. security interests. In the western Pacific, the United States has deployed the Seventh Fleet and two divisions to defend Japan and Korea. A carrier task force operates in the Indian Ocean, and there are token forces in the Panama Canal Zone and the Caribbean area. However, unlike the strategic nuclear forces and the units in Western Europe, these other deployments are valuable primarily as symbols of U.S. commitment and as a frame to be filled out by mobilization rather than for their immediate combat power, which is not on a scale comparable to that of the enemy forces nearby.

In a confrontation with Cuba, the United States would possess total nuclear superiority. However, one assumes that nuclear weapons would not be used against Cuba unless a threat of

nuclear attack arose from the island, as it did in 1962. Therefore, the force available for use against Cuba would have to be drawn from the nonnuclear units not earmarked for deployment elsewhere. As the following tables indicate, very few U.S. military units are available for use against Cuba without significantly reducing forces already committed to other theaters.

The shortfall in U.S. land and naval power revealed in Tables I and II is even greater than it appears. Two army divisions, for example, are not completely manned by active duty personnel. Moreover, it would never be possible to deploy 100 percent of the active ships and submarines in any of their assigned areas. At best only some fraction of the ships would be on station. (See Table II.) The others would either be in transit or in port because of equipment and weapon shortages, training, crew leave, and maintenance. During one of its perennial struggles with the Congress for operating funds, the Pentagon revealed how severe these reductions can be. In June 1983, a Defense Department spokesman stated that the United States was able to arm fully only 5 of its 13 operational carriers at one

time.³ This observation underlines the inability of the United States to use its existing naval power against Cuba. Any diversion of carriers and surface combatants from their regular assignments to blockade or combat duty in the Caribbean would reduce the other fleets to token forces unable to carry out their missions.

As Table III reveals, the United States has no tactical fighter squadrons available for use against Cuba without reducing its capabilities to intervene in the other vital theaters—Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—to which the nation is committed. This is critical to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Central America and the Caribbean because of the vital importance of control of the air to effective naval and amphibious action in the region.

As was true with naval strength, the table exaggerates U.S. tactical air power, since only a portion of the airplanes listed would be ready for combat flight. If one generously assumes that 50 percent of all tactical aircraft are ready for combat, Cuba has an operational force of 109 aircraft available for combat in a confrontation with the United States. The United States has none.

Table I. Planned and present deployment of U.S. Army divisions

Deployment	Mechanized	Armored	Infantry	Airborne	Brigades
Europe	2	2			4
Europe (planned)	3	2	2		1
U.S. Central Command (planned)	1			2	1
Japan					support troops
Korea			1		
Alaska					1
Panama					1
Hawaii			1*		
Totals	6	4	4	2	8
Total in U.S. Army	16				
Total Planned Deployment	16				
Army divisions Available for use against Cuba	0				

Sources: *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983); *United States Military Posture*, prepared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983); *The Military Balance 1982-83* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).

*Unit's establishment is detached

Fleet	Carriers	Surface Combatants	Attack Submarines
Second (Atlantic)	4-5	76	41
Third (Eastern Pacific)	3	44	30
Sixth (Mediterranean)	2	14	5
Seventh (Western Pacific)	3	21	8
Indian Ocean	1	6	0
Mideast	0	4	0
U.S. Central Command (planned)	3	60(?)	8(?)
Totals	17	225	92
Active Strength	14	204	90
Available for use against Cuba	0	0	0

Source: *The Military Balance 1982-83* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).

Table II. Deployment of U.S. Navy major combatants

Clearly, the table reveals the same unfortunate picture as the others. Without a serious reduction in the ability of the United States to honor its commitments in Europe, the western Pacific,

and the Middle East, the United States lacks the air power to engage Cuba militarily.

The U.S. Marine Corps has a strength of 192,000. It is constituted in three divisions, each

Table III. Strength and deployment of U.S. tactical air force divisions

Location	Squadrons (aircraft)					
	Base	F-4	F-15	F-16	F-111	A-10
Alaska		1(24)				
Germany		6(144)	3(72)	2(48)		
Iceland		1(24)				
Japan			3(72)			
Korea		2(36)		2(48)		1(18)
Netherlands			1(24)			
Philippines		2(48)				
Spain		1(24)				
United Kingdom					7(156)	7(126)
Totals		13(300)	7(168)	4(96)	7(156)	8(144)
Active Strength		31(708)	16(376)	13(312)	11(252)	12(288)
Remaining		18(408)	9(208)	9(216)	4(96)	4(144)
Fighter Squadrons (F-4, F-15, F-16, A-10) Remaining		40(976)				
U.S. Central Command (planned)		20(?) fighter squadrons				
Europe (planned)		20				
Available for use against Cuba		0				

Source: *The Military Balance 1982-83* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).

with its own air wing, a total of 441 combat aircraft in 26 fighter and ground attack squadrons. Plans for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force call for an independent Marine amphibious brigade, but this unit apparently has not yet been established. (See Table IV.)

Table IV. Strength and deployment of U.S. Marines

Deployment	Division
Japan/Okinawa	1*
CONUS	2
Hawaii	brigade from Japan-based division
California	1
North Carolina	1
U.S. Central Command (planned)	1
Total Marine divisions	3
Deployed or committed	2
Available for use against Cuba	1

Source: *The Military Balance 1982-1983* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982); U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings/Naval Review 1983*, May 1983, p. 272.

*Part of unit's establishment is detached.

The unavoidable conclusion is that out of this impressive force of army, navy, and air forces, the United States has at best one Marine division

with its air wing available for service in the Caribbean without disrupting the assignment of other units to other theaters. In a word, Cuba has the military initiative in the region. Cuban not U.S. foreign policy is adequately supported by military power.

The following survey of Cuban military power shows that Castro has acquired potent self-defense and interventionary capabilities. The effectiveness of this Cuban military power is enhanced by the inadequacies of conventional U.S. military forces opposed to it. The Cuban army, reserves, and paramilitary forces have expanded dramatically in the past six years and now greatly outnumber the active force the United States has to send against them. (See Table V.) During the same period, the U.S.S.R. has significantly increased both the size and quality of the Cuban air force, which now disposes of some 190 advanced fighter aircraft, MiG-21 and MiG-23. (See Tables VI and VII.)

The Cuban navy is a coastal defense force. However, the range of its missile boats and the narrow waters around Cuba make it formidable to an opponent who has not established air superiority. The missile boats are the Osa-I and II and Komar class, with a range of 800 nautical miles at 25 knots and 400 nautical miles at 30

Table V. Recent developments in Cuban military manpower
(in nearest thousands)

Service	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82
Armed Forces	189	159	189	206	227	225
Army	160	130	160	180	200	200
Navy	9	9	9	10	11	10
Air Force	20	20	20	16	16	15
Reserves	90	90	90	90	130	190
Paramilitary	113	113	118	118	118.5	618*
State Security	10	10	15	15	15	15
Frontier Guard	3	3	3	3	3.5	3
Youth Labor	100	100	100	100	100	100
Territorial Militia	-	-	-	-	-	500*

Sources: *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual); U.S. Department of State, "Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence," Special Report No. 103, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., August 1982.

*Castro began to form this military unit early in the Reagan administration. *The Military Balance* gives a total of 50,000 for the unit in 1982. The much larger U.S. State Department figure is used here. Presumably the unit is still being formed.

Aircraft	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Squadrons (number of aircraft)						
Ground attack	4(75)	2(30)	3(40)	3(40)	3(42)	3(50)
Interceptor	7(120)	7(118)	8(128)	8(128)	8(113)	14(169)
Transport	3(50)	3(50)	4(30)	4(46)	4(57)	4(54)
Helicopter	2(54)	2(54)	3(40)	4(49)	4(59)	7(112)

Source: *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual).

Table VI. Strength of the Cuban Air Force
(by aircraft type and squadron)

knots respectively. They are armed with the Styx missile, which has a range of 18 miles and carries a 1100-pound conventional warhead. (See Table VIII.)

Cuba, Okinawa, and the Falklands

A comparison of present U.S. forces to those employed in the invasion of Okinawa underlines the inability of the United States to coerce Cuba. The island of Okinawa, one of the Ryukyu chain, runs north to south and is some 60 miles long and from 2 to 18 miles wide; total area, 485

square miles; its population in 1940 was 435,000. Cuba has an area of 44,218 square miles and a population of 9,827,000.

For the invasion of Okinawa, the United States amassed an impressive force. Altogether, 184,000 troops were assigned to the operation, code-named Iceberg. Supported by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (FCTF), five divisions or 116,000 men were committed to the initial landings, which began on 1 April 1945. The Fast Carrier Task Force included 9 carriers, 5 fast battleships, 8 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 3 anti-aircraft

Table VII. Strength of the Cuban Air Force
(by aircraft type)

Aircraft	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82
Combat aircraft	195	148	168	168	175	259
MiG-17	75	30	30	30	30	30
MiG-19	40	40	40	40	40	40
MiG-21	80	78	78	78	78	154
MiG-23	—	—	20	20	27	35
Transport	50	50	30	46	57	54
Il-14	Some	Some	10	10	10	20
An-2	Some	Some	Some	12	12	12
An-24	Some	Some	Some	4	15	2
An-26	—	—	20	20	20	20
Helicopters	54	54	40	49	59	112
Mi-1	30	30	10	5	15	Some
Mi-4	24	24	20	24	24	60
Mi-8	—	—	10	20	20	40
Mi-24	—	—	—	Some	Some	12
Surface-to-air missiles	144	144	144	144	144	200
SA-2/3	144	144	144	144	144	144
SA-6	—	—	—	Some	Some	56?

Source: *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual).

Ships	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82
Submarine	—	—	2	3	3
Frigate	—	1	1	1	1
Patrol (large)	18	18	14	12*	10
Fast attack (missile)	26	27	26*	23*	26
Fast attack (torpedo)	24	24	23*	22	24
Coastal patrol	12	12	12	12	12
Minesweepers (all able to lay mines)	—	2	8	9	9
Landing craft (medium)	7	7	7	7	7
Survey vessels	6	12	13	13	13
Frontier guard	15	14	14	14	14
Totals	108	117	120	116	119

Sources: *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual); *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London: Jane's, 1981).

* *Jane's* and *The Military Balance* sometimes give different figures. The figures shown represent the author's best estimate where marked by an asterisk.

Table VIII. Strength of the Cuban Navy

cruisers, and 58 destroyers. In addition to the FCTF, another 1300 American ships followed the invading American troops, including 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats. In all they fired 44,825 shells of 5 inches or more, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells. All the landing area for 1000 yards inland was blanketed with enough 5-inch shells, 4.5-inch rockets, and 4.2-inch mortars to average 25 rounds in each 100-yard square. Simultaneously, aircraft from American carriers attacked Japanese positions. They were aided by a British carrier force, whose planes flew 345 sorties to destroy enemy aircraft on nearby islands. To supply the invasion force required a sealoft of approximately 745,000 measurement tons. Japanese forces defending Okinawa numbered approximately 77,200. Less than 10 percent survived the battles. American casualties were also heavy: 12,300 dead. Aircraft and shipping losses were severe on both sides.⁴

In contrast to the American armada deployed against Okinawa, the active U.S. forces available

for conventional military operations against Cuba are minuscule. Without disrupting American commitments to other theaters, they include 1 Marine division and its fighter wing, several carriers, and a handful of surface combatants. It is beyond the capability of this brave but slender force to establish control of the air around Cuba. Without adequate air cover, U.S. naval commanders would be reluctant to bring their carriers and large surface combatants into the waters around Cuba. For the same reason the Gulf of Mexico would be closed to U.S. capital ships if hostilities between Cuba and the United States were imminent. It follows, then, that a naval blockade of Cuba could not now be established. A blockade that depended on mines for complete coverage would also fail because of Cuban air, missile boat, and minesweeping capabilities. (See Tables VII and VIII.) The United States committed 180 ships to blockade a far weaker Cuba in 1962. This was less than one-fourth (21.5 percent) of the active U.S. fleet of 835 ships. Twenty years later, the commitment of 180 ships would represent nearly 45 percent of the entire fleet.⁵

In contrast to the American operation against Okinawa in 1945, the forces assembled by the British government to recover the Falkland Islands were much smaller. Even so, they provide a standard of successful amphibious warfare and would probably surpass the American forces that could be committed against Cuba without borrowing heavily from other commands. For the Falklands campaign, the British assembled a task force of 28,000 men and 100 ships. They were opposed by some 12,000 Argentine troops in the garrison on East Falklands and by the Argentine air force and navy operating from the mainland.

Among the 44 warships in the British task force were 2 carriers, 6 submarines, 2 missile destroyers, 6 destroyers, 15 frigates, and 5 minesweepers. Altogether, 42 Sea Harrier vertical short takeoff aircraft were committed to combat. British losses were 255 dead and 777 wounded. The task force lost 12 ships and 28 aircraft (7 planes and 21 helicopters).

Two of the most important advantages gained by Britain during the fighting were control of the air—by British count 117 Argentine warplanes were destroyed—and control of the sea. After their initial heavy losses, and fearing attack by the nuclear submarines of the British task force, the Argentine navy would not venture beyond the 12-mile coastal safe limit allowed by British commanders and, therefore, was unable to hinder the operation against the Falklands in any significant way. Perhaps the most striking comparison relevant to U.S. strategy in the Caribbean is that in an operation against forces that are much smaller, less potent, and less well trained than those of Cuba, the British deployed a task force whose warships numbered one-fifth the entire surface combat fleet of the U.S. Navy. Plainly, the lesson of the Falklands is that the United States can find the power to coerce Cuba only by wrecking the structure of its military commitments to other vital theaters.⁶

Alternative Policies toward Cuba

United States foreign policy toward Cuba and the nations of Central America must now be made on a basis of U.S. military weakness. But most critics of the Reagan administration will not address this military reality. Rather, they appear to share the view that nothing short of the establishment of a Soviet military base in the region is harmful to U.S. vital interests or would justify U.S. countermeasures. Senator Christopher J. Dodd took this position in his reply to President Reagan's address to a joint session of Congress on 27 April 1983. Charles William Maynes, editor of *Foreign Policy*, expressed this view succinctly in a widely publicized article: "In the final analysis," Maynes argued, "there is only one step these countries could take that would affect the national security of the United States: They could offer military facilities to the Soviet Union."⁷

This might be termed the minimalist definition of U.S. vital interests. It is attractive to critics of administration policy because it seems to

postpone indefinitely the day of a showdown. After all, what Latin American revolutionaries would be foolish enough to offer military facilities to the U.S.S.R.? Can we so easily have forgotten Castro's offer and its acceptance by the Soviet Union?

Contrary to the view of the minimalists, the United States must continue to be intimately involved in the defense of endangered countries in Central America precisely because revolutionary disturbances may bring to power radicals who would offer military facilities to the Soviet Union. It is a matter of political common sense. No prudent government throws away military and political allies. To do so would be strategic folly. In addition, it would demoralize all potential U.S. allies, making military showdown with the Soviet Union even more likely than it is at present.

There are other serious problems with the minimalist argument. Apparently, there is nothing to admire about U.S. policy in Central America. To Maynes, there is no difference between U.S. policy in Central America and Soviet policy in Central Europe. "The United States should recognize," Maynes wrote, "that it cannot oppose the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe while proclaiming a Reagan Doctrine in Central America." The argument is false. The constant effort of the Carter and Reagan administrations has been to bring about democratic reform in Central America. Admittedly, both administrations were unwilling to overthrow the existing friendly governments in order to achieve rapid peaceful change. But this is prudence rather than a compromise of principle. In any case, the U.S. search for democratic reform, a lessening of repression and violence, and free elections have nothing in common with Soviet policy in Poland, which has been to do exactly the opposite.

The remedy offered by these critics is as flawed as their analysis. They say, if the Soviet Union should attempt to establish a base in Central America, the United States should then ruthlessly wipe it out. Moscow and the nations of Central America and the Caribbean should be

told, as Maynes put it, that any establishment of Soviet military bases in Central America "will trigger an immediate U.S. invasion to wipe out the facility." The statement has a certain appearance of toughness to it. But it must not be taken at face value for at least two reasons. First, as this analysis has shown, the United States has no immediate conventional military options in the Caribbean and Central America. It would acquire them over a period of years, but few of the critics speak in favor of the large-scale conventional buildup that would be needed to get them. In these circumstances, to speak of unilateral American intervention to destroy Soviet bases is to indulge in fantasy.

Second, a Soviet base already exists in the Caribbean, but neither Maynes nor Dodd nor any of the other critics of this school advocate its elimination by military attack. Why should one believe that if another Soviet base were to be established in Central America they would favor its destruction by prompt American military action? Rather than advocating such firm steps, they would be the foremost spokesmen for the peaceful acceptance of the new status quo. Arguments would be found to prove that the base was small or concerned only with strengthening the internal position of the newly installed revolutionary regime. The Soviet action would be shown to be the result of a new power struggle within the Kremlin, a conflict that would be wrongly influenced if the United States took decisive military action in Central America. Interdependence would be cited as proof of the irrelevance of such military outposts. Then, the War Powers Resolution would be recalled, and the strategic defense of U.S. vital interests would be transformed into a constitutional question.

If one rejects such criticisms—and rejection is appropriate—one does not readily find more satisfactory proposals among those basically friendly to the policy of the Reagan administration. Perhaps the most elaborate constructive criticism of administration policy was presented in a monograph prepared in September 1982 for the U.S. Department of State and Air Force.⁸ It is

a serious, conscientious work whose shortcomings stem less from errors of its author, Edward Gonzalez, than from the limitations imposed on him by his government sponsors. Clearly, he was instructed to confine his advice to measures that could be implemented within the present political and material limits on U.S. policy. Gonzalez was not allowed to suggest, for example, a significant increase in U.S. conventional military capabilities, although he warned that significant military action against Cuba would surpass the present military capabilities of the United States. Given these limitations, it is not surprising that Gonzalez recommended little more than incremental increases in present policy: better surveillance of arms shipments, better propaganda, and intensified economic and diplomatic pressure on Castro.⁹ Until such steps are backed by adequate U.S. conventional power deployed in the Caribbean, Cuba will ignore them. The visit of Cuban General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, organizer of Castro's African interventions, to Nicaragua in June 1983 suggested that the Cuban government was planning to increase its aid to the Sandinista regime in disregard of the Reagan administration's opposition.

In addition, Gonzalez has made a critically important error. The goal of U.S. policy, he argued, should be to "Finlandize" Cuba. By his definition, this would mean: "The integrity of the smaller country's political institutions and economic system, and its international autonomy, are observed by the neighboring superpower on the condition that the smaller state respect the superpower's security interests."¹⁰ This is a misleading analogy for at least three reasons. Most important, the U.S.S.R. has gone to war against Finland twice and has annexed part of its territory in order to oblige the smaller country to "respect the superpower's security interests." Although the United States has used force against Cuba, notably during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, it now lacks the military capability to attack Cuba without mobilization. This is not true of the Soviet Union and Finland. Moreover, the Soviet Union has repeatedly used massive

force against the nations of Eastern Europe since 1956 and, in Poland, has continued to threaten invasion.

The Soviet capability to invade Finland is all too credible. To the east of the Finnish-Soviet frontier lie Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, where the U.S.S.R. maintains one of the largest concentrations of conventional air and sea power in the world. John Erickson has described the Soviet Northern Theater of Operations as:

... one of the strongest—possibly the strongest—complex of bases in the world ... housing strategic forces capable of and committed to operating far beyond the Soviet periphery plus tactical forces deployed to protect these bases and embodying the capability of seizing and holding any appreciable territorial buffer zone ... It is this search for security, avowedly defensive in origin, which has led and will continue to lead to overweening presence, impressive tactical readiness and pressure inevitably inducing instability.¹¹

Second, Finland has a large Communist party and for the sake of its own internal unity must accommodate all but the most extreme demands from the Soviet Union. As part of the armistice agreement with the U.S.S.R. in 1944, Finland was obliged to legalize the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). Previously the party had operated directly from Moscow. Since the end of World War II, the SKP has been one of the country's four major parties and has repeatedly joined in coalition governments of Finland. Although Finland is a relatively small country, the SKP ranks with the major Communist parties of Europe, usually polling from 16 to 23 percent of the vote. In 1979 its electoral front, the Finnish Peoples Democratic League (SKDL) won 17.9 percent of the vote and membership in the government. The party's share of the vote fell in local elections in 1980. Even so, the SKDL/SKP put three ministers in the new government formed after Mauno Koivisto succeeded Urho Kekkonen as President in January 1982. The foreign policy objective of the SKP in the presidential elections was "to ensure the maintenance and strengthening of ties with the USSR" and to place "top priority on reassuring Moscow that

Finnish authorities would adopt no policies constituting a threat to Soviet security."¹²

Not only is there no pro-American equivalent of the Finnish Communist Party in Cuba but the United States has allowed Castro to deport to its shores by the hundreds of thousands the very people who might have forced him to accommodate his policies to the interests of the United States. Finally, by its continuing communization of Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated to Finland that the alternative to acquiescence to the demands of Soviet security is most unattractive. This condition has no counterpart in the Cuba-U.S. relationship.

Although they are not spoken as criticism, the arguments of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick in favor of supporting rightist authoritarian regimes also require attention in a survey of viewpoints supportive of the Reagan administration's policies in Central America. In simplest terms Ambassador Kirkpatrick's analysis holds that no sensible nation undermines friendly governments in a vital security zone. She embellishes the argument by observing that rightist authoritarian regimes are not in principle morally inferior to leftist totalitarian ones. But this does not detract from her appeal to political prudence.¹³

Granted, it is imprudent to ignore the dangers of one's friends. Let us even assume, for the sake of argument, that the policy informed by the Kirkpatrick view of revolution in Central America is capable of producing a successful defense of vital U.S. interests. One still encounters two serious problems. First, the policy inspired by this analysis may be an international success and a domestic failure. The injustice of the existing regimes may be so great and reform of them may be so protracted and uncertain that domestic support for the administration's policy disappears in partisan wrangling and indecision. While the ugliness of the authoritarian right in Central America is all too tangible, the sins of the totalitarian left remain hypothetical as long as such movements fail to win power. Unable to discern the similarity, the American democracy

may choose the lesser apparent evil.

It is, of course, far from clear that the Kirkpatrick view of the revolutionary process will always lead to successful international results. And if it does not, what recourse will the administration have? The metaphor employed throughout the debate on Central America has been that of climbing a staircase—a slow, steady rise in American involvement similar to that followed in Vietnam. A more apt metaphor would be falling off a cliff. If the present policy of military aid, economic development, and diplomacy and propaganda fails, the administration will suffer a nasty spill.

A DIFFERENT policy is needed.

It must be one that is based on adequate military support. It must also be a policy that can win the support of the three-quarters of the electorate within the United States who have a grasp of the role of force in international politics. The international test of such a policy would be the return of a political and military environment in Central America favorable to the United States. The domestic political test of such a policy would be its ability to win the backing of those who oppose meddling in the internal affairs of the Latin and Central American republics and who are also alarmed about the dangers of Soviet and Cuban adventurism. Without a strong bipartisan basis, any policy of opposition to Havana and Moscow will fail. Under present political constraints, the United States will be denied more or less indefinitely the ability to intervene directly in revolutionary conflicts in Central America.

This restraint notwithstanding, the problem remains: How to base American foreign policy in Central America and the Caribbean on adequate military power? The solution would be to separate the internal politics from the foreign policies of the governments of Central America. In other words, American policymakers would base their decisions on the external actions rather than the internal ideology of these regimes. This

approach has been recommended by observers with views as diverse as Maynes and Gonzalez. However, they have not advocated the additional measures without which such a distinction remains rhetorical. That step is for the United States to acquire the conventional military capabilities—primarily increased air and naval power—necessary to prevent governments in the region from refusing to respect U.S. security interests. At the same time, the United States must maintain its programs of reform and economic and military assistance in order not to squander military and political assets. In some cases these efforts will aid in the appearance of viable, morally attractive regimes. In others they will fail, and hostile, anti-American regimes will come to power.

The problem for the United States is to develop an internationally effective recourse when the failures come, as some surely will. This is not to suggest that U.S. foreign policy problems in Central America and elsewhere in the Third World can be solved by military means alone. Any satisfactory resolution of the problems facing the United States in these areas will require all the resources of diplomacy and economic development that the U.S. commands. But neither will these problems be solved by a foreign policy that is inadequately supported by military power. In this sense, it is possible to identify a rough test of the adequacy of U.S. conventional strength in Central America and the Caribbean. U.S. policy will be adequately supported when the United States is able to impose an air and sea blockade on Cuba without disrupting its commitments to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

With such military strength behind its foreign policy, the protection of vital U.S. interests becomes feasible and not, as it is in the critics' world, hypothetical. Without this margin of conventional military power, the United States will remain unable to defend its vital interests in Central America and the Caribbean.

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Notes

1. Major criticisms of the administration's Central American policies may be found in Senator Christopher Dodd's televised speech, text in *New York Times*, April 28, 1983; Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1982; William LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1982; Tom Wicker, *New York Times*, April 29, 1983; William Pfaff, *Los Angeles Times*, May 23, 1983.

2. The administration's policy was set forth in National Security Document 17 of 1981 and in "United States Policy in Central America and Cuba through FY 1984," prepared by the National Security Planning Group, an entity established by the President in 1981. Its members are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Council, and the three top presidential aides—Edwin W. Meese 3d, Michael K. Deaver, and James A. Baker 3d. The text of the National Security Planning Group's document is in *New York Times*, April 7, 1983. The text of President Reagan's address on Central America to a joint session of Congress is in *New York Times*, April 28, 1983. See also the responses to LeoGrande's *Foreign Policy* article by Myles R. R. Frechette, Office of Cuban Affairs, Department of State; and Edward Gonzalez, University of California, Los Angeles, in *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1982.

3. *Los Angeles Times*, June 22, 1983.

4. See Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, John Stevens, *United States Army in World War II. The War in the*

Pacific, volume 2, part II. *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), chs. 1-3, 17-18, appendixes, and tables.

5. The figure for U.S. ships in the blockade of Cuba is from Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Bantam, 1966), p. 98. For fleet strengths in 1962 and 1982, see *Military Balance, 1962-1963; 1982-1983* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies).

6. For information on the Falklands campaign, see the article by the former British Defence Minister John Nott in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review 1983*, May 1983, pp. 118-39.

7. *Los Angeles Times*, June 12, 1983.

8. Edward Gonzalez, "A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s," R2954-DOS/AF (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, September, 1982).

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-130.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

11. John Erickson, "The Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1976, p. 68.

12. Finis Herbert Capps, "Finland," in Richard F. Staar, editor, *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982: Parties and Revolutionary Movements* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 273; see also Keesing's *Contemporary Archives*, April 2, 1982, p. 31410.

13. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979.

An intelligent Russian once remarked to us, "Every country has its own constitution; ours is absolutism moderated by assassination."

Georg Herbert, Count Münster
Political Sketches of the State of Europe, 1814-1867

R air force review


NATO PILOT TRAINING IN REVIEW

CAPTAIN DENNIS L. DANIELSON

THE most significant training project to be undertaken by allies during peacetime is the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT). The nations involved are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The official opening was 23 October 1981 at 80th Flying Training Wing (FTW), Sheppard AFB,

Wichita Falls, Texas. The goal is to produce the best fighter pilots in the world. ENJJPT is the most extensive multinational undergraduate pilot and pilot instructor training program ever conceived.

ENJJPT has been in development since 1973, but its origin can be traced back to World War II. From June 1941 to the end of 1945, the United States provided the personnel and facilities needed



to train more than 14,000 Allied pilots.¹ Most of them were from England and France although the graduates also included Chinese, Brazilian, and Dutch pilots. The United States undertook this training program because we were not under daily threat of enemy attack and did not have the poor weather that prevailed over Europe; therefore, training could progress without interruption.

Allied training was provided under the leadership of Major General Henry H. Arnold, then Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps. General Arnold committed one-third of his training capacity to train foreign pilots.² Pilot training was conducted at many locations throughout the United States including Lackland, Lowry, Luke, Maxwell, Moody, Nellis, and Tyndall Air Force bases. Foreign students from diverse backgrounds converged on these bases to be transformed into the backbones of their respective countries' air forces. The training program was very successful, but the unique cultural backgrounds from which the students came posed complex questions for the instructors. How does an American instructor pilot train a Chinese student who comes from a strictly agricultural society? How does one teach air discipline to a student whose only concept of flying stems from his observations of the flight of birds? In addition to these culturally related problems, American instructors had to face a more serious problem, the language barrier. Many students who came to the United States spoke little or no English. Removing this roadblock proved to be a major task and interpreters were acquired to help conduct training. Even then, a great deal of information was lost through translation. In spite of all obstacles, the World War II training program proved vitally important to the war effort of each country that sent pilot candidates to the United States.

The postwar period brought many changes to the Allied pilot training program. Lend-Lease training was terminated in March 1946, which meant the countries receiving training assumed total financial responsibility for that training.³

As a result, foreign training in the United States has decreased significantly since the end of World War II negated the need for large air forces and countries channeled their financial revenue toward reconstruction. Nevertheless, America's Allies still required a force of well-trained pilots and continued to rely on the United States for assistance. The United States has been training foreign pilots ever since.

Sheppard AFB, Texas, has been used for foreign flight training throughout the last 16 years. A flight school for the Federal Republic of Germany was opened in 1966 upon the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Hans Opel, Commander of the German Air Force (GAF) Training Group in the United States.⁴ German students arrived in 1967, and the GAF program started training more than 200 students a year. The GAF sent experienced German pilots to Sheppard to serve as instructors; however, most of the instructor pilots were from the United States Air Force. Training was accomplished by using approximately 80 T-37s and T-38s that were purchased and maintained by funds from the Federal Republic of Germany.⁵ The program proved very successful, and other European countries expressed their interest in it. In 1979, the Netherlands decided to enroll students in the GAF program and also sent a Dutch pilot to be an instructor. Throughout the last ten years, Sheppard AFB has also been used as a training base for student pilots from Central and South America, Africa, and Asia.

The goals of all our foreign training programs have been to strengthen our allies in order to deter another global war and be prepared to win if war should occur. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exists to achieve these same goals. The worth of any military organization is based on its ability to train and maintain professional soldiers in any arena of combat.

In 1970, the EuroGroup established the [Euro-training Subgroup] as a forum for the exchange of views of training matters in general.⁶ This subgroup was expanded in 1971 into the Euro-NATO Training Group. In 1973, the idea of a

NATO-wide flying program was adopted by the Euro-NATO training—Air Force Sub-Group (ENT-AFSG). A subsidiary of Euro-NATO Training, the ENT-AFSG formed a multinational working group from potential participating nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to study the feasibility of establishing a multinational pilot training program. The ultimate objective would be a NATO-wide air force accustomed to flying and working together using the same concepts, tactics, and rules of flight.

The United States was finally selected as the best location for at least the next ten years. As mentioned earlier, our weather is consistently better than Europe's. Additionally, we have been in the business of large-scale national and international flight training longer than any other country. Furthermore, the United States has greater resources available in terms of facilities, airspace, and instructor pilots.

In 1980, Sheppard AFB was selected as the logical USAF base for ENJJPT. The 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard AFB had the capacity to expand its flying operations to meet the needs of the ENJJPT program and a sizable cadre of American, German, and Dutch instructors to begin the program. The German Air Force T-37s and T-38s could be turned over to ENJJPT, and the GAF syllabus needed only minor modifications to make it suitable for the program. The 80th Flying Training Wing also had an operational PIT (pilot instructor training) program that could expand to meet ENJJPT's instructor requirements. A final point worth mentioning is that the German Air Force program at Sheppard enjoyed an excellent rapport with people in the surrounding communities. Experience gained through past foreign training programs at Sheppard helped the 80th Flying Training Wing anticipate and solve the problems it faced as it expanded to become the only multinational organization of its kind.

In February 1980, representatives of the twelve NATO countries met at Sheppard to set opera-

tional policy for ENJJPT. A variety of issues concerning finances, student quotas, support facilities, legal arrangements, housing, etc. had to be resolved among all twelve nations. In December 1980, ministers of defense from each country met in Brussels, Belgium, to sign the memorandum of understanding. After the Brussels meeting, plans were completed to ensure ENJJPT's success, and each country began selecting personnel who would ultimately be the ones to make ENJJPT work. ENJJPT was under way. It is a truly joint cooperative, cost-sharing project with a NATO-developed syllabus, a joint NATO staff and faculty, and facilities dedicated to NATO.

The key ingredient for a successful pilot training program is found in quality instruction. Instructors for ENJJPT are carefully screened and selected according to their military records. Many European instructors chosen for ENJJPT have between 10 and 15 years of experience in fighter aircraft. American instructors include top undergraduate pilot training (UPT) graduates plus a cross-section of experienced pilots from all major weapon systems. The 80th Flying Training Wing enters all instructor trainees into its own PIT course in lieu of the standard American PIT course at Randolph AFB. Although the local PIT course at Sheppard is the same length as PIT at Randolph, the course is specifically tailored to prepare a pilot to be an ENJJPT instructor.

The ENJJPT UPT course is significantly different from standard American UPT. Among other things, the students are among the best qualified from each NATO country. For example, only 5 percent of German applicants and 8 percent of qualified American UPT applicants are chosen. Other nations select students in an equally stringent manner. Then, during the 55 weeks at Sheppard AFB, students complete approximately 450 hours of classroom academics, 260 hours of actual flight instruction, and 115 hours of procedural and ground training. The ENJJPT syllabus has a strong emphasis on low-level navigation and formation. During the T-37 phase, each student solos in low-level navigation

and formation. During T-38 training, two of the low-level navigation sorties are flown as a flight of two aircraft at an altitude of 500 feet. During the formation phase, each T-38 student receives a flight evaluation in formation flights of two and four aircraft. Emphasis in formations of four aircraft is placed on the basic tactical maneuvers that students will use throughout their careers in fighter aircraft.

The first UPT class consisting of 4 Norwegian, 15 American, and 17 German students

actually began training on 1 October 1981. The same day pilots from Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the United States entered instructor training. Every six weeks a new class of 36 NATO students enters training. ENJJPT's second student class was composed of Norwegians, Dutch, Danes, and Americans. The second PIT class included pilots from Norway, Turkey, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States. Throughout fiscal year 1982 students arrived from all countries except Canada, Greece, Portugal, and Italy. Until now Italy has not participated; however, Italy is entering the program in FY84 with UPT students and instructors. Some of the nations (Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany) will depend on the ENJJPT program to train all of their fighter-oriented students. Other nations expect to retain their own

The quality of instruction is a key factor in making any training program a success. The USAF uses some of its best pilots in the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training effort. Here an instructor answers a Royal Air Force pilot's questions about local flight procedures.





flight schools and will depend on ENJJPT to train only a portion of their UPT students (subject to further consideration). The full impact that ENJJPT will have on the NATO alliance awaits the test of time, but some observations have already become apparent within the 80th Flying Training Wing.

From the viewpoint of an instructor, the most significant observation concerns language. Students arrive with a good working knowledge of the English language in both reading and comprehension. Although their vocabulary may sometimes be limited and flying opens a whole new chapter of words and phrases, students aggressively tackle the challenge to master the language. This is no small task since one publication alone, the Department of Defense General Planning document, for example, contains hundreds of aeronautical terms that students must learn. Learning new terminology in an international environment such as ENJJPT does have its humorous moments. For example, a recent radio conversation between Fort Worth Center and a student pilot went as follows:

FORT WORTH CENTER: "Snort 34, when will you depart your area, sir?"

The Northrop T-38 Talon, standard advanced trainer in the USAF, serves in many of the inventories of our NATO allies. Pilots from several NATO countries will have had extensive experience in the fighter versions of this aircraft, the F-5 Freedom Fighter and the Tiger II.

STUDENT (replying in a heavy accent): "In roundabout two minutes."

FORT WORTH CENTER: "Was that two or ten, sir?"

STUDENT: "Two minutes!"

FORT WORTH CENTER: "I can't understand you, sir, two or ten?"

STUDENT: "Two; one plus one!"

In spite of occasional misunderstandings, students are becoming remarkably adept in handling radio calls and many other flying terms associated with the program.

Another significant observation deals with the sense of comradeship created among the students by the intense pressure of training. Students have been transplanted from unique backgrounds into a common environment that is equally demanding for all. The "melting pot" effect, that has characterized America's history continues today in ENJJPT. Each ENJJPT class is sharing

a year's worth of hard work, long days, and the ultimate joy of success. Their common goal to become fighter pilots is enabling these students to overcome the cultural and social barriers of their varied backgrounds.

The ENJJPT Pilot Instructor Training program brings together the same cultural backgrounds but under different circumstances. The trainees entering PIT are experienced pilots; many have performed prior duties as instructors in a variety of NATO fighter aircraft. Their rank ranges from second lieutenant to colonel. The challenge in PIT is for each pilot to tailor his instruction and standardize his grading practices to the level of a UPT student. The diverse backgrounds of flying experience among PIT trainees provide an inherent advantage in the ENJJPT program. The European instructor trainees bring with them valuable experience from flying in European weather conditions under European flight rules in NATO fighter aircraft. The variety of techniques and practical knowledge each instructor has learned from his previous flying makes a significant contribution to the ENJJPT program.

As in the ENJJPT Undergraduate Pilot Training program, language and communication differences have required attention, but they are generally viewed as an opportunity to interact. American instructors face the challenge of communicating without overusing colloquialisms. A U.S. instructor would accomplish little if he debriefed an allied student's landing by saying, "You started out in the ball park, but when you landed we almost bought the farm." Even the three English-speaking NATO countries (United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom) find themselves separated at times by a common language. For example, if a British pilot requested an "overshoot, visual circuit with undercarriage for a roller," and after landing asked for a "bowser," he has requested a low approach, followed by a closed pattern, gear down for a touch and go. After landing he wants to refuel—everyone's vocabulary grows in ENJJPT.

When we compare ENJJPT with its predeces-

or flight program during World War II, the most significant achievement has been to reduce the problems caused by the language barrier. "ENJJPT English" is a way of life. Furthermore, the cohesion already apparent within ENJJPT with its people working together is particularly significant when one considers the political differences and problems between some of the participating nations in the past. The Warsaw Pact will probably never enjoy the spirit of unity demonstrated within ENJJPT. But what of ENJJPT's future?

Foreseeable problems are now being faced so that ENJJPT will not only survive but will fulfill the aims and goals envisioned by each parent country. Within the working level of ENJJPT, the 80th FTW is becoming a uniquely organized unit. An American second lieutenant instructor may have a Norwegian flight commander, a Dutch section commander, a Danish squadron commander, a German deputy commander for operations, and an American wing commander. That may sound nice to the ambassador of each country, but the young instructor may have a hard time getting help from his supervisors for a serious personal problem. In matters pertaining to pay, base housing, promotion, career planning, etc., he may not receive much help from his immediate supervisors because they probably know less about the USAF system than he does. Likewise, most American supervisors know little about the career-planning decisions that other nations' officers must make. To help deal with such problems, each country has a senior national representative (SNR) who assists in meeting needs of personnel from that country. There is help available to the junior officer, which may come from his immediate supervisor or from his SNR. Personal and professional matters all are dealt with tactfully and diplomatically. In a sense, everyone in the program is an ambassador.

Probably the most significant concern each country has in the ENJJPT program is in the product. Each graduating class is being carefully evaluated by everyone involved. The abilities of

the ENJJPT graduates are directly dependent on the specific maneuvers they were taught coupled with the judgment that was imparted to them while performing such maneuvers and the minimum standards they had to achieve in order to graduate. Twelve different countries like those in ENJJPT would have 12 different courses of training if each country conducted its own training. For example, in the United Kingdom the Royal Air Force flight school introduces its pilots to low-level navigation at an altitude of 250 feet above ground level when a student is in his initial phase of flight training. Additionally, they do not assign aircraft individually to a block of airspace for training as the American UPT bases do. Instead, their training takes place with all aircraft assigned to operate within the same area. (It certainly teaches a student to watch where he is going.) It is common to hear an instructor say, "Well, in my country we do it this way." The point is that ENJJPT must be a compromise. The program must take advantage of every country's experience and not lose the value of separate programs through compromise.

The current ENJJPT syllabus was derived from the previous German Air Force program at Sheppard. In 1980 each country's representative on the ENJJPT steering committee approved adoption of the GAF syllabus to initiate the ENJJPT program. Since that time instructors and SNRs have recommended changes to the syllabus, which are presented to the ENJJPT steering committee during its semiannual meetings. These circumstances are the opportunities that make ENJJPT both worthwhile and unique.

How they are handled by the steering committee and within the 80th FTW impacts the whole ENJJPT concept. Program success is being realized at the worker level, within the wing, and the dedication and commitment of all ENJJPT personnel are very evident. The overall future of ENJJPT depends on its ability to produce a pilot that meets the needs of each country's defense, but there is one final consideration: ENJJPT's future is also dependent on the future of NATO.

In his inaugural speech at the ENJJPT commencement ceremony, United States Senator John G. Tower of Texas said, "I wish politicians could emulate the splendid international cooperation that is displayed by the military leadership [which has enabled NATO to] survive the political problems that have afflicted NATO from time to time." As long as NATO members share the common commitment to deter tyranny and aggression in Western Europe, ENJJPT stands to contribute to that goal.

If deterrence fails, ENJJPT-trained pilots will be the first line of defense. As General Lew Allen, Jr., recent USAF Chief of Staff, said,

In the critical early days of any conflict that might come, the skill of NATO fighter pilots may well determine the tide of battle. The NATO allies must fight as one if war should come. Fighter pilots must react in a similar way; they must understand the principles of flying, of tactical fighter flying, in a similar fashion. And there's no better way to start that cohesion, that common basis for integral combat, than this initial joint training.⁷

That statement summarizes the purpose of the world's most unusual flying training program: Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training, ENJJPT!

Sheppard AFB, Texas

Notes

1. Air Training Command Historical Monograph, *History of Foreign Training in ATC 1941-1946*, pp. 14-33.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
4. *History of the 3630th Flying Training Wing*, 1 January-30 June

1966, p. ix.

5. *Sheppard Air Force Base History, 1 January-30 June 1967*, p. 37.
6. *The Eurogroup*, published by the Eurogroup, issued by the NATO Information Service, B-1110 Brussels.
7. General Lew Allen, Jr., Speech at ENJJPT Commencement, 23 October 1981.



IRA C. EAKER ESSAY COMPETITION

Air University is pleased to announce the fourth annual Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition. Its purpose is twofold:

—First, to honor the achievement of Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker and his colleagues, aviation pioneers whose courage and innovative spirit laid the foundation for American greatness in aerospace.

—Second, to memorialize the indomitable martial spirit of these men, a spirit that nourishes the perception of military service as a calling.

Topic areas for the essay competition are professionalism, leadership, integrity, ethics, strategy, tactics, doctrine, esprit de corps, or any combination thereof.

ENTRY RULES

—Essays must be *original* and *specifically* written for the contest. Only one entry per person may be submitted.

—Entries must be a minimum of 2000 words and a maximum of 4000 words.

—Essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, and on standard-size paper.

—The competition is open to all active (duty) members of the regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Academy and AFROTC cadets, and Civil Air Patrol.

—A separate cover-sheet should include the essay title, author's name, rank, duty/home address and duty/home phone numbers. The author's name must not appear on the essay itself. The title should be at the head of the first page.

—Send entries to the Editor, *Air University Review*, Building 1211, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112. All essays must be received or postmarked by 1 June 1984. For further details, call AUTOVON 875-2773, Commercial (205) 293-2773.

—First-publication rights on all essays belong to *Air University Review*.

First, second, and third-prize medallions will be awarded as well as \$2000, \$1000, and \$500 United States Savings Bonds. Distinguished Honorable Mention and Honorable Mention certificates will also be awarded. Winning essays will be published in the *Review*.

The Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition is funded by a permanent grant from the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation through the United States Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C.

R books, images, and ideas

FIGHTING THE RUSSIANS: AN ULTIMATE TEST?

DR. DENNIS E. SHOWALTER

TOTAL wars, as waged by industrial nations in the preatomic era, have tended to become wars of attrition, at least at some times in some theaters. The wearing-down process that took place during World War I on the Western Front occurred in Russia a quarter-century later. Yet the conflict that tore the heart out of Hitler's war machine, which set the stage for British and American victories from El Alamein to D-day, until recently was relatively unknown to English-language readers. Language barriers combined with the destruction of German records and the



reticence of the Russians to create an impression of prehistoric beasts grappling in a nightmare landscape composed of equal parts of snow, dust, and mud. The very scale of the fighting seemed to beggar description on any but the most general terms.

IN this context, the memories of German generals with a literary bent acquired disproportionate importance. Autobiography has been aptly described as the life story of a hero by one who knows. The Wehrmacht's commanders had to perform the dual task of explaining a lost war while justifying their service in the ranks of a hideous dictatorship. By and large the result was a tendency to devote several hundred pages to the glory days of Operation Barbarossa, then plug in a chapter deploring Hitler's interference with one's military genius, and finally skip lightly over the three years that brought the Russians from the Volga to the Elbe.¹ Yet despite their shortcomings, these works remain a major source of operational information on the Russo-German War.

First published in English in 1958, Erich von Manstein's *Lost Victories* has contributed much to its author's controversial image.† Some accounts make a virtual cult figure of him: the archetypal decent German who obeyed Hitler grudgingly the better to serve the men under him; the brilliant staff officer who designed Germany's plan of campaign against France in 1940; the master of offensive operations whose genius almost rescued the 6th Army from Stalingrad; the man who held Germany's front together in southern Russia for more than a year against hopeless odds. On the other side of the coin are descriptions of a Manstein whose military gifts were not matched by a corresponding force of character. This Manstein sanctioned and

endorsed atrocities against Russia's Jews that earned him a sentence as a war criminal. This Manstein, early aware of the military conspiracies against Hitler, temporized for the sake of his own career and even after Stalingrad continued to walk the trimmer's path. This Manstein developed such inflated ideas of his own capacities that as late as 1944 he believed Germany could win the war if he were only made commander in chief.²

A rereading of this unaltered reprint of the memoir's original English version suggests that Manstein's professional achievements matched his character almost exactly. It is impossible to question his operative gifts. No high commander in World War II fulfilled a broader spectrum of responsibilities so brilliantly. The staff planner of Poland and France became the dynamic leader of a Panzer corps in the first stages of Operation Barbarossa. Transferred from Leningrad to the Crimea, Manstein assumed command of an army undertaking one of the war's most complex sieges. His conquest of the peninsula after ten months of brutal head-on fighting demonstrated that he could be patient as well as dashing, that he could use artillery as well as tanks. As commanding general of Army Group Don, later Army Group South, he played the Russians as a matador plays the bull, multiplying inadequate forces by his virtuosity in handling reserves, allowing local Russian breakthroughs to overextend themselves, then checking them by well-timed counterattacks.

Manstein was an optimist. Even after Stalingrad he argued that a draw was still possible on the Eastern Front. In particular, the demonstrated weakness of the Russian high command justified a policy of taking big risks for big gains. Indeed, much of Manstein's growing hostility to Hitler reflected his disgust with the Nazi leader's lack of strategic sense. Manstein asserted that

†Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, reprint edition, edited and translated by A. G. Powell, foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart, introduction by Martin Blumenson (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982, \$18.95), 574 pages.

even Kursk was too limited in its conceptualization and its objectives to be worth the risk. His repeated insistence that only an elastic defense could maintain German's position in Russia eventually cost him his command.

One of Manstein's sharper critics says that he achieved "little" except for planning the French campaign, overrunning the Crimea, and containing the Russian offensive in the spring of 1943.³ It seems reasonable to respond that any one of these feats would be quite enough for most soldierly careers. Combined, they ensure Manstein's place among World War II's great captains. Yet at the same time Hitler's repeated criticisms of Manstein's tunnel vision cannot be dismissed out of hand. Manstein was an able technician but not a commander whose genius transcended the military limits imposed by geography and diplomacy. Ultimately he accepted these; he did not challenge them.

In this context Manstein's repeated descriptions of himself as a man willing to push Hitler to the limit and to disobey him when necessary are not mere window-dressing. But his arguments that he was too busy fighting a war to perceive Hitler's true nature, and that in any case a general no more has the luxury of resigning than does a private, are less convincing. The essential difference in this respect between the general and the common soldier is that the former is tested morally rather than physically. When a senior officer's personal integrity or professional judgment are unacceptably challenged, it is at least arguably his duty to refuse compliance whatever the consequences. Whatever his motivations, Manstein remained a step below the highest levels of his craft morally as well as technically. Is it too extreme to suggest that his limitations in one area reinforced as well as reflected his shortcomings in the other? And in that context, is it inappropriate to note that

resignation was not an acceptable option for the U.S. Army's generals in Vietnam despite their relatively high level of substantive dissent from administration policies?⁴

THE most favorable description of *Great Battles on the Eastern Front* is that it is an extended working paper.† Trevor Dupuy's Historical Evaluation and Research Organization has developed a complex and controversial method of applying statistical analysis to military history. Using mathematical formulae, Dupuy claims the ability to determine the outcome of battles future as well as battles past. Thus far the approach has been primarily illustrated with examples from Northwest Europe and the Italian front.⁵ Its application to the Russo-German War seems only a matter of time. As an apparent first step, Dupuy and his current associate Paul Martell offer a book consisting largely of statistical tables and orders of battle based on Soviet sources.

Much of the material is intrinsically worthwhile. Buffs as well as scholars have had cause to bemoan the scarcity of such information on the Red Army. The exact operational deployment of individual fronts (the Soviet equivalent of a Western army group) at Kursk, or during the Battle for Berlin, can be useful knowledge. Comprehensive data on the tactical density of Soviet artillery and armor in key engagements are also welcome, though I would wish to learn whether the infantry's 82-mm mortars are systematically included in the figures listed under "guns and mortars." Interesting, too, is the material on the organization of the 2nd Air Army in July 1944—among the few detailed breakdowns of the Russian tactical air arm at its cutting edge.

Unfortunately, however, the data are presented in what amounts to a raw state. The lists

†T. N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, *Great Battles on the Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945* (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982, \$14.95), 249 pages.

and tables are too often meaningless in the absence even of general information on comparative organizations and doctrines—the sort of thing that war-gamer James Dunnigan did effectively in *War in the East*.⁶ What is the use of knowing how many rifle divisions were in the first echelon of the 2nd Byelorussian Front at the start of the battle for Berlin if one remains ignorant of what a rifle division was or should have been? The number of tanks supporting the Steppe Front on 10 August 1943, as compared to 10 July 1943, means relatively little without an accompanying sense of how they were organized and what their formations were supposed to do. Dupuy and Martell appear to have adopted a variant of the common Soviet belief that statistics convey meaning in themselves.

The problem is made worse by the nature of the text. It amounts to little more than a series of battle histories, based heavily on Russian sources and incorporating neither analysis nor commentary. The authors make no significant effort to show how the statistical evidence they have so painfully compiled influenced the course of operations. Even more surprisingly, Dupuy and Martell begin their work by an eloquent description of the German performance against such odds as one of history's greatest feats of arms. Then they refuse to tell their readers anything significant about how the Germans did it. What factors—perhaps nonquantifiable factors—enabled the Mansteins, the Models, and the men they led to hold off the Russian masses?

IN *Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies*, Allen Chew is less pretentious and more useful than *Great Battles on the Eastern Front*.[†] Number 5 in the excellent series of *Leavenworth Papers*, this work juxtaposes a series of company-scale actions fought

outside Arkhangelsk in 1919 by British and American troops, the 1940 destruction of a Russian rifle division by a Finnish task force, and the winter campaign of 1941-42. Whether he is discussing platoons or armies, Chew's conclusions are the same. Equipment, acclimatization, and training are the keys to winter warfare. Technical or numerical superiority can be irrelevant, or indeed a positive handicap, as the Russians 44th Division learned in 1940. Northern winters confer a disproportionate superiority on the defense and significantly extend the time required to perform even simple tasks, whether on personal or formation levels.

Chew accurately criticizes the failure of Germans and Russians alike to draw conclusions from the experiences of 1918-19. Planners in both armies simply ignored the implications of winter conditions or expected that morale and general professional competence would enable their soldiers to cope. The school of experience charges notoriously high tuition. But as Chew demonstrates, the Russian army by 1941 had at least begun making institutional adjustments to its own climate. Had he chosen to enlarge his work, he could have shown that the Germans quickly learned their own lessons, developing increasing sophistication in winter combat as the war progressed.

Chew's work invites more detailed consideration of the role of training, as opposed to heritage, in preparing men and units for winter warfare. The Finnish troops that destroyed the 44th Division, for example, included a large number of men with directly relevant skills: skiers, hunters, and lumberjacks. Fighting on their home ground, they reduced a motorized division of Ukrainians to a static target in a matter of days. It is not, however, usual to find a defending force so well adapted to its operational environment by virtue of the civilian occupations of its per-

[†]Allen F. Chew, *Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies*, *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 5 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 51 pages.

sonnel. Are elite, specialist units necessary under arctic conditions, or can the requisite operational skills be acquired by any good battalion? In this context it is unfortunate that Chew's third case study was a general discussion rather than a regimental-scale operational analysis like his first two. A treatment of the functions and limitations of air power under extreme winter conditions would also have been welcome.

Nevertheless, *Fighting the Russians in Winter* resembles the other books discussed in this review. All three incorporate warnings for an America whose geographical and political cir-

cumstances demand the ability to cope with a broad spectrum of enemies, climates, and terrain. Wars have a habit of being fought in unlikely and unpleasant places. They have a way of defying even the most sophisticated efforts of reducing them to quantifiable data. And above all they place demands on character as well as professionalism. No military system favoring the one-dimensional specialist, the man who executes but does not reflect, can ultimately expect to produce either great captains or competent commanders.

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Notes

1. Gotthard Breit, *Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbilder deutschen Generale beider Weltkriege in Spiegel ihre Memoiren* (Boppard, 1973) is a useful comparative survey of German military memoirs.

2. As introductions to the Manstein question, the essay in *Nie Ausser Dienst. Zum achtzigsten Geburtstag von Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein* (Köln, 1967) are less sycophantic than might be expected. Andreas Hillgruber's discussion of Manstein and his myth is particularly useful. Albert Seaton, "Von Manstein," in *The War Lords* edited by Michael Carver (London, 1976), pp. 231-43, is more

critical.

3. Albert Seaton, *The German Army, 1933-1945* (New York, 1982), p. 216.

4. This point is statistically established in Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, New Hampshire, 1977).

5. Trevor N. Dupuy, *Numbers, Prediction, and War* (New York, 1979).

6. James Dunnigan et al., *War in the East: The Russo-German Conflict, 1941-45* (New York, 1977).

THE BROKEN EAGLE: THE LUFTWAFFE AND HISTORY

DR. EDWARD L. HOMZE

THE gifted young English historian Matthew Cooper, who earlier wrote a lively account of the German Army, has now turned to the Luftwaffe. His considerable skills as writer and researcher are matched by the difficulties involved in trying to untangle the history of the Luftwaffe. The youngest and most favored branch of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe was largely responsible for many of the successes of the Wehr-

macht as well as its failures. In many ways analyses of the rises and falls of the Luftwaffe are better barometers of the Nazi regime than are studies of any other of its military institutions. The characteristics of the regime can be seen clearly in the youthful air force, since the Nazis literally moulded it from its inception to its fiery death.

The focus of *The German Air Force 1933-1945*

is slightly different from most of the recent publications on the Luftwaffe.† Cooper concentrates on the strategic development of the Luftwaffe, an area that, according to the author, has been missed by others. The weapons, tactics, and combat experiences of the Luftwaffe have not been ignored but are seen in relationship to the strategic development of the Luftwaffe. That is one of the many strengths of this book. Cooper sees the Luftwaffe in its totality. The interdependence of technology, the economy, political judgments, and military doctrine constitute the story he is trying to tell. This is what he means by strategic development.

In the first three chapters, Cooper quickly surveys the prewar period and concludes that the Luftwaffe of 1939 was a tactical air force largely because of the technological and economic realities of the period. The leadership of the Luftwaffe was planning a balanced air force consisting of strategic as well as tactical forces, but time ran out on them. Cooper notes with approval the Luftwaffe's decisions to skip development of the first generation of heavy bombers in favor of an advanced bomber and the interim solution of dive-bombing. He is also sympathetic to the 1938 decision to concentrate production on four principal aircraft: the Bf 109, Me 210, Ju 88, and the He 177. Unlike most of the postwar critics of the Luftwaffe, Cooper argues that these were sound decisions arrived at through consensus by the leadership. He even has some kind words for Ernst Udet's handling of the Technical Office and its selection of aircraft models, although he agrees that Udet and his staff were not capable of handling their many tasks.

In the prewar chapters, he explains the flaws in the command structure and the growing tensions among Hermann Göring, Erhard Milch, Udet, and the professional military that were to plague the Luftwaffe during the war. Not much is done with how the political climate of nazism

influenced the Luftwaffe, nor does Cooper address the arguments of many Luftwaffe generals, after the war, that they were kept in the dark about Hitler's grand strategy. Since they were not privy to the Führer's ultimate goals, they did not know what kind of air force to build. Should it be built to war against France, or should it be built to attack England or Russia? Obviously that would make a difference. Without tight control and guidance of the political leadership, the Luftwaffe just grew—battling with the army and navy for a bigger share of the limited resources but without a clear idea of its intended use. That the Luftwaffe performed so well in the blitzkrieg mode was largely accidental, Cooper would agree with a recent work of Wilhelm Deist¹ that by the time the Luftwaffe concentrated on a blitzkrieg type of operation the blitzkrieg was a thing of the past. In reality the Luftwaffe was like most of the other prewar air forces, a hybrid—part strategic and part tactical. Reflecting the Douhet tradition, the Germans wanted a strategic Luftwaffe—or at least make it appear to be a strategic air force—but the best they could afford was a tactical air force. As the war was to show, the Luftwaffe was a failure at strategic bombing but successful with interdiction and close support. Probably just as important as its structure and doctrines, the Luftwaffe was saturated with an "offensive-minded" philosophy that was hard to reverse during the war. The feeble efforts at night fighting early in the war and the slowness in switching over to fighters later in the war are two examples of this persistence of offensive-mindedness that would cost the Luftwaffe dearly.

Once the war started, the shortcomings of the Luftwaffe became evident. Although it performed well in the early campaigns in Poland and France, the Battle of Britain was another story. Cooper thinks the Luftwaffe could have won it had the Germans persisted in their origi-

†Matthew Cooper, *The German Air Force 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure* (London: Jane's, 1981, \$27.95), 406 pages.

nal strategy of pressuring the Royal Air Force. Fighter Command was on its last leg, but according to Cooper, "It was weaknesses in the Luftwaffe's own conduct of the Battle that ultimately prevented it from gaining the victory within its grasp." (p. 160) The Luftwaffe had air superiority over at least southeast England in support of a seaborne invasion.

Despite the loss over Britain, the real turning point in the fortunes of the Luftwaffe was the invasion of Russia. Germany now was fighting a three front aerial war that simply outstripped its limited resources. The faults in the German production, training, and organizational programs became evident, but the leadership failed to react quickly enough. Just as the French seemed to be a step behind the Germans in 1940, the Germans seemed a step behind the Allies during the second half of the war. The Germans were too slow in building their night fighter force, even slower in gearing-up their production. Hard-pressed on all fronts, German leadership turned conservative, preferring "a bird in the hand to two in the bush" approach. As a result, older proven aircraft were kept in production longer than they should have as the leadership was afraid to gamble on newer, more-advanced models. Of course, given their experience with the Me 210 and the He 177, this cautious approach is understandable, but every country during the war had flops. The difference was that Germany could not afford them as much as the Allies.

In other areas the German leadership revealed its slowness and caution. After the failure of a quick victory in Russia, the Luftwaffe had to abandon its concept of a "balanced air force." Concentrating on combat aircraft, they relegated the production of trainers and transports to a secondary role with dire results. More and more the Luftwaffe in Russia became tied to ground-support roles, and what little reserves it had were often switched frantically from one sector to another or one major front to another like a fire brigade. "Too little and too late" was a refrain as common to the Germans after 1942 as it was to the Allies before 1942.

In most other areas still hotly debated, Cooper's judgment is usually very sound. For example, on the issue about the slow introduction of the jet fighter, he does not blame Hitler so much as the Luftwaffe's leadership. They were too slow in pushing the program. As Cooper constantly pointed out, the bringing into operational service of a new aircraft is a finely tuned process between military requirements, industrial capacity, and technology. A mistake or even a change in goals in any of these areas has an immediate repercussion on the others. The German leadership never mastered this art; parenthetically maybe nobody ever masters this art, but at least some do better than others. In this case Cooper would agree that the Germans did not do as well as the Allies, as the Me 210, He 177, Bomber B, and the jet fighter prove.

In two areas Cooper's views are open to criticism. First, he does not see how the organizational structure and training of the Luftwaffe's leadership created a mentality that lent itself to disaster. As Horst Boog recently pointed out in his seminal study on the Luftwaffe's leadership,² the doctrine, training, and, of course, the promotions to higher ranks encouraged the development of a Luftwaffe mentality that emphasized combat over all else. Technological and industrial requirements were downgraded just as the officers who served in these areas were handicapped by the system. The results were obvious—a further unbalancing of the Luftwaffe. In what is probably the best history of the air war, R. J. Overy argues the same thing;³ that the western Allies developed their balanced use of all forms of air power largely because of the circumstances they found themselves in, while the Germans and Russians did not. Second, Cooper does not address the problem of how nazism affected the Luftwaffe. The Nazi system, freewheeling, disjointed, personality dominated, without clearly defined goals (except for racism and expansion) had a devastating effect on the economy as well as the military of Germany. Under the Nazis, there just was no overall guiding concept for the air industry or the Luftwaffe. The Nazis' scorn of

methodical approaches, their impatience with experienced experts, and their incessant search for easy, "quick-fix" solutions had a corroding effect on the Luftwaffe during the war. The Nazis' flair for activism and improvisation may have been a success in the political realm, but it was a failure in the more prosaic realm of build-

ing an industry and an air force to fight a world war.

Despite these criticisms, Cooper has written the best popular history of the Luftwaffe during World War II. It is a balanced, thoughtful, and interestingly written book that is every bit as good as his earlier work on the German Army.

University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Notes

1. Wilhelm Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). Deist is a member of the Institute for Military Historical Research at Freiburg im Breisgau which is currently doing a projected ten-volume history of World War II called, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*; two volumes in the series have been published. Deist has written the Wehrmacht

sections, and he has argued in all of his works that the so-called blitzkrieg strategy is largely a figment of imagination in the minds of writers. Hitler had no coordinated, rational plan for rearmament.

2. Horst Boog, *Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung, 1935-1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982).

3. R. J. Overy, *The Air War 1939-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980).

MINERAL IMPORT DEPENDENCY: DOES IT MATTER?

DR. LEONARD G. GASTON

IN congressional testimony in 1980 General Alton D. Slay, then Commander of the Air Force Systems Command, pointed out that it was not just petroleum that presented serious problems of import dependency for the United States. Noting that some forty minerals were essential to an adequate defense and a strong economy, he reminded the Industrial Readiness Panel of the House Armed Services Committee that the United States imported more than one-half its supplies of more than twenty essential minerals.

Since that time, more discussion has appeared in the press; and recently a study has been released by the Library of Congress that will be of interest to Air Force professionals who would like to know more about the nature and extent of U.S. dependency on imported minerals.†

This study by the Library's Congressional Research Service contains an almost overwhelming array of tables and statistics. It lists twenty-nine minerals included in the National Defense Stockpile, defined as "strategic and critical" by

†*A Congressional Handbook on U.S. Minerals Dependency/Vulnerability* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 404 pages, a report to the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

public law and provides an informative discussion of each: its uses, possible substitutes, where imports came from, and the status of actual supplies versus stockpile goals. Information as to what percentage of U.S. use of each, from 1976 to 1979 was imported, is given in a summary table.¹ The reader who is not familiar with General Slay's testimony may find sobering the information that two regions, Southern Africa and the U.S.S.R., loom large as sources for certain scarce minerals essential to the industrialized world.²

The report examines the assertion that the U.S.S.R. is engaged in a "resource war" against the United States; and it concludes that there are three points of view or levels of concern regarding such a conflict. None of the three are particularly reassuring. The first view indicates that *war* is an inappropriate term. Supporters of this view suggest that the Soviet Union is in the process of changing from an exporting nation for many materials to an importer nation. Although only economic issues would be involved, such a shift could "dramatically change the world supply/demand status for the materials thus involved and necessarily, will strongly affect U.S. attempts to maintain the necessary level of mineral imports." (p.167) The highest level of concern maintains that a serious resource war is indeed being waged by the U.S.S.R. The middle view concludes that the Soviet Union lacks the foreign exchange necessary to get the minerals it needs on the international market and the capital to develop internal supplies. Consequently, it will attempt to combine intimidation and subversion with economic means to obtain and assure overseas mineral supplies. Some authorities would insist that recent Soviet behavior is not new. The ruling government of Russia has pursued a calculated policy of expansionism for some three hundred years from the time of Peter the Great, and it would be expected that the U.S.S.R.'s increasing economic and military power would make it more able and willing to carry out such subversion. (p. 169)

The report discusses the relative stability and

accessibility of various sources of minerals imported by the United States, including three critical countries of Southern Africa—Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo), Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), and the Republic of South Africa (all-important suppliers of essential minerals but vulnerable to unrest or terrorist activities). Other suppliers include Australia (stable but far away) as well as Canada and Mexico (already reliable, large-scale suppliers of some minerals). Among many interesting tabulations, the report lists the six countries that are major U.S. suppliers of more than one strategic or critical material: the Republic of South Africa (4 materials), Australia (3), Brazil (3), Canada (3), Thailand (2), and the U.S.S.R. (2).

The report singles out eight materials "for which the industrial health and defense of the United States is most vulnerable to potential supply disruptions"—chromium, cobalt, manganese, the platinum group of metals, titanium, bauxite/aluminum, columbium, and tantalum—and points out that the first five have been called "the metallurgical Achilles' heel of our civilization." (p. 130)

An interesting sidelight is provided by a discussion of the commercial potential of deep seabed manganese nodules, which contain commercial quantities not only of manganese but of copper, cobalt, and possibly, molybdenum. Concentrations of these nodules lie far beyond normal national jurisdictions, and, until the late 1960s, this would not have been a barrier to mining. Unfortunately (in my opinion), the United Nations General Assembly in 1967 passed a resolution to consider national limits and jurisdiction over minerals beyond these limits. During the intervening 14 years, some 150 nations, most economically and technologically underdeveloped, have taken part in drawn-out negotiations over these questions. As a result, although American firms have led the way in sampling and analyzing deposits of nodular concentrations for commercial viability, "because of uncertainty over the outcome of the U.N. conference, plans for proceeding with commercial

development of ocean mining are being delayed." (p. 295)

Another possible source of more minerals for the United States might be neighboring countries in the Western Hemisphere; but U.S. interests there appear to be losing out to aggressive policies of the Metal Mining Agency of Japan and Japanese government loan guarantees and negotiations. (pp. 322, 330-32)

The strengths of the report are in its assemblage of data and insights regarding them. Its weaknesses are minor: It quotes extensively in places from other reports, and possibly because of this the reader can lose his way in terminology. "Southern Africa" seems clear in meaning as does "Republic of South Africa," but "South Africa" as used on page 159, in a sentence which follows one that refers to "Southern Africa," is not. In addition, some readers might quarrel with the conclusion that new initiatives by the Reagan administration to improve the nation's

defense posture will increase the possibility of a return to the cold war. (p. 165) (Since the Soviet military buildup has proceeded apace and Soviet influence has continued to expand around the world, one could argue that the cold war never departed.) Another minor complaint concerning what was, overall, an excellent collection of data: Greater discussion of the potential offered by the Serra dos Carajás region of Brazil would have been desirable.

But the report's most serious drawback is not attributable to its authors but to the unknown person, who, for reasons of economy or to meet the definition of a "handbook," made the decision that the publication would be printed on 5-by 9-inch pages. The original, well-typed, double-spaced research report on 8½ x 11-inch paper was no doubt highly readable; but, photographically reduced to 5 x 9 inches, it is not. Readers over thirty will want as a minimum to assure the availability of extremely good lighting.

Enon, Ohio

Notes

1. I believe the terms adopted by the *Wall Street Journal* to be more descriptive: *critical* meaning essential for the continued operation of U.S. industry (some 40 minerals), *strategic* meaning critical minerals that are available in large supplies only from foreign sources (roughly

half of those designated as critical). Roger Lowenstein and Maria Shag, "Vital Ingredients," *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1981, pp. 1, 20.

2. Edgar Ulsamer, "In Focus," *Air Force*, January 1981, pp. 17-21.

POTPOURRI

The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine by Andrew Cockburn. New York: Random House, 1983, 338 pages, \$16.95.

Andrew Cockburn's book is the latest contribution to the rapidly expanding collection of books and articles depicting the Soviet armed forces as a clay-footed colossus or, more in tune with its national origins, a Potemkin village. In his words, the Kremlin has on its hands "a drunken, half-trained conscript army, a high command riven with political intrigue, progressively less useful weapons systems, and a society more vulnerable than most even to a limited nuclear onslaught." (p. 236) Given an enemy so weak, why is the United States spending so many billions on defense? The answer, according to the author, is simple: the military-industrial bureaucracy needs a viable Soviet threat to keep the dollars flowing for the purchase of increasingly more complex and costly weapon systems. And those on the other side of the curtain, the poor slob, try to keep up with the latest American fad in armaments, whether useful or not.

Cockburn assumes throughout that the denizens of the Pentagon are dishonest, data-juggling people interested only in a bigger slice of the budgetary pie. Nowhere does he depict the top brass as deciding anything for patriotic reasons. Their sole motivation, from the secretaries of defense down, is to keep the public, especially its representatives in Congress, sufficiently alarmed about the Soviet threat to cough up the wherewithal for their costly gadgets. This theme is repeated ad nauseam.

Just how much of a threat do the Russians present? According to Cockburn, of the million and one-half men drafted each year, about half of them end up in the construction or railroad troops, usually for ethnic reasons. Only the Slavs and the Balts man the ground force combat units or go into the Air Force and the Navy. But even the Slavic recruits spend an inordinate amount of time getting drunk, stealing anything movable to get money for alcohol, or beating up on the non-Slavic conscripts. The officers do little about these transgressions for, if reported, they will reflect not only on the officer's career but even on his superior's. This is the so-called "vertical stroke" that permeates the armed forces.

In dealing with the other services, Cockburn finds them all grossly overrated. The Soviet air force's planes are far inferior to the Pentagon's evaluations; the PVO, with its one-half million men, 5000 radar installations, 10,000 anti-aircraft missile launchers, and 2500 interceptors, is militarily inept but a real boon to the U.S. bomber lobby's demand for ever more expensive equipment; the capabilities of Gorshkov's navy are invariably exaggerated by the American admirals; and, finally, the much-vaunted Civil Defense is really a boogiemanager conjured up by General George Keegan, Leon Gouré, and T. K. Jones. By the time Andrew Cockburn is through retailing the Soviet inadequacies, his American reader should feel rather complacent about the Russian threat. But not for long, for he is then informed of how fouled up his own forces are. Cockburn, it would seem, just doesn't

think much of military institutions in general, and the American and Russian brands in particular.

On a more positive note, his prose flows readily; he can be witty in his castigations of the bloated military bureaucrats, and he does display a good knowledge of weapon systems, both American and Russian. Some of his criticisms of the practitioners of military politics are both astute and justified. If it were possible to avoid the continuous diatribe aimed at the iniquitous behavior of the Pentagon bureaucrats, *The Threat* could make enjoyable reading, but that would mean ignoring the *raison d'être* of the opus. The last chapter, entitled "The Consequences of Threat Inflation," offers some dour, even apocalyptic, warnings about how the inflation of the threat can eventually lead to Armageddon. I suppose the "hawkish" rebuttal is that "deflation" of the threat to such a point of absurdity is even more dangerous.

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The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book, Vol. I:

The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier, Vol. II, by Richard A. Gabriel. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980, Vol. I, 252 pages \$40.00; Vol. II, 246 pages, \$22.50.

The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level by Herbert Goldhamer. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1975, 352 pages, \$8.75 paper.

Little has been written about Soviet conscripts, although they comprise nearly eighty percent of the Soviet armed forces. The reason, quite simply put, is that access to information in a totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union is severely restricted. The collection of most information is prohibited, and officially released information is frequently and intentionally distorted. The result is a profound lack of information regarding the Soviet soldier. As a consequence, the Soviet military is often evaluated by solely quantitative means (counting the number of tanks, aircraft, or personnel) and making comparisons with the size and numbers of Western military organizations. Thus, the United States falls short in most of these assessments. However, such simple quantitative comparisons are faulty since they neglect an accurate assessment of "the people behind the machines."

Richard Gabriel's two-volume work helps fill this information gap and demystifies the Soviet soldier. It is based on empirical data drawn mostly from surveys conducted with recent Soviet émigrés. The first volume contains the statistical data, a treasure for academic purests, but the second volume makes for more interesting reading. It is a well-written analytical summary of the collected data.

Among other serious studies of the Soviet soldier, the late Dr. Herbert Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier* may well be considered a classic. This study relies principally on unclassi-

fied Soviet journals, gleaning as much as one can from them for information regarding the Soviet soldier's life.

Goldhamer's and Gabriel's books complement one another and together comprise an indispensable reference for students of Soviet military affairs. They provide a thorough understanding of the largest portion of our adversary's forces. One of the most important experiences for the Soviet soldier is the extensive premilitary training, which begins at an early age. Preschool and youth programs administered by the state are aimed at instilling a sense of subordination to authority. In accordance with the 1967 Law of Universal Military Service, overall responsibility for the premilitary training of youth was given to a Communist party organization known as DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy). DOSAAF membership numbers about 80 million citizens between the ages of 14 and 27. Through the establishment of military clubs, training reaches almost all Soviet youth. Although touted as voluntary, public and social pressures expose youth of all ages to some aspects of the club activities. Beginning in the tenth grade, all boys and girls receive 140 hours of compulsory basic military instruction.

Nonetheless, despite this extensive program of premilitary training, Goldhamer cites several shortcomings serious enough to call into question its overall effectiveness. Compulsory premilitary training was introduced as a replacement for basic training conducted after induction, but complaints abound about the quality of the premilitary training. Soviet youth, like all youth, have their own preferences concerning what they learn. Often these preferences do not correspond to the priorities or needs of the military. Additionally, equipment for premilitary training programs is often neglected, resulting in a scarcity of materials required for effective training. Reports indicate a serious lack of skill among conscripts reporting for duty, and basic training after induction is becoming necessary more frequently.

All young Soviet males must register for military service at 17 and report for duty at 18. Service is for two or three years, depending on which branch they are assigned to (two years for army and air force; three for navy). Call up takes place twice a year—in the spring, after the planting season; and in the fall, after the harvest. Females are permitted to enlist, but those few who do serve in noncombatant roles, traditionally in the clerical and medical fields.

Professor Gabriel's survey reveals that family support of conscription is low. Rather, resignation to military service as "an evil that cannot be avoided" (although deferments for extenuating family circumstances, physical problems, and continuing education account for about ten percent of those eligible for induction) seems to be the general sentiment among conscripts. Also, the fear of severe punishment assures mass conformity among Soviet servicemen.

One questions whether Soviet leadership could maintain morale and reliability among conscripts if engaged in a protracted conflict, especially one not directly threatening the Soviet homeland. Perhaps Afghanistan provides a good example: Morale and discipline problems seem to abound within the ranks of the Soviet forces currently battling native resistance in that bordering Moslem country. Pacifism, fighting, and alcohol abuse are also limiting the effectiveness of Soviet soldiers.

Yet it is safe to assume that the Soviet soldier would be a vigorous opponent in a conflict involving the West. In fact, historically, the Russian soldier has fought best when the motherland was felt to be in danger. However, both Gabriel and Goldhamer caution against viewing the Soviet soldier as "ten-feet tall" or a "man of steel." A comprehensive assessment of the Soviet armed forces would probably place them on a par with their Western counterparts.

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The Pentagon

Mighty Eighth War Diary by Roger A. Freeman with Alan Crouchman and Vic Maslen. New York: Jane's, 1981, 508 pages, \$29.50.

This volume is a labor of love, the second in a planned trilogy chronicling the day-by-day exploits of the Eighth Air Force during World War II. Roger Freeman first became enamored with the activities of American aviators, when as a teenage schoolboy he watched the formations departing in the gray dawn and returning in the afternoon, most often in lesser numbers, to airfields adjacent to his father's farm in East Anglia. The romance has blossomed through four decades and seven books, and Freeman probably possesses more knowledge than anyone else of the *Mighty Eighth*, as he entitled the first volume in this series.

Most of this volume is a compilation of statistics dealing with each mission launched by the Eighth. Among these is the first heavy bomber attack against the marshaling yards in Rouen, France, on 17 August 1942, flown by aviators such as Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General, Eighth Bomber Command; Colonel Frank Armstrong, on whose exploits *Twelve O'Clock High* was based; and Major Paul Tibbets, later of *Enola Gay* fame. For each mission, the author has laboriously researched and provided identification of the groups participating; the targets attacked; the number of aircraft dispatched; the number of effective aircraft (defined as those which actually dropped bombs); the number, type, and tonnage of bombs dropped; claims of enemy aircraft destroyed; and American losses of aircraft and personnel (killed, wounded, and missing in action). This awesome array of data is supplemented by well-written vignettes of the personnel, airfields, aircraft, and missions involved. Most of the excellent photographs, interspersed liberally throughout the book, have been obtained from participants, giving them a spontaneity and depth often lacking in official photographs.

Freeman wisely declines to take sides in the argument that still rages among armchair veterans of that combat as to whether the B-17 or B-24 was the better aircraft. Freeman sometimes accepts too uncritically the reminiscences of aviators who have retold their same daring exploits for forty years, unconsciously embellishing them in the retelling. There are some unexplained disparities between the official records cited and the credits claimed in the volume. On the whole, however, the number of errors, given the mass of statistics provided, is minimal and evinces the care with which the volume has been prepared. Those who have long

believed that the United Kingdom and the United States are separated by a common language will find some convincing evidence in this book as one reads that "short-snorters" were "autographed bank notes" and some aircraft "went missing" while on others "the undercarriage lowered to restrict speed."

These minor caveats aside, this excellent collection, which is aimed essentially at the aficionado, clearly evokes memories of forty years ago when young American airmen, many of them teenagers, were received so hospitably in Britain. The Yanks grew to like fish and chips, drank warm beer, played darts in friendly pubs, and ogled, romanced, and sometimes even married lovely English lasses. The visiting Americans were also impressed with the lush, green countryside which, when viewed from the air, showed little evidence of a determined British people engaged along with the Royal Air Force and the Eighth Air Force in their deadly struggle to defend human freedom and dignity. *Mighty Eighth War Diary* is a fitting statistical and photographic account of the exploits of the most publicized of the World War II air forces and one of the proud ancestors of the present USAF.

Major General John W. Huston, USAF (Ret)
United States Naval Academy

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The agony of Afghanistan continues to bedevil most of the world, which has ineffectually opposed the Soviet military takeover and the sweep of Afghanistan into the Soviet colonial sphere. Henry S. Bradsher has made a superb contribution in analyzing those developments. He brings to this study years of experience as a news correspondent on Soviet and Asian affairs, including stints in Moscow and Kabul. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* was written while he was a scholar at the Smithsonian Institution's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Bradsher has made excellent use of government documents, periodicals, and newspapers from around the world and of interviews with knowledgeable officials and other participants of recent events in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, but understandably, many of those interviewed are not identified.

After a brief introduction to modern Afghan history, Bradsher moves quickly to the cold war and then concentrates on developments since the 1960s, especially the overthrow of Mohammed Daoud in April 1978 and the ensuing chaos and Soviet intervention. The analysis is superior to anything yet published and, in light of Soviet and Afghan secrecy, undoubtedly will not be superseded for years. Those interested in American policy also will find this a rewarding work. Bradsher follows the interplay of American politics and is critical of American timidity since the withdrawal from Vietnam.

Besides the fullness of his account, the author has made two major contributions to understanding the conversion of Afghanistan into a Soviet colony. The first is his analysis of the importance to Soviet leaders of their perceptions of the international "correlation of forces" in decisions concerning Afghanistan. He believes the Soviets carefully evaluated those

forces and, perceiving the balance between "socialism" and "capitalism" as favoring them, acted decisively. In arguing his case, Bradsher goes far beyond events in Afghanistan in a fine chapter dealing with changes in Soviet military theory and force structure and with intervention elsewhere, principally in Africa and the Middle East. Since the 1970s, conditions have appeared most favorable for a relatively free hand for the Soviets in Third World adventurism, unrestrained by fears of Western countermeasures. He admits that analysis of Soviet decision-making is difficult and that the story of decisions regarding Afghanistan is still clouded and may never be fully known; nevertheless, his appraisal of the military, economic, ideological, and other factors is convincing.

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In addressing the question of motivation for the Soviet military invasion, Bradsher states that for the short term it was considered essential to maintain the PDPA in power, while for the long term the Soviets were not blind to the opportunity to move closer toward control of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Those anxious to see an independent, nonaligned Afghanistan will find little solace here, where Bradsher states that "Russian and Soviet power has historically thrust forward until it met some military or political reason for stopping." (p. 255) He also rejects the Finlandization of Afghanistan as a solution, noting the sharp divisions within the *mujahideen* resistance as well as their violent hatred of the Soviets, which precludes the organization of an alternative government. Moreover, the Soviets insist that Afghanistan remain within the Soviet sphere. One must agree with Bradsher's conclusion that the future is dark for Afghanistan and "worrisome" for others on the Soviet periphery.

Dr. George W. Collins
Wichita State University, Kansas

The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917 by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981,
652 pages, \$25.00.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa contends that the February Revolution was neither a triumph of professional revolutionaries over the established order nor of good over evil. Rather, the

February Revolution was a fortuitous combination of two events: the revolt of the masses against the autocracy and the alienation of the liberal opposition from the tsarist regime.

Devoting his primary attention to the nine-day period from the beginning of the revolt to the abdication of the Grand Duke Mikhail, Hasegawa is, nonetheless, aware that the social and political factors that led to the revolution are too complex to be described out of context. Consequently, while two-thirds of the study is devoted to the events of February, Hasegawa makes a considerable effort to set the stage by detailing the social and political conditions in Russia between 1914 and 1917.

The Russia of that era was preindustrial and precapitalist; World War I forced the industrial revolution and all of its birth pains on the backward nation. As Hasegawa illustrates, the unifying effects of an external enemy—while they temporarily eased a tense political situation—soon gave way to even greater unrest. Combined with an exponentially increasing industrial work force, this situation produced a volatile political climate.

The central portion of Hasegawa's book deals with the uprising, the Petrograd Soviet, and the Duma . . . in short, with the de facto transfer of power. Hasegawa's use of primary source material is excellent. Each of the crucial seven days through 1 March 1917 is painstakingly recreated. Hasegawa manages to retain the human element through his chronicling the minute details of the actions of individuals and small groups—actions that were in themselves inconsequential but, in sum, proved vital to the success of the revolution.

Hasegawa clearly demonstrates that the February Revolution was not a spontaneous uprising; the masses had clearly defined, experienced leaders, and the groups that participated in the various activities were predictable by their regularity. Popular discontent, while one of the elements of Hasegawa's thesis, was an important but inconclusive factor. Perhaps the best example of this was the increase in patriotic fervor evident in the early days of World War I. That discontent had become a major negative factor by 1917 is clearly traced to government ineptitude and corruption. Hasegawa also notes that current historians often inflate the role of the Bolsheviks. Initially a weak, disorganized player, the Bolsheviks assumed a greater role only through coalition and fate; they were never the driving force behind the February Revolution. Finally, Hasegawa concludes that the liberals were powerless to act against the government but notes that the autocracy was powerless to act without liberal support. This, then, set the stage for the decisive moment.

The February Revolution has received relatively little attention despite the fact that its significance may eclipse that of the October Revolution. For this reason alone, Hasegawa's book is a significant contribution. The work is thoroughly researched, including excellent use of rare primary sources. Hasegawa's thesis is logical and well supported by the evidence; if he had any bias, he has done a commendable job of suppressing it. Consequently, *The February Revolution* rates top marks as a scholarly work.

Beyond that, however, the book has two other features which make it worthy of note: it is extremely readable, and it contains sections that should be of great interest to professional USAF officers.

For the Air Force officer, Hasegawa has included some

sections that should be professionally interesting and important. Specifically, the book contains long passages on military life, the treatment of noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel (and the subsequent effect of such treatment), and the role of the military in the government and the revolution.

Hasegawa has also captured the life-essence of the February Revolution, for his descriptions of events and people seem to come alive. Indeed, *The February Revolution* ranks with Harrison Salisbury's *Black Night, White Snow* as being among the most enjoyable ways to learn Russian history.

Thus, *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917* stands as a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the revolution in Russia and one that will appeal to a relatively wide audience.

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The Russian Intelligentsia: From Torment to Silence by Vladimir C. Nahirny. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Books, 1983. 192 pages, \$22.95.

The Russian intelligentsia is a subculture all to itself, and the study of it requires entrance into the peculiar *Zeitgeist/Weltanschauung* of that very special world. It is for this reason a somewhat forbidding, because altogether erudite if not arcane, academic field. On the other hand, it is as important as it is difficult, for the intelligentsia, however it is defined, has given us the Russian ruling class and the Soviet administrative apparatus that bedevil our newspaper headlines and our equilibrium almost daily.

The story of the intelligentsia is a tragic one because it involves for nearly every participant in it a fateful choice: that between something like involuntary thralldom to the hulking leviathan of Soviet government or the agonizing superfluosity of the persecuted dissidents. This kind of choice has been constant, though the names of the doctrines have been changed to confuse the innocent, for the past several centuries.

Vladimir Nahirny has written a remarkably fresh review and assessment of the intelligentsia. He has a genuinely astonishing knowledge of the Russian literature. Especially interesting is his analysis of the social origins of the intelligentsia. He disagrees fundamentally with Marc Raeff, who argued that the intelligentsia came from the pampered whiz kids of the Russian nobility. On the contrary, Nahirny shows that it was scarcely noble or Russian. Almost all of the writers in Russian history before Peter the Great were from the priestly class. More than half of the Russian scholars born between 1750 and 1799 came from priests' families. Only 26.2 percent of the members of the Academy of Sciences in the eighteenth century were Russian. From the foundation of Moscow University in 1755 to the end of the century, only 30.4 percent of the professors were Russian.

Nahirny notes the almost inhuman seriousness with which the intelligentsia devoted itself to the cause of humanity. "It was in . . . the sphere of 'truth,' in the company of the brethren of conviction, that they found a substitute for love,

believed that the United Kingdom and the United States are separated by a common language will find some convincing evidence in this book as one reads that "short-snorters" were "autographed bank notes" and some aircraft "went missing" while on others "the undercarriage lowered to restrict speed."

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The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917 by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981.
652 pages, \$25.00.

Tsuyoski Hasegawa contends that the February Revolution was neither a triumph of professional revolutionaries over the established order nor of good over evil. Rather, the

February Revolution was a fortuitous combination of two events: the revolt of the masses against the autocracy and the alienation of the liberal opposition from the tsarist regime.

Devoting his primary attention to the nine-day period from the beginning of the revolt to the abdication of the Grand Duke Mikhail, Hasegawa is, nonetheless, aware that the social and political factors that led to the revolution are too complex to be described out of context. Consequently, while two-thirds of the study is devoted to the events of February, Hasegawa makes a considerable effort to set the stage by detailing the social and political conditions in Russia between 1914 and 1917.

The Russia of that era was preindustrial and precapitalist; World War I forced the industrial revolution and all of its birth pains on the backward nation. As Hasegawa illustrates, the unifying effects of an external enemy—while they temporarily eased a tense political situation—soon gave way to even greater unrest. Combined with an exponentially increasing industrial work force, this situation produced a volatile political climate.

The central portion of Hasegawa's book deals with the uprising, the Petrograd Soviet, and the Duma . . . in short, with the de facto transfer of power. Hasegawa's use of primary source material is excellent. Each of the crucial seven days through 1 March 1917 is painstakingly recreated. Hasegawa manages to retain the human element through his chronicling the minute details of the actions of individuals and small groups—actions that were in themselves inconsequential but, in sum, proved vital to the success of the revolution.

Hasegawa clearly demonstrates that the February Revolution was not a spontaneous uprising; the masses had clearly defined, experienced leaders, and the groups that participated in the various activities were predictable by their regularity. Popular discontent, while one of the elements of Hasegawa's thesis, was an important but inconclusive factor. Perhaps the best example of this was the increase in patriotic fervor evident in the early days of World War I. That discontent had become a major negative factor by 1917 is clearly traced to government ineptitude and corruption. Hasegawa also notes that current historians often inflate the role of the Bolsheviks. Initially a weak, disorganized player, the Bolsheviks assumed a greater role only through coalition and fate; they were never the driving force behind the February Revolution. Finally, Hasegawa concludes that the liberals were powerless to act against the government but notes that the autocracy was powerless to act without liberal support. This, then, set the stage for the decisive moment.

The February Revolution has received relatively little attention despite the fact that its significance may eclipse that of the October Revolution. For this reason alone, Hasegawa's book is a significant contribution. The work is thoroughly researched, including excellent use of rare primary sources. Hasegawa's thesis is logical and well supported by the evidence; if he had any bias, he has done a commendable job of suppressing it. Consequently, *The February Revolution* rates top marks as a scholarly work.

Beyond that, however, the book has two other features which make it worthy of note: it is extremely readable, and it contains sections that should be of great interest to professional USAF officers.

For the Air Force officer, Hasegawa has included some

sections that should be professionally interesting and important. Specifically, the book contains long passages on military life, the treatment of noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel (and the subsequent effect of such treatment), and the role of the military in the government and the revolution.

Hasegawa has also captured the life-essence of the February Revolution, for his descriptions of events and people seem to come alive. Indeed, *The February Revolution* ranks with Harrison Salisbury's *Black Night, White Snow* as being among the most enjoyable ways to learn Russian history.

Thus, *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917* stands as a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the revolution in Russia and one that will appeal to a relatively wide audience.

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The Russian Intelligentsia: From Torment to Silence by Vladimir C. Nahirny. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Books, 1983, 192 pages, \$22.95.

The Russian intelligentsia is a subculture all to itself, and the study of it requires entrance into the peculiar *Zeitgeist/Weltanschauung* of that very special world. It is for this reason a somewhat forbidding, because altogether erudite if not arcane, academic field. On the other hand, it is as important as it is difficult, for the intelligentsia, however it is defined, has given us the Russian ruling class and the Soviet administrative apparatus that bedevil our newspaper headlines and our equilibrium almost daily.

The story of the intelligentsia is a tragic one because it involves for nearly every participant in it a fateful choice: that between something like involuntary thralldom to the hulking leviathan of Soviet government or the agonizing superfluosity of the persecuted dissidents. This kind of choice has been constant, though the names of the doctrines have been changed to confuse the innocent, for the past several centuries.

Vladimir Nahirny has written a remarkably fresh review and assessment of the intelligentsia. He has a genuinely astonishing knowledge of the Russian literature. Especially interesting is his analysis of the social origins of the intelligentsia. He disagrees fundamentally with Marc Raeff, who argued that the intelligentsia came from the pampered whiz kids of the Russian nobility. On the contrary, Nahirny shows that it was scarcely noble or Russian. Almost all of the writers in Russian history before Peter the Great were from the priestly class. More than half of the Russian scholars born between 1750 and 1799 came from priests' families. Only 26.2 percent of the members of the Academy of Sciences in the eighteenth century were Russian. From the foundation of Moscow University in 1755 to the end of the century, only 30.4 percent of the professors were Russian.

Nahirny notes the almost inhuman seriousness with which the intelligentsia devoted itself to the cause of humanity. "It was in . . . the sphere of 'truth,' in the company of the brethren of conviction, that they found a substitute for love,

friendship, human affection, and indeed, felt comfortable and at ease."

I missed here the work of Gregory Freeze on the eighteenth-century Russian clergy. In my opinion, it would have been appropriate to examine more closely the thesis of Martin Malia, who has dealt ably with the eternally teasing question posed by Mikhail Bakunin: I can understand the French bourgeoisie making a revolution to gain political rights, but how can I understand the Russian nobility making a revolution to lose them? Still, Nahirny's work is an informed and valuable addition to our literature on the intelligentsia.

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Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Volume 6 edited by David R. Jones. Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1982, 433 pages, \$47.00.

Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, like earlier volumes in the series, includes review articles covering recent developments in the organization, equipment, and disposition of all branches of the Soviet military. New features include an overview section and a very helpful bibliography of works on the Soviet armed forces and strategic questions published in the West. Additionally, the 1982 edition contains special surveys on internal security and border troops and on Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean region.

Readers of *Air University Review* will want to pay special attention to the chapters on air defense forces by David R. Jones and air forces by Alfred L. Monks; the authors highlight important shifts apparently under way in the Soviet command structure. In the first instance, assets committed to the air defense of maneuver units of the ground forces (mainly surface-to-air missiles) are being brought under the administrative control of the national air defense service, PVO. This merger of tactical and strategic air defense seems to be in response to the advent of sophisticated low-level offensive penetration capabilities of the NATO air forces and the resultant need to provide defensive coverage at all altitudes. Such developments are instructive because they illustrate the manner in which Soviet defense planners perceive threats and respond to them and remind us that the other side must also contend with military-technological change.

In a similar vein, it appears that a reorganization of the Soviet Air Forces (VVS) is in progress, with the tactical component (Frontal Aviation) in some way being realigned into the new "theater of military operations" emphasizing the combined-arms doctrine and with the strategic bomber force (Long-Range Aviation or DA) being downgraded from major command level to some new, lower status. Not in this connection specifically, but nevertheless of considerable interest, are the details of qualitative improvements in Soviet aviation, including the introduction of new aircraft types and better air-to-air tactics.

Given the importance of matters related to the military budget and the impact of defense spending on the national economy in both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the chapter on the Soviet economy in this volume is all too brief. Also, some minor mistakes of fact detract from the overall

solid quality of the individual essays. For example, the NATO code name for the SA-8 is Gecko (not Grechko, as reported), and the aircraft used as a surrogate for the MiG-21 in the AIMVAL/ACEVAL DACT studies was the F-5 (not the F-4, whose capabilities are not at all like the MiG-21).

Particular strengths of this collection are the many tables of data, compiled from varied sources, and the balanced perspective on national security interests, especially the inclusion of details from Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's assessment of military-strategic issues.

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Tracks of the Bear: Soviet Imprints in the Seventies by Edgar O'Ballance. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982, 240 pages, \$15.95.

Tracks of the Bear is a journalistic account of Soviet history and foreign policy in the 1970s. It begins on a polemical note, making such claims as "the Soviets are bully boys who need to be taken down a peg or two . . ." and continuing with an emotional, shallow, and, I believe, error-ridden analysis of Soviet leadership. Subsequent chapters deal with an analysis of the "Soviet political-military mind," followed by discussions of Soviet progress in the East-West negotiations, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Edgar O'Ballance continues by addressing the Soviet Navy and then concludes with a discussion of the early 1980s. In his conclusion, he calls on the United States to "have a strong, sustained foreign policy," to use economic aid as a weapon; to support resistance groups in Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere; to continue to develop the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; and to prevent the further development of nuclear weapons by Third World nations. Six maps and an index support this text.

The book's greatest strength is perhaps its scope, which includes not only Soviet domestic politics but also discussions of Soviet policy in all of the world's major regions. Also, O'Ballance often refers to General George Keegan and other politically conservative experts who are infrequently quoted but nonetheless have a contribution to make to the subject. In addition, O'Ballance's observations are occasionally noteworthy. For example, I enjoyed his discussion of "mirror imaging," in which he says that Western leaders are wrong to expect that Soviet leaders will react in the same way as Western leaders to a given situation. Finally, the author's journalistic style makes the book very readable.

Against these strengths, the book suffers from such major weaknesses that I question its value to the knowledgeable reader. Of these, the most serious is that O'Ballance does not adequately footnote his material. I noted less than two dozen notations to other sources or references, and many of these were to O'Ballance's other books. This is even more serious in that the author often leaves solid ground to enter the realm of conjecture. In his Middle East chapter, for example, he claims that the KGB secretly aided Middle East terrorism and that many Soviet military personnel were killed in Middle East hostilities before 1971. Footnotes and discussions would help the reader by raising the exposition from conjecture to

analysis. In this respect, his worst footnote reads as follows: "Figures quoted are generally those given by the London-based . . . ISS, U.S. Defense Department, the Pentagon or the CIA." (p. 18) Such imprecise use of source and reference materials prevents the reader from checking and analyzing O'Ballance's figures. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the author does not appreciate that the figures of each of these organizations often reflect their positions, and a high or low figure can indicate their threat perceptions. By not identifying sources and by using data from several sources, O'Ballance confuses his discussion and makes it of little value to the military analyst.

A second major flaw is O'Ballance's polemical tone. For example, while calling the Soviets "bully boys" and making other similar statements might sound convincing to the frustrated or naïve reader, it should not be popular with the military or informed general public. Thus, I believe that O'Ballance's book is a disservice to serious analysis of Soviet political or military affairs, because it so popularizes these respected analytical endeavors that it places them on an emotional level where opinion prevails, often at the expense of truth.

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Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience by Colin S. Gray. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982, 256 pages, \$19.50.

Not so very long ago, a "strategist" was a military commander or adviser who planned the use of armed force. A handful of officers—e.g., Clausewitz, Mahan, Douhet—wrote about strategy, almost as a hobby apart from their duties. One of the oddities of the thermonuclear age is that a strategist has become exclusively a writer about strategy, and almost all of those writers have been civilians. (Indeed, the only uniformed strategist named in *Strategic Studies and Public Policy* is General Glenn Kent, USAF.)

Political scientist Colin Gray is one of today's most prolific strategic writers. Son of an RAF Bomber Command navigator, he immigrated in 1976. To those readers familiar with his polemical writings, this book is a pleasant surprise—nowhere is the supposed "window of vulnerability," nor are advocates of minimum deterrence libeled with the smear of "MAD." But unnecessarily tart attacks on Henry Kissinger, Robert S. McNamara, and W. W. Rostow do appear. And he abjures mention of his protracted campaign for multiple-protective-shelter ("shell game") basing for MX.

Most of the book is analysis and theoretical justification of strategic studies, directed toward academia—his criteria for strategic "scholarship" could exclude participation by serving officers. The military professional may find the sections giving a short history of strategic writing more interesting. The best ideas were produced under U.S. Air Force sponsorship at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, which Gray rightly labels "the Golden Age" of nuclear strategy. However, he gives the impression that most civilian strategists favor "assured destruction" theory; certainly academics do, but most Pentagon analysts and consultants share the oldest

and wisest of military ideas: stronger is safer.

Readers interested in nuclear strategic theory will find this a competent summary of the so-called "war-fighting" school, now the dominant declaratory doctrine of the United States.

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The Third World in Soviet Military Thought by Mark N. Katz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, 188 pages, \$18.50.

Soviet interest and involvement in conflicts of the Third World so evolved during the Brezhnev era as to become one of the central aspects of both Soviet foreign and military policy. Mark N. Katz, in *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, has examined this thinking in order to assess its importance for Soviet foreign policy and its significance for the West.

Katz determined that there are six different aspects concerning Soviet military thought in conflicts involving the Third World. First is the relationship of local war to a world war; second, the nature and types of war in the Third World; third, the relationship of peaceful coexistence to local wars; fourth, the Soviet view of indigenous forces in the Third World; fifth, the Soviet view of American ideas about and actions in local wars, and finally, the role of the U.S.S.R. in Third World conflicts. (p. 10)

The Brezhnev era was examined because it was then that Third World conflicts became a major topic of Soviet military thought. Soviet doctrine concerning the Third World changed progressively from a period when little action was envisioned for the Soviet Union in the Third World to a very optimistic and active involvement in such areas. This has been followed (since 1976) by a pessimistic view about Soviet capability to achieve its foreign policy goals in the Third World without a large-scale, long-term, costly commitment of Soviet military forces to Third World conflict.

During the 1970s "the Soviets became increasingly convinced that the growing military strength of the Soviet Union could prevent local war from escalating into world war." (p. 124) Since 1976, the U.S.S.R. has encountered many of the same problems and obstacles that the United States has. As a result, the thought process has changed from one of optimism to pessimism. This "illustrates how the USSR underestimated the intractability of the Third World and the difficulty in both gaining and retaining influence in it." (p. 158)

The lessons each country has drawn from these experiences in the Third World have differed in at least two respects. First, the Soviets have reached the conclusion that the most reliable Third World allies have Marxist-Leninist governments (while the United States has only supported democratic governments some of the time). Second, "Soviet pessimism about the Third World . . . has given rise to greater Soviet military involvement in these conflicts in order to protect what the Soviets see as vital Soviet interests." (pp. 158-59) (The United States since Vietnam has been unwilling to become involved militarily in Third World conflicts.)

Katz concluded with a paradox. Soviet activities in the Third World are intended to gain allies but often have the

opposite effect. Conversely, U.S. policy is intended to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, but the opposite often results. To prevent this, American foreign policy must determine its goal is in the Third World. Then some attempt at determining Soviet intentions could be found.

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Aircraft of the Soviet Union: The Encyclopaedia of Soviet Aircraft since 1917 by Bill Gunston. London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1983, 415 pages, \$68.00.

Noted aviation author Bill Gunston has compiled an exhaustive encyclopedia of Soviet aircraft. Most of the book details the development of Soviet aircraft from the Revolution to the present. In fact, the detailing is so extensive as to be bogging. However, this is as it should be in this kind of publication; and scholars, buffs, as well as military professionals will find the book useful.

In the pages of *Aircraft of the Soviet Union*, one finds not only the MiGs, Sukhois, Lavochkins, and Tupolevs with which we are familiar but also the Golubkovs, Nikitins, and Kalinins about which we know very little. While Gunston does his usual excellent work at detailing the technical matters associated with aircraft development, his analysis of the "why" and "how" of Soviet aircraft evolution does not measure up to that found in Robin Higham and Jacob Kipp's *Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View*, which remains the authoritative work in this area. Nevertheless, one can recommend *Aircraft of the Soviet Union* to scholars and military professionals.

E.H.T.

Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities by Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983, 265 pages, \$14.95.

In the fluid and dangerous world of international relations, governments are more concerned today than ever about their vulnerability to strategic surprise—an inevitable acute defeat by an unexpected attack. The phenomenon of surprise attack is not a new occurrence in the international political arena. It has only been recently, however, that attempts have been made to comprehend the significance of strategic military surprise. *Strategic Military Surprise* adds important and systematic dimensions to understanding such occurrences.

Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan have selected more than twenty cases which they label as strategic surprise drawn from the past 120 years. This volume, on the other hand, is not concerned with analyzing the limited surprise that occurs, as a matter of course, in ongoing military battles.

The Napoleonic Wars marked the turning point for innovative actions such as strategic surprise, resulting from improvements in communications, transportation, weaponry, and new military bureaucratic structures (e.g., general staffs) that enabled the management of huge armies that could inflict smashing defeats on major states. Prussia was

the first state to realize and exploit the developments in its wars with Austria and France in 1866 and 1870, respectively. The book begins at this historical point and concludes with the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Today, the possibility of a strategic surprise is fueled by the growing strength of the Soviet military and fears in the West that Moscow might be tempted to strike at U.S. nuclear forces or to attack Europe.

A systematic analysis has been made of the reasons that lead states to attempt such attacks. In particular, the kinds of capabilities required for such undertakings and the dimensions that exist to make states vulnerable to strategic surprise are examined. Perhaps the most informative and instructive part of this volume is what political considerations contribute to a state's vulnerability.

The book concludes with a chapter on the lessons for statecraft that can be derived from studying strategic surprise. It includes an assessment of the degree to which states continue to be vulnerable in spite of improvements in the collection of intelligence information and in the relative effectiveness of essentially defensive weapon systems and postures. The authors close, however, on a pessimistic note by stating that, "... the business of minimizing strategic surprise faces odds that, though not exactly insuperable, are very formidable indeed." (p. 264)

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Vietnam: A Nation in Revolution by William J. Duiker. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, 171 pages, \$18.50.

In *Vietnam: A Nation in Revolution*, William J. Duiker traces Vietnam's evolution, with attention to its government and politics, economics, culture, and society. In doing so the author has taken on a daunting task: that of writing a history of Vietnam, from early times to the modern era, in only 155 pages of text.

Although the book may be of use to the novice, the specialist will have some reservations about its analyses. For example, in turning to the Annotated Bibliography, one finds the work of Gareth Porter (described here as "one of the most respected critics of U.S. policy") and William Turley; omitted are such scholarly giants as P. J. Honey, Dennis Duncanson, and Bernard Fall—all of whom were critical of the Communist regime in Indochina.

As an aside, the author implies that Guenter Lewy's exhaustively researched *America in Vietnam* is "an apologia for the U.S. role in the war" by attributing this charge to "critics." Contrary to some current opinions, writing a scholarly work on recent Vietnam does not require that the United States be singled out for criticism. Too many scholars have been self-hobbled by their ideologies, and William Turley, an American professor (whose book is listed in Duiker's bibliography), has stated—apparently seriously—that the Vietnamese are now in Cambodia (Kampuchea) in order to help the Cambodians. He, like Harrison Salisbury before him, traveled to Hanoi to get the "facts." Such is the level of academic integrity to which much of the writing on Vietnam has

descended in this country in the last two decades.

Nothing is said of American Indochina policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt. That policy, shaped by Roosevelt's Francophobia, has in large measure shaped the present face of Indochina (whose people in recent times have suffered more hideously from their own tyrants than under foreign domination).

A continuing blind spot of virtually all American writers on an important period is reflected by the customary play-back on the British occupation of Saigon in 1945. The British commander, General Douglas Gracey, is always assumed to have been bent on destroying the Vietminh hold on Saigon and returning the French to power, when in fact neither he nor his officers had any use for the French, criticized them severely, and continually pressed the French to grant independence to Vietnam. Gracey drove the Communist-led Vietminh from power in Saigon because they were a serious bar to his written directions to maintain law and order, a condition without which he could not disarm and repatriate the Japanese. This is a small but indicative passage in the book.

Concerning America's Vietnam War, the Cambodian regime of Sihanouk is called "neutralist." The available archival material shows in fact that Sihanouk, having concluded that the North Vietnamese would win the war, sided with the Vietnamese Communists in granting sanctuary to their forces, the use of Cambodian ports for their war supplies, and instructed his army to materially assist the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Many American soldiers were killed by enemy supplies brought in with the connivance of these "neutralists."

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the author suggests that there was some hesitation in Hanoi over unifying both Vietnams; this is interesting in that since the early 1940s the Vietnamese Communists had expressed an intention to unify all of Indochina, not just Vietnam (which they had always considered a single entity), under their aegis. In fact, in 1930 Ho Chi Minh had been instructed by the Comintern to change the name of his party from the "Vietnamese Communist Party" to the "Indochinese Communist Party."

The going gets stickier when the author analyzes "the triumph in Vietnam of communist doctrine and practice over Western bourgeois democracy." One reason not mentioned was that an entire society (described accurately as a "garrison state" by the late Bernard Fall) was mobilized for one enterprise—the making of war. It was supported throughout, at enormous cost, by steadfast Communist allies and was able to destroy a competing culture which was weaker in part because, for all its faults, it tolerated differences by a greater degree than did the Communists; in the end the South was abandoned by its own major ally. Thus, to suggest that the Vietnamese Communists won "after a generation of bitter struggle by their own efforts" may be stretching a point. The war was won because the Communists and assorted sympathizers worldwide locked ranks behind the Vietnamese Communists. The author anticipates an argument over the reasons for the "growing popularity" of Marxism, which was and is an alien creed to perhaps most Vietnamese and had to be constantly disguised by the party to make it more palatable to the masses.

Although at first glance there is an appearance of an

evenhanded approach ("some charge that such and such produced great hardship, but on the other hand, others stated that . . ."), on closer inspection the knowledgeable reader will question some of the portraits presented here. Take, for example, the bloody crushing of the peasant revolt in Tonkin in 1956 (which appears in the section on the Catholics); this may lead the reader to think that religion was somehow principally involved in the uprising (no casualty figures are offered), rather than the brutalities and failures of the Communist "land reform" program. Experts have stated that as much as four percent of the population was killed by their own North Vietnamese Army.

There is unquestionably useful information of a general nature in this little book; one whose time is limited will get some benefit from reading it. However, *Vietnam: A Nation in Revolution* is a portrait with the warts selectively removed and the wrinkles smoothed. Its chief value lies in its timeliness and freshness, but serious students will want to turn elsewhere for a clearer look at the past.

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Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties by Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, 154 pages, \$15.00.

This book is a primer on the United States military and defense policy aimed at the general public. It is to be praised for covering a large number of major issues in its short span and for doing so in a readable manner.

Unfortunately, the work is marred by certain weaknesses. Among other things, the authors have opted for a zero-citation policy: no statistic, claim or allegation, no matter how controversial, is given a documentary source. Consider this assertion:

The extent to which the output of scientists and engineers in the United States has been appropriated by the Department of Defense is quite staggering. Conservative estimates indicate that defense and space programs employ 20 percent of all American scientists and engineers engaged in research and development work. Other estimates go as high as 50 percent. (p. 67)

No citation is given for these "estimates." A moment's reflection tells us the point being alleged is absurd, exaggerating the reality by a factor of about 100. After all, "scientists" include anthropologists, geologists, botanists, etc., and "engineers" include chemical engineers, electrical engineers, highway engineers, and so on.

As this silly claim indicates, the authors are not neutral about the role of the U.S. defense establishment. They take the view that the military represents a menace to American society. Their analysis of this point does them little credit.

For example, they find cost overruns on weapon systems "distressing evidence" of a military establishment outside civilian control. (p. 94) But if a cost overrun is ipso facto evidence of a lack of civilian control, then no segment of the

U.S. government is controlled by civilians, for cost overruns abound everywhere. I note, for example, that New York City's Woodhull Medical Center was just completed at a cost of \$311 million, nearly four times the \$85 million originally projected. For a cost overrun on a gigantic scale, what about the U.S. Social Security system? The huge overruns on the Rayburn House Office Building show that civilians don't even control Congress!

Another "out-of-control" episode alluded to by the authors is an (unexplained and undocumented) "private bombing campaign" conducted by an (unidentified) air force major general. (p. 94) The authors themselves state that this alleged action was unsanctioned by military superiors, and hence, at best, a problem of malfeasance, concerning *military* control of the military. The alleged episode is therefore irrelevant to the civilian control issue.

This tendency of the authors to miss critical distinctions, to make mountains out of molehills in order to push their military-as-menace-to-society prejudice, renders this primer untrustworthy as well as unsophisticated.

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Soviet Style of War by Nathan Leites. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1982. 400 pages, \$22.50.

Dr. Nathan Leites's book is one of the few published works for Western readers that deals with Soviet attitudes and performance on the battlefield in considerable detail. It contains extremely important, yet often violated, misunderstood, or simply forgotten principles and elements in the Soviet conduct of war. Dr. Leites has undertaken a task of crucial significance for anyone who needs to have a deeper and more subtle understanding of how the Soviets fought in their Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and how they may fight again in the future.

The book was written largely by using Soviet public sources, specifically memoirs of their wartime leaders, war histories, and articles in military journals and the military daily *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star). Research for the book must have been a tremendous undertaking.

This long book includes seven chapters; yet, inexplicably, no conclusions are provided. The author cites extensively (in often unduly long passages) from the writings of Soviet authors (and occasionally German, too) in portraying the Soviet doctrinal views and performance in respect to such important matters as (1) value of surprise, (2) indecisiveness and passivity, (3) offense, (4) defense, (5) failure to pursue the enemy, (6) rigid adherence to an original plan, despite repeated setbacks, (7) underestimating the enemy, and many, many others. Soviet experiences on the battlefield during the Great Patriotic War and postwar peacetime training activities are used to illustrate their views on specific matters in conducting combat.

Despite its title, *Soviet Style of War* pertains almost exclusively to the combat employment of ground troops. There are occasional, and mostly misplaced, references (for example, on pages 103 and 357) to naval activities and very little with regard to the air force or to naval aviation. The 14-page chapter VII entitled, "Inferences from the Displayed

to the Hidden; Strategic Nuclear War" is almost a non sequitur. Moreover, it does not describe adequately what its title alleges. It would have been better if the chapter had been omitted entirely and conclusions written instead.

Dr. Leites's work contains much valuable information about Soviet proclivities in combat, but it also has some serious shortcomings. Perhaps the single most disturbing flaw is that actual Soviet performances in combat and Soviet peacetime activities are described together. Writers and students of the Soviet military should be cautious in taking Soviet historical writings at face value, not only owing to their customary exaggerations but also because of the well-known Soviet tendency to rewrite historical events according to the needs of a moment. Also, it would have been better, if Soviet combat performance during the Great Patriotic War had been assessed in more detail in the book by Germans who fought them rather than by Soviet authors. Soviet description of their own training activities should not have been equated with their actual performance. There is a wide discrepancy between what the Soviet claim in their writings as accomplished and what they actually carry out, especially in regard to combat training in peacetime.

However, Dr. Leites's book, despite its shortcomings, breaks new ground and cannot but contribute to better understanding of how the Soviets conduct war. One way of getting a more realistic picture of what the Soviets think and intend to do is by reading their open sources carefully. Not everything the Soviets write is propaganda or deliberately planted *dezinformatsiya*, although some of it, undoubtedly, is. However, Soviet military writings cannot be intended merely to deceive those in the West without confusing their own rank and file. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the bulk of Soviet military writing reflects a reasonably faithful picture of what the Soviets really think. All too often the Western mind views the Soviet mind as a mirror image of its own. *Soviet Style of War* will help us perceive more realistically Soviet motives and behavior in conducting *their*, not *our*, style of war.

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Blacks and the Military by Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, with Alvin J. Schexnider and Marvin M. Smith. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982. 190 pages, \$18.95 cloth, \$7.95 paper.

Military members are aware that social forces affect mission performance, and commanders have to be cognizant of the need for success of their personnel. Social changes in the military since World War II have affected blacks more than any other segment of American society. From the beginning of desegregation in 1948, to the gains of the Robert McNamara era, to the impact of Vietnam, blacks have moved toward full integration. Statistically, by 1981, in the enlisted force, blacks represented more than 33 percent of the Army, 22 percent of the Marine Corps, more than 16 percent of the Air Force, and 12 percent of the Navy. However, some have viewed this overrepresentation—blacks make up 12 percent of the nation's population—as a "problem." This attitude has come principally from nonmilitary scholars.

Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, with Alvin J. Schexnider and Marvin M. Smith, have examined every aspect of the current discussion over the employment of blacks in the military, and the Brookings Institution has published the results of their research. The authors have set ambitious goals in collecting a wealth of material to stimulate research and encourage debate. Their effort is amply documented and accessible in the footnotes at the bottom of the page. However, they do not wish to draw any conclusions or attempt to settle the debate. They have collected the information; others must use it or continue the research. Still, the book has generated a fair amount of controversy because they have discussed the "problem" and because some people believe that their real purpose in writing *Blacks and the Military* was to advocate the return of the draft.

What are the issues affecting blacks as they serve in the U.S. military? There are several, but permeating all the rhetoric is the central question of whether there are too many in the armed forces. Some argue that this number imposes an unfair burden on one segment of American society, especially in potential combat casualties, while others believe that the large number poses certain risks to U.S. national security. Most of the arguments lean toward the latter and seriously question the government's wisdom in permitting the percentages of blacks to get to a high level. Interestingly, and a point not discussed, many Department of Defense military and civilian officials have denied that the overrepresentation is a "problem" or have simply ignored the whole issue.

Recently, the Army's personnel chief, Lieutenant General Maxwell R. Thurman, disputed contentions that the Army had too many blacks, or that they might bear an unfair burden of combat casualties, or that they might be unreliable in certain military operations; the high percentage of blacks, the general remarked, "doesn't cause me any problem at all." (*New York Times*, July 4, 1982) As a military person, I also question the validity of many of the arguments concerning blacks. But that does not mean that the whole issue should be ignored; periodically, it is refreshing and important to examine our military. But what is complicating the question of black participation is that it is part of a larger and more important topic that has not been resolved—the concept and role of military service in contemporary American society. And the Cold War environment continues to add confusion to the discussion. This does not lessen the value of *Blacks and the Military*. Military members need to be introspective and confront all issues affecting our chosen profession, and this work provides excellent food for thought.

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Fight for the Falklands! by John Laffin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 215 pages, \$5.95 paper.

The swish of the missiles has barely died away, and the political and military aftershocks still jolt the Southern Cone, but British journalist-historian John Laffin has generated a book-length account of the 1982 Falklands War.

From title to end of 201 pages of undocumented, large-type text, *Fight for the Falklands!* gushes forth the British version of the struggle.

A mutual intelligence failure set Argentina and Britain on a collision course. The Argentines misinterpreted the willingness of the British to make minor concessions and miscalculated British military strength and resolve. British Foreign Office analysts dismissed Argentine warnings as rhetoric of a military regime mired in political turmoil. Once the Argentines occupied the islands, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded with "rapid, sustained action." Britain scored a diplomatic victory by gaining the European Economic Community's backing while assuming eventual U.S. support.

Britain's electronic arsenal and the skill of specially trained units guaranteed British victory in the early conflicts. With Downing Street's nod, Tigerfish torpedoes microchipped the *General Belgrano* to its icy death. British commandos destroyed aircraft, radar, and munitions in a flawless raid on Pebble Island.

After the "nonnegotiations" collapsed, Admiral Woodward unleashed the liberation invasion supported by more than 26,000 men and a hundred ships. Skillful diversions, just the right equipment, and lack of an Argentine land resistance explains the invasion's initial success. Incredibly, the Argentine Air Force handed the British 36 hours of respite after an initial D-day challenge. But they returned with kamikaze tactics to claim one British frigate after another as the Sea Dart missile's radar proved clumsy in combat. The land battle glowed occasionally white hot, but superior British mobility, equipment, and training spelled Argentine defeat.

Laffin's book offers much raw material for debate and insight. Fighter pilots' spines will tingle with accounts of Argentine tactics against missile defenses. Laffin's conclusion that Admiral Woodward got away with violating "a long standing rule of war . . . that air superiority is essential" demands amplification. Can "detailed planning, skill, courage," and a few vertical takeoff jets substitute for air superiority? One suspects that Argentina's low stock of Exocet missiles and the brevity of the land battle may have proved more important. Laffin also heaps new fuel on a traditional fire: the debate on the wartime roles of the press and official propaganda. His long-term solution to the conflict—construction of a U.S. base to serve "American geopolitical ambitions in the South Atlantic"—should also provoke discussion.

Laffin's pro-British sympathies heavily tint his account. He stresses British humaneness but omits mention of press reports that several Argentine prisoners died while searching for unexploded mines. He says nothing about the British helicopter crew reportedly rescued in southern Chile. He approves of British "calculated leaks" of disinformation while deriding Argentina's "extravagant propaganda." He displays a certain disdain for Argentines, whose men are "victims of machismo" and whose women "accept that they are being reared for early marriage or domestic service." Argentine leaders were ignorant of British traditions and "neither imaginative nor intelligent enough" to be more effective.

Reading this work is an important first step in under-

standing the course of the Falklands War and how electronic weapons affected its outcome. It also helps explain why, in the author's words, "neither side understood the nature of the other."

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U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security edited by William T. Tow and William R. Feeney. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, 264 pages, \$20.00.

The basis for *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security* was a panel on Asian-Pacific security that convened at the International Studies Association meeting in 1981. In addition to the papers presented at that gathering, contributions were solicited from Stephen Gibert and Robert Rau in order to expand the scope of the inquiry and lend a fuller measure of analysis to the topic.

The basic premise of this book is that the United States should adopt transregional strategies for both Europe and Asia which, while not so elaborate as to constitute a global security organization of non-Communist or anti-Soviet countries, would be fully capable of producing a greater return on U.S. security investments than is now possible. The specific intent of this collection of essays is to develop a framework of analysis for future and more sophisticated models of transregional security integration between the United States and its Asian-Pacific defense partners.

William Tow contends in the first chapter that the foundation necessary to build such a transregional security linkage with our Asian-Pacific allies already exists. He points to recent Japanese interest in increasing strategic dialogues with NATO powers as well as the growth of overall military interaction between Asian and European states.

Stephen Gibert of Georgetown University argues that, while rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a welcome development, the United States must not neglect its commitment to Taiwan. By proposing that the United States engage in such a juggling act in conducting our policies toward the PRC and Taiwan, Gibert indicates a serious misreading of the extent to which the PRC holds our break with Taiwan as the main ingredient in a continuation of friendly relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Robert Rau believes that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—which consists of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia—have come to recognize the need to develop their own resilience and military strength as a result of partial Western strategic retrenchment from Southeast Asia. Further, he reasons that the United States and its Western allies could enhance regional security by lending encouragement and support to ASEAN.

Sheldon Simon concludes in his chapter that the U.S. "contribution to Southeast Asian security for the 1980s will be neither as ubiquitous as the 1960s and early 1970s nor as minimal as most skeptics contend." What is needed, according to Simon, is a new *modus vivendi* by the United States,

the PRC, Japan, and ASEAN with Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. This would permit the Asian-Pacific region to devote more of its resources to development rather than military preparations.

Henry Albinski lends some observations on why ANZUS (the alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) has been so stable and notes that exponents of a viable security framework for the Asian-Pacific region might well wish to keep it so.

In the final substantive chapter, William Feeney treats issues such as geographical, legal, and political-economic problems connected with the U.S. Asian-Pacific basing system. He accentuates the need to increase contact and cooperation among military personnel of allied and friendly regional states.

By way of conclusion, the collective analyses of the contributors are synthesized, and some tentative policy recommendations are offered. Taken as a whole, this book makes a strong argument for the adoption of the transregional option.

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Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814 by Gunther E. Rothenberg. Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1982, 191 pages, \$18.95.

Students of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods will appreciate this short but encompassing study of the force which contributed the most manpower and was most often in the field against the French—the Army of the Habsburg Empire.

After an overview of the Austrian Army, Gunther Rothenberg follows it from the First Coalition of 1792 to the entry into Paris in 1814. Battles are discussed, but the emphasis is on administration and organization, the quality of leadership, the bitter and confused relationships between military and civil leaders, and the feeble efforts at reform. As his focal point, Rothenberg concentrates on the central military figure, Archduke Charles, brother of Emperor Francis I.

Rothenberg, the foremost American historian of the Austrian military, provides a fascinating look not only at the military but also at the political and social fabric of the Habsburg Empire. The emperor's distrust of his generals, especially his brother, and the constant interference he insisted civilians play in the organization and strategy of the army shows throughout. The unwillingness to recognize or implement even the most fundamental tactical and organizational changes is obvious. Most important, no one of importance, neither the reactionaries nor the enlightened conservatives such as Charles, was willing to accept any military reform that would require social or political change. Clearly, military defeat was more palatable than changing the status quo.

The very thoroughness of the picture Rothenberg presents, however, calls into question his own title. Reading the catalog of mismanagement, ill-preparedness, backstabbing, and operational blunders, one wonders how the word "great" can be applied to this army and its leaders. Certainly,

one can admire the sheer staying power of this polyglot Austrian Army. It is also true that this army did serve the political goals of its state, "not to achieve military glory but to defend and restore the dynastic order of the eighteenth century." Yet its performance on the battlefield was generally mediocre at best. Likewise, the portrait of Charles as an individual seeking only limited reform while often insisting on the old ways and lacking the drive to impose his ideas on his subordinates does not support the conclusion that "the Archduke was a great soldier."

If the description "great" applies to any part of the Habsburg military in this period, it belongs to the regimental officers and the rank and file who "displayed fortitude and professionalism" and "fought much better than could be expected." Unfortunately, this is the one area that remains obscure, presumably due to the paucity of source material.

Great or not, the Austrian Army was a constant adversary which, by whatever means, imposed the first battlefield setback on Napoleon. By providing this look at the other side of an oft-neglected hill, Gunther Rothenberg has contributed to our understanding of the entire Napoleonic Age.

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Modern American Armor: Combat Vehicles of the United States Army by Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop. London, England, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Arms and Armour Press, 1982, 88 pages, \$15.95.

At first glance, this is a typical picture book of the coffee-table variety, full of photographs of tanks in action and obscure experimental models that never entered production. However, *Modern American Armor* is a deft combination of reference book and specialized history. As a reference, this book includes virtually all forms of armored vehicles, such unusual types as the M993 Multiple Launcher Rocket System and the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious troop carriers. Each of the major weapons is accompanied by constant 1:76 scale drawings as well as explanations that note the recognition features that distinguish different models. This volume is, in fact, a companion to the authors' earlier *Modern Soviet Armor* and as such is an excellent reference for anyone who needs to distinguish between combat vehicles on sight.

More important for the general reader, *Modern American Armor* is a good brief history of how and why these vehicles have evolved since 1944. To cite but one example, the authors correctly identify the reasons why the M4 Sherman tank was frequently outclassed by its German opponents in World War II. According to American doctrine, the Sherman was mass produced as a reliable, mobile vehicle for armored exploitation, while specialized antitank or tank destroyer units defeated enemy armor. Such explanations greatly assist any reader seeking to understand why American combat vehicles have developed in specific ways.

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The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics by Frederick A. Bergerson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, 216 pages, \$14.00.

A decade ago the third largest air force in the world (after the United States Air Force and that of the Soviet Union) belonged to the U.S. Army. Frederick A. Bergerson, associate professor of political science at Whittier College and a veteran of the 1st Air Cavalry, seeks to determine the process by which the army acquired its own air corps. His approach is to analyze the Army insurgents in the bureaucratic maze as they obtained the right to develop their own air support.

Bergerson's primary thesis is that "when controversy occurs over basic issues of role, mission, and domain, in large-scale organizations under certain conditions a movement can develop which might be called a bureaucratic insurgency." To prove his thesis, the author stresses the importance of mission and the role of noncompliance in the process by which this comes about.

He contends that mission can act as a unifying force among those who wish to alter the official policy of their superiors. He examines the many degrees of noncompliance from direct disobedience of an order to partial compliance.

From Pearl Harbor into the 1960s, the U.S. Air Force thought itself to be solely responsible for air support of the Army. In the sixties, a small group of Army officers—whom Bergerson labels "insurgents"—realized the future significance of the helicopter. They managed to overcome opposition from their Army superiors, civilian authorities, and the Air Force through various bureaucratic maneuvers and techniques (described in detail in Bergerson's model) and systematically reconstructed the Army Air Force.

Bergerson's slender study provides a working model that may be useful to the analyses of other "political phenomenon." However, *The Army Gets an Air Force* is certainly not a quick read.

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Africa's Super Power by Paul L. Moorcraft. Published by Sygma Books and Collins Vaal, 1981, Johannesburg, South Africa, Distributed in U.S. by Battery Press, Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, 192 pages.

Military propaganda can be occasionally useful reading; although not usually valuable from a technical viewpoint, it can be from an emotional one. Paul Moorcraft's *Africa's Super Power* is an unabashed paean to South Africa's military machine, which the author sees poised to repel the "total onslaught" of Soviet-led forces against Pretoria. This coffee-table display-size book is crammed with admirable photographs of South African military equipment and heroic personnel but is a bit thin on specifics regarding number, capability, and deployment of forces. That is to be expected in a country where the government strictly controls information about its military. Students of South African military capabilities will do well to stick with *The Military Balance*. The text that supplements the photos is more lively

than one expects from official sources, but the substance of the writing carefully follows government-approved themes and is very selective when presenting facts to support South Africa's interpretation of the Soviet worldwide threat. Moorcraft acknowledges the assistance of several South African governmental organizations in producing the book; I have little doubt that his work underwent careful official scrutiny before being published.

That being the case, why should anyone not enamored with military pictures read *Africa's Super Power*? First, the author strongly imparts the bitterness of South Africans at their treatment by the United States and the United Kingdom since 1945. Pretoria sees itself as having been discarded by the countries it helped in the world wars and Korea, unwillingly driven into the role of international pariah. Further, Moorcraft all too clearly shows the extreme to which the Republic of South Africa has committed itself to the notion that South Africa is about to be sucked under by a Soviet-created maelstrom; that this bastion of Christian, Western civilization is facing imminent invasion from Moscow's surrogates, perhaps even direct intervention by Soviet forces as well. Thus, the only hope for the republic is to have a military powerful enough to deal with any threat from guerrilla war to conventional invasion. This extreme interpretation of the threat facing South Africa is dangerous on at least two counts: it tends to harden the isolated position of the government, and it makes clear assessment of Soviet goals in southern Africa very difficult. With planning blinded by the fear of imminent onslaught, South Africa sacrifices the flexibility needed to deal with what is a very long-range Soviet policy goal. The Soviets do see opportunities in southern Africa, and they will be supporting forces opposed to Pretoria in order to drain South African will power and strength. It will probably be a process stretching ahead for decades, and South Africa would do well to face the threat realistically rather than push the idea of imminent invasion.

In an indirect way, then, *Africa's Super Power* serves the interests of an American reader. It provides a glimpse of an obviously capable military force and it raises our awareness of a problem that will not fade away. That problem centers on an interesting combination: our need for strategic metals, the growing Soviet cadre of "advisers" working in southern Africa, the Soviet's expanding power projection capability, and our desire and ability to influence events in distant places. It is essential that we understand the stakes involved in southern Africa and the thinking of the major players. Moorcraft's book is a colorful start for anyone interested in the political-military situation in southern Africa.

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A Policy for Peace by Field Marshal Lord Carver. London: Faber and Faber, 1982, 114 pages, \$4.95 paper, \$9.95 cloth.

This slim but meaty volume argues that no sane policy can be rationally furthered by recourse to even "limited" nuclear war and that the stocks of nuclear weapons in Europe should

be greatly reduced. Advocates of these reductions will be pleased to read such opinions from a former Chief of the British Defence Staff, and serious students of the nuclear question from all perspectives will profit from his detailed exposition of the historical and theoretical background of the issue.

After previewing his main conclusions, Lord Carver argues that the Clausewitzian notion of absolute war has been misunderstood and emphasizes the importance of subordinating military to political considerations in the conduct of war. The goal must be a victory in which all sides suffer as few casualties as possible, a consideration that is particularly urgent given the nature of modern weapons. He then summarizes the views of previous writers on nuclear war, particularly limited nuclear war, and shows how the assumptions that make such wars feasible are not valid. This discussion is placed in the historical context of evolving nuclear capabilities and doctrine.

It seems to me to be beyond serious question that we must reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons of all types, although many will take issue with Lord Carver's specific recommendations for doing so. These include reducing the stockpiles of weapons for limited nuclear war, maintaining only an invulnerable (and necessary) reserve for deterrence; making better use of manpower reserves by organizing them into NATO-linked "home guard" forces with light antiarmor weapons; reducing or even eliminating Britain's independent nuclear deterrent; emphasizing confidence-building measures with the Soviets; and accepting the present European borders and alliances as given, in view of the danger that an uprising in Eastern Europe could escalate into general war in a process of perception and misperception similar to that of 1914.

Readers interested in a crisp exposition of Lord Carver's policy recommendations can skip to the last thirty pages, but they will miss the intellectual and historical context provided earlier. My only complaint is that overlong quotations from Clausewitz, Herman Kahn, André Beaufre, and (especially) Henry Kissinger detract from the flow of the argument ably presented by the author in his own words. As an expensive primer for those who wish to learn or relearn the history and theory of the nuclear debate, it is first rate, and the author's conclusions deserve careful consideration.

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Above and Beyond: 1941-1945 by Wilbur H. Morrison. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, 314 pages, \$16.95.

Wilbur Morrison's recently published *Above and Beyond* is the latest of the author's six books about various aspects of the history of air power, following *Point of No Return* (1979) and *Fortress Without a Roof* (1982). With these two books, the new work forms a trilogy covering the air war of World War II. *Above and Beyond* is a one-volume narrative focusing on the role of naval air power in the Pacific during the Second World War.

The author, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel who served with the Twentieth Air Force during the war, provides

a fast-moving, action-packed account of the events with which he deals, based on his study of declassified navy documents, operations journals, and previously published war histories, as well as on numerous interviews with men who served in the Pacific Theater of war.

The text is more or less chronological in its organization and is clearly written to entertain rather than to educate. While how the war ended can never be in doubt for adult readers, they cannot help becoming emotionally involved in the exciting, life-or-death events Morrison describes: actions on the outcome of which the lives of the individual participants, the functional capability of entire fleets, and the destiny of the world's nations all depended.

The author keeps his conviction that air power is all-important in war on a comparatively low-key basis through most of *Above and Beyond*, vitiating its more forthright statement toward the end with the admission that "by a large margin, his [Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's] submarines sank more [Japanese] ships than the entire air effort." (p. 292)

A researcher looking for specific details of some action in the Pacific during World War II may happen to find what he needs in *Above and Beyond*, making the work momentarily valuable for him. Most readers, however, can be classified into three groups: lay, military, and scholarly. Curiously, Morrison's text proves unsatisfactory for members of all three groups.

The book deluges the reader with an endless succession of details, many of which are fully meaningful only to someone who thoroughly understands the geographic relationship to each other of the places mentioned on virtually every page. The average reader is no expert on the geography of the Pacific and will be left with a feeling of dissatisfaction.

Unless they are out merely to kill time or entertain themselves, military men will probably read *Above and Beyond* in the hope of gaining new insights into the strategy and tactics of modern combat. Their hope is going to be a forlorn one, though—lessons to be learned from World War II fighting have long since been extracted.

Because the book is simply not a scholarly one, historians and other scholars will be put off by the mass of trivial information included.

However, Morrison's *Above and Beyond* may well be a topic of conversation during the next twelve months. Thus, anyone who wants to participate knowledgeably should read it.

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Jane's Military Review edited by Ian V. Hogg. London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982. 160 pages.

Probably the most enduring feature of *Jane's Military Review*, second edition, is its treatment of the Falkland Islands invasion. Published just months after the hostilities ended (and appropriately caveated as hastily compiled) it has nonetheless zeroed in on one major lesson to be drawn from the conflict: that we should beware of drawing the wrong conclusions too quickly from the results of that fray.

Jane's commentator has addressed what the British strategy should have been rather than dwell on successes resulting from Argentine ineptness. For example, British air was supreme over the Falklands in spite of a lack of a British offensive counterair campaign. Similarly, the survival of Britain's two aircraft carriers should be a reinforcing argument neither for more and larger aircraft carriers nor against airborne early warning aircraft (which were not available).

My only criticism of Jane's treatment of the Falklands episode is that it did not go far enough with what has to be the paramount lesson learned: implied but not stated emphatically is the point that Britain had to fight the war they were least prepared to fight. Within the tight budget constraints of the 1980s, they had built a compact, economical military force designed to fit neatly into the integrated military structure of NATO. As a result, it was exactly the wrong force for a Falklands action: short on air transport, lacking airborne surveillance, and possessing no suitable long-range interdiction or antiairfield weapon systems. Although I do not wholly accept the statement attributed to a previous editor of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* that, "History . . . repeats itself to such an extent that if one knew all history one would never make a mistake in life . . ." I agree that we tend to have to relearn some of the lessons of history, often at great cost.

Of considerable interest are the chapters that constitute a useful look at several aspects of today's NATO and its forces. Articles on the Central Army Group (a NATO principal subordinate command under Allied Forces Central Europe) and the German Territorial Army (the instrument of rear area security, personnel replacements, and other key functions for the German Army) fill in some organizational details while articles on the role of infantry and the current state of the NATO alliance deal with more subjective matters. While generally nonpolitical and objective, the closing article by Nicholas Stethem is more pessimistic than optimistic and may leave the reader with a nagging feeling of disquiet.

For those readers with a more technical orientation, there are articles providing an in-depth look at the current state of the art in military hardware, accompanied by a primer on how we have achieved our current state. A feature on "optronics" (optics plus electronics) gives a good layman's history of low-light/no light viewing devices. Night is now like day on the battlefield, and we need to get over our "fight-by-day/sleep-by-night" mind-set—our potential enemies will exploit it to the maximum. Articles on explosives and ammunition, tank guns, and other equipment are also interesting, informative, and authoritative. For the history buff and just to show how far we have come in 100 years, editor Ian V. Hogg provides excerpts from an 1882 equipment list that include an approval for an india-rubber chamber pot for the use of lunatics.

For posterity, *Jane's Military Review* provides a look at the military environment of 1982 seen in the perspective and context of 1982. As such, it is a welcome addition to the military professional's library.

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The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944 by Alan F. Wilt. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981, 208 pages, \$15.00.

Of the major amphibious operations of World War II, Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944, is one of the least known. Alan Wilt's book is the first full-length account of the actions of all participants in the campaign, rather than just a German or particular Allied nation's view. It is a very well-researched and -written account of an operation that was a microcosm of the problems of coalition warfare and the Allied mastery of air, land, and sea combat which won the war.

Professor Wilt emphasizes the intense debate between British and American planners over whether the potential gains from the invasion were worth the investment of men and materiel. The British argued for concentrating Allied resources on the Italian campaign, while the Americans insisted that Dragoon was vitally important in reducing enemy pressure on the Allied foothold in Normandy. In the end, the dominant American position in the Western alliance forced the British to give way. According to Wilt, Dragoon was a great tactical success. Within a month, southern France was cleared of German troops, Allied forces in the south linked up with those in the north, and Allied supplies were moving through French Mediterranean ports. Unfortunately, large numbers of German troops escaped from southern France and rejoined their northern forces.

The strategic significance of Dragoon is harder to assess, Wilt believes, because though it cleared southern France, it weakened the Italian campaign and reduced the chance of an Allied breakout through Italy into central Europe. Thus, the Allies were unable to meet the Soviets as far to the east as some British officials wished. However, he concludes that the main importance of Dragoon was its clear indication of American preeminence in setting the Western Allied strategy during World War II.

The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944 is an excellent study of the political and military aspects of one of the major Allied operations in Europe and is a must for students of the European theater or coalition warfare. It is well illustrated with maps and photographs and contains extensive notes and bibliography.

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Yours to Reason Why: Decision in Battle by William Seymour. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, 338 pages, \$17.95.

Former career officer in the British army and amateur historian William Seymour examines the strategic and tactical decisions in ten campaigns that begin with the Norman Invasion of Britain (1066) and end with Anzio (1944). These campaigns are all essentially on land, a medium for battle in which Seymour, a professional surveyor, feels at home and describes with a keen eye for the influence of terrain and weather. Some of the campaigns (Saratoga, Waterloo, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg) will be more familiar to American readers than others (Crécy, Agincourt, Oliver Cromwell's 1650 campaign in Scotland, and the Gaza battles of 1917).

Seymour's purpose is to examine generals' choices at critical moments in campaigns and battles by reconstructing the plausible choices they faced. His alternatives are largely rational, based on the sort of situational assessment learned by all professional ground officers in the twentieth century. (The current Army formula is METT-T.) One difficulty with *Yours to Reason Why* is that Seymour combines his own judgment and the assessments of his principal generals. It is sometimes unclear whether, say, Napoleon and Lee actually assessed the situations the same way Seymour does. Seymour complicates the analysis by shifting the perspective among several commanders engaged in the same battle.

Written with some grace and solidly based on the better secondary accounts of its campaigns and battles, *Yours to Reason Why* does not, however, catch the physical and psychological stress in which field commanders operate. Intestinal problems, for example, probably clouded Napoleon's and Lee's tactical vision on two of their worst days of command (18 June 1815 and 3 July 1863). In addition, Seymour says little about the decision-making structure of his commanders, i.e., their staffs, their advisers, their procedures. The best appraisal on every score, interestingly, is Seymour's account of the Anzio campaign, in which the author fought as an officer of the Scots Guards. Seymour's performance at Anzio suggests that he might have done better with fewer campaigns and more detail, for he seems to have the potential to mix the best Keeganesque description with command and staff college rationalism.

Yours to Reason Why will appeal to war-gamers and amateur generals, especially since it contains serviceable maps and orders-of-battle. It does not, however, contain systematic unit assessments and combat effectiveness ratios. Nevertheless, Seymour has written an intelligent, engaging book that takes a careful look at the dilemmas of command in several important campaigns. His book is a modest contribution to the growing literature on operational history.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft," by Major General I. B. Holley, Jr., Air Force Reserve (Ret), as the outstanding article in the September-October 1983 issue of the *Review*.

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